Implementing social security programmes in post-conflict Iraqi Kurdistan region: the case of "Social safety net" and "Rights and privileges to families of martyrs and genocide survivors" after 2001 by Irwani, Muslih
Irwani, Muslih (2014) Implementing social security 
programmes in post-conflict Iraqi Kurdistan region: the 
case of "Social safety net" and "Rights and privileges to 
families of martyrs and genocide survivors" after 2001. 
PhD thesis, University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/14414/1/Muslih_Irwani_PhD-
Implementing_Social_Security_Programmes_in_Post-conflict_Iraqi_Kurdistan_Region.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
· Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to 
the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.
· To the extent reasonable and practicable the material made available in Nottingham 
ePrints has been checked for eligibility before being made available.
· Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-
for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge provided that the authors, title 
and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the 
original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way.
· Quotations or similar reproductions must be sufficiently acknowledged.
Please see our full end user licence at: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of 
record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please 
see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription.
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
  
Implementing Social Security Programmes in 
Post-conflict Iraqi Kurdistan Region: 
The Case of ÔSocial Safety NetÕ and ÔRights and Privileges to 
Families of Martyrs and Genocide SurvivorsÕ After 2001 
 
By 
Muslih Irwani 
(BA, MA) 
 
 
Thesis Submitted to the University of Nottingham 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
February 2014 
 
 
 II 
Abbreviation List of Names 
 
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government 
RPFMGS Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide 
Survivors 
MoMA Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs 
MoLSA Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
SPF Social Protection Fund 
FPF Family Protection Fund 
SSN  Social Safety Net 
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party 
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
KNA Kurdistan National Assembly 
IKF Iraqi Kurdistan Front 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
OFFP Oil-for-Food Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 III 
Abstract 
 
By drawing on the hegemony of politics over the administration and social policy in 
the Kurdistan Region, researching the implementation of social security programmes 
is critically important for understanding the outlook of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) towards social policy. This research broadly examines policy 
implementation theories within the context of this politically underdeveloped region, 
taking into account the social security programmes of the KRG as a case study. 
Primary questions could be asked here, such as what are the critical factors in the 
implementation of social security in the KRG? Why has the KRG not adopted and 
implemented an effective social policy with its developmental programmes since its 
relative economic growth in 2001? My focused question in the current research is: 
why has the KRG implemented its two main social cash transfers (ÔRights and 
Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide SurvivorsÕ and ÔSocial Safety NetÕ) 
differently? Exploring these cases would favour understanding of the extent to which 
the political conditions of the Kurdistan Region have influenced the implementation of 
social benefit schemes of the KRG. Experiencing its national struggle in the past, 
intra-Kurdish civil war during the 1990s and partisanship afterwards has formed the 
KRG. 
As for the theoretical framework of this research, I have used two sets of literature: 
policy implementation and clientelism. Having employed qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with forty-six individuals and six focus groups from implementers of the 
aforementioned programmes in the region, this research discusses the critical factors 
in the implementation process of social security programmes in the KRG. In contrast 
to almost all policy implementation theories and models, which lay emphasis on the 
role of top officials (top-down approach), bureaucrats and implementers (bottom-up 
 IV 
approach), I argue that the political character of the programme and its beneficiaries is 
potentially a determinant actor in the policy implementation success. The KRG deals 
with social cash transfers in accordance with the profile and socio-political status of 
beneficiaries. In this regard two types of clients could be distinguished: high value 
clients treated within a preferred programme (RPFMGS) and low-value clients treated 
within a neglected programme (SSN). The profile and status of beneficiaries of social 
security schemes play a decisive role in the salience given to the social programme, 
and in the effectiveness of its implementation. 
Both aforementioned social security programmes are implemented at a ministerial 
level. However, the performance of the two programmes appears to be complicated 
and evidently different. The main difference between both programmes is that the first 
programme, RPFMGS, serves a population who are characterised as Ôpolitical 
victimsÕ, while the second programme, SPF, covers Ôsocio-economic victimsÕ. 
Labelling beneficiaries based on their socio-political status will primarily explain the 
reason why the KRG deals with each social security programme very differently. The 
first programme is highly prioritised politically, while the second is neglected politically. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Journey of the Research 
Living in a house with my mother and several younger siblings, without my father, 
during my childhood did not make me understand the reason for my mumÕs tears and 
silent sorrows. I was always seeing my mum at midnight crying, after the younger 
children were asleep. I thought she was thinking of my father or had news about him. 
Perhaps she was upset by missing my father in the genocide campaign. Only after I 
became old enough to understand did my mum reveal that the secret of her tears was 
her deep concern as to whether her children would die of hunger altogether or one 
after another. For me, it is still a big puzzle and mystery how we survived. My family 
and all other Kurdish people, affected by war and genocide (Anfal), were left without 
any means of life or any choice of how to live. For them, there was no work, no 
income, and no support from government after the campaign. 
Almost all those genocide-attacked families had lost their breadwinners and resources 
of life. The survivors were either children or illiterate women with no skills of work 
outside their villages. Despite all these extreme difficulties, they made their lives, 
survived and their children grew up. Nearly two decades later, with the self-ruling 
Kurdish government in Iraq, those people are at least financially served and some are 
even in high political, government or party positions. However, we are still seeing 
mothers and fathers in the Kurdistan Region shedding tears. 
 2 
Previous disadvantaged people were labelled as Ôpolitical victimsÕ of the war and 
displaced families due to the atrocities of the former regime in Iraq on them. However, 
current disadvantaged people are politically and economically different from war and 
genocide-affected people. They are unable to find a ÔpoliticalÕ trait (as the first group 
advantaged to be identified with) for themselves to be served with their livelihood by 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). They are just poor and cannot afford a 
decent life for themselves in the recent, rapid economically developing Kurdistan 
Region. In contrast to the 1980sÕ political victims, the voice of the present needy 
people is heard but mostly on the television screens as advertisement materials. On 
one side, opposition parties and non-government local media try to show the scene of 
needy people and their suffering as images of dysfunction of the KRG in the area of 
public services. On the other side, those people are being put in different scenes, with 
senior officials treating them. The KRG and its senior officials show how peopleÕs 
demands are met and use this as political propaganda within their clientelistic 
practices. This thesis aims to critically analyse how two types of social security 
programmes, covering the two above-mentioned groups of people, operate. It also 
discusses the bases for this and why one programme is prioritised while another 
programme is neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region. In order to do so, 
I have employed the implementation theory and clientelism as theoretical frameworks 
for the research. 
This research methodologically focuses on the implementation process and its actors. 
However, it does not take claimants of the social security programmes as its 
participants. It is not even involved in any kind of comparison between the previous 
Iraqi regime and what the KRG has implemented as Kurdish self-ruling after 1992. I 
have clearly demonstrated in the background chapter, Chapter 3, that the former Iraqi 
regime practised the discrimination as part of its genocide operation against those 
Kurds not showing any loyalty to the BaÕathist ruling party.  
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I drew on my experience to later explain how difficult it is when a government 
identifies, differentiates and implicitly discriminates politically against the population in 
terms of taking care of their needs and providing public benefits, although the 
condition that disadvantaged people experienced under the previous regime, 
including discrimination and exclusion difficulties, is in no way comparable with the 
experience of a difficult financial life under the KRG. However, I always remember my 
motherÕs tears every time I now see television programmes focusing on the plight of 
poor people when they are asking for help or when sometimes they are visited by 
senior officials to show the generosity of government and party leaders. These scenes 
have raised many questions in my mind. I always wondered why, in spite of the 
economic and financial growth of the KRG and legal framework to serve 
disadvantaged people in an institutionalised way, the government has been so cold-
minded at all times and has not played its role in helping its people. 
As mentioned, this thesis is about two social security programmes that the KRG is 
committed to implement. The first is the ÔRights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs 
and Genocide SurvivorsÕ (RPFMGS) administered by the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal 
Affairs (MoMA). This programme provides monthly salaries and non-cash benefits to 
beneficiaries identified as family members of Kurdish liberation fighters, survivors of 
the genocide campaign and chemical attacks, and other war victims. The second 
programme is the Social Safety Net (SSN); its name has been changed from the 
Social Protection Fund (SPF) in 1992, then to the Family Protection Fund (FPF) 
between 2001 and 2009, and recently changed to the SSN. This programme consists 
of means-tested benefits administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(MoLSA). In the SPF, a wide variety of population are targeted, based on their 
financial situation including people with very low or no income, the disabled, the 
widowed, married full-time students with a very low income, orphans and the elderly 
people. 
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This thesis is devoted to exploring the implementation of the two aforementioned 
social security programmes. Both social security programmes are implemented at 
ministerial level. However, the performance of the two programmes appears to be 
different. The main difference between both programmes is that the first programme, 
RPFMGS, serves a wide range of population, namely, as I prefer to call them, 
Ôpolitical victimsÕ; while the second programme, SSN, covers Ôsocio-economic victimsÕ. 
Labelling beneficiaries based on their socio-political status primarily explains the 
reason why the KRG deals with each social security programme very differently, 
amounting to Ôdouble standardsÕ. Although both the RPFMGS and SSN are based on 
a similar legal framework in the KRG, the first programme is highly prioritised 
politically, while the second is politically neglected. Though the SSN dates back to the 
early 1990s and the RPFMGS was established later, in the mid-2000s, in their 
implementation they have taken very different directions. 
The relative economic development and the rapid increase in general budget has led 
to a development in formation and implementation of the KRGÕs social security 
programmes. However, there are still thousands of families who are living in 
desperate conditions. Although they are treated within so-called social cash transfer 
programmes, the government does not take alleviating the living conditions of poor 
people as seriously as the rights of Ôpolitical victimsÕ to social protection. I argue that 
the KRG implements its social protection programmes in a double standard, clientelist 
way. This research looks at the implementation of social security programmes in 
connection with clientelism. This clientelist-driven implementation in social policy 
seems to be controversial in terms of the way and the methods of contributions to 
equality and appropriate public welfare system. 
 
 5 
1.2. Research Aims and Questions 
The aim of this research is to find out what are the critical factors in implementing 
social security in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and why these factors are critical. It is 
concerned especially with the politico-administrative conditions of the implementation 
of social security programmes in the KRG. 
The main objective of this research is to explore the critical implementation factors of 
social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region and the rationale behind these 
factors. To this end, the following research questions have been adopted in this 
research. 
1. To what extent do political conditions affect the implementation process? 
2. Why does the KRG prioritise some social security programmes over others? What 
bases are there for a social security programme to be prioritised while another is 
neglected by the government in the Kurdistan Region?  
3. How and why are social security programmes used for political party interests in the 
Kurdistan Region? 
4. How do different groups in the policy implementation process perceive policy 
implementation? 
5. What are the implementation gaps in the field of social security and what accounts 
for these? 
6. How plausible are the key theories/models of implementation in a politically and 
economically under-developed region? What lessons can be drawn from social 
security programme implementation in developing countries in light of the research 
findings? 
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1.3. The Significance of the Research 
The significance of this research can be briefly discussed from the following 
perspectives. First, most research on the policy implementation has focused on 
developed countries (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Elmore, 
1985; Lester et al., 1995; Parsons, 1995; OÕToole, 2000; Barrett, 2004). Exploring 
policy implementation in developing countries is neglected, though some limited 
research has been undertaken in the last decade (see Chapter 2). The main 
emphasis of implementation literature in both developing and developed countries is 
placed on the relations between policy making and policy implementation, policy 
actors, implementation problems, and how and why the performance of the 
programme matches or deviates from the policy. Implementation literature has given 
little attention to exploring policy implementation within the policy context-content 
debate. In other words, in addition to emphasising the relations between policy actors, 
this research takes another step in implementation research that looks at the policy 
performance within a broader politico-administrative context. In other words, this 
research focuses on the contextual factors; that is, the political and administrative 
environment of the post-conflict Kurdistan Region. It argues that policy 
implementation in politically less developed entities cannot be understood without 
taking into account the broader politico-administrative system of the country/region. 
Drawing on evidences from the implementation of social security programmes in the 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region, this research explains the political factors, i.e. political regime, 
instability, and corruption, which drive the implementation of social protection 
programmes in the KRG. 
The literature review of the thesis discusses experiences of Iraq (excluding the 
Kurdistan Region), Iran, Venezuela, Mexico, Turkey, and Israel in relation to social 
policy provisions. Common political characters of social policy implementation in 
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developing countries will be highlighted in order to compare those experiences with 
those of the Kurdistan Region. Those countries have been selected based on their 
political condition. Iraq and Iran have experienced a long-term war and are highly 
politicised. Venezuela, Mexico and Turkey have a deep tradition of clientelism. The 
Israeli government has also practised discrimination and clientelism against non-
western Jews in terms of providing public services. These case studies have been 
employed as selective examples to support one of the main arguments of the 
research. This would help to elaborate how and why the clientelism is being practiced 
in the design and implementation of social policy programmes (see Chapters 2, 3 and 
7). 
Another distinctive contribution, which has been addressed by the research, is the 
focus placed on the status of beneficiaries as significant actors in policy formulation 
and implementation. This research did not interview social security claimants, but 
implementers (especially in the case of employees of the MoMA) who are in the main 
time beneficiaries of the programme itself. This study is one of the first of its kind to 
investigate the role and status of beneficiaries in policy formulation and 
implementation in developing countries. In policy implementation research, the role of 
service users is researched mostly as recipients of a policy programme, yet such 
research has not charted their status as significant actors in the process of policy 
formulation and implementation. Policy research largely considers actual actors rather 
than potential actors. In this sense, policy implementation research includes a wide 
range of individuals such as executive directors, programme managers, supervisors 
and other staff members. The potential status of service users in the implementation 
process is often ignored because the focus tends to be on implementers rather than 
beneficiaries. 
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This research has drawn on Ôprioritising a social programme over anotherÕ (from one 
of the research questions). I have interviewed some Ôprogramme implementers as 
actual beneficiariesÕ; especially employees of the RPFMGS programme, who are 
mostly from families of martyrs and genocide survivors. As for the second programme 
(SSN), the status of beneficiaries has been analysed from the perspective of officials 
and implementers. This research explores why one social security programme has 
been prioritised by the KRG over others. For that, the research examined corruption, 
non-transparency and sufficiency in the social benefits.  
Apart from the endeavours made in this research to explain the top-down/bottom-up 
debate in light of research findings, this research seeks to fill a gap in implementation 
theory by exploring the significant impact of the broader politico-administrative context 
on policy implementation by examining the political and policy preferences and the 
public welfare system of the region. In other words, despite the internal organisational 
procedures, the politico-administrative structure can place a determinant ÔexternalÕ 
influence upon the content of social security programmes. 
This thesis focuses on social security in the post-conflict Kurdistan Region. It 
concerns the misuse of social security programmes on the KRG for political party 
interests. Within the political context of the Kurdistan Region, the research has 
identified a clientelistic use of social security programmes in the KRG. It explores how 
social security programmes of the KRG are used as a cash transfer to consolidate 
party loyalties. Using social funds to buy votes is extensively researched in developed 
countries (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Robinson & Verdier, 2003; Brusco, Nazareno & 
Stokes, 2004; Calvo & Murillo 2004; Penfold-Becerra, 2007). This thesis researched 
the social security programmes as they have been utilised by government and the 
ruling party as a financial reward to people for their political/electoral backing. 
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1.4. Thesis Structure 
In Chapter 2, I review the key literature and theories employed by the research. This 
thesis examines two sets of literature. The first is policy implementation. The 
mainstream theories and models of implementation in developed countries will be 
discussed. Thus, I will discuss the top-down, bottom-up and synthesis models of 
policy implementation. 
I also address some existing literature on policy implementation in developing 
countries, especially those that have highlighted the impact of political and 
administrative processes on policy implementation. Although, most of the policy 
implementation theories and models have been conceptualised and tested in the 
context of the developed world, attempts have been made to test and articulate 
these implementation theories in the developing world. Chapter 2 also refers to key 
policy-relevant concepts such as policy salience, policy content and policy context. 
The second theoretical framework of this research is clientelism and clientelistic 
practice in social policy/programmes. I will use all theories and literatures for two 
purposes. On one side, it will be used as a theoretical-conceptual framework for my 
research; and on the other side, theories will be applied to seek understanding of 
the implementation of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. 
Chapter 3 is a contextual analysis of the politics, socio-economy and administration 
of the Kurdistan Region. The main focus, first, is placed on the development of the 
political condition that emerged in the Kurdistan Region as a special administration 
case amongst post-conflict developing country/regions. It starts by drawing upon the 
background and current political and socio-economic conditions, and then it 
provides a general overview of the current social security programmes of the KRG. 
These backgrounds need to be presented and analysed in order to capture the 
context which influences the social policy and its implementation. As I argue in this 
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thesis, the social policy process in a less developing country/region cannot be 
clearly understood without taking into account how the politico-administrative 
system operates. 
As a result, Chapter 3 presents a brief history about the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, 
highlighting some events such as the displacement, marginalisation, deportation, 
genocide and civil war. I have discussed key events in the history of Iraqi Kurdistan 
that explain the conflict and uncertainty, plus their socio-economic consequences on 
the region. There then follows an argument that, due to a repressive policy that the 
state has followed against Kurds in Iraq, the Kurds have become politically 
repressed and socio-economically vulnerable. 
A section in Chapter 3 is devoted to analysing the establishment of the Kurdistan 
National Assembly (KNA) and the KRG and the way they both operate. It starts from 
the period when the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) took over the local administrations 
from the three Kurdish governorates of northern Iraq. For the first time in the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region, free elections were held which followed the establishment of the 
KNA and KRG in May 1992. These events are always referred to as an optimistic 
period in the history of the Kurdistan Region. However, it did not take long for signs 
of pessimism to emerge. The intra-Kurdish civil war, ÔfratricideÕ, started between the 
two major political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP). 
In the background chapter I will argue that the forms of Kurdish political struggle and 
partisanship in Iraq have continued to maintain the Soviet-style regime of political 
parties with their ultimate domination over parliament and government. What 
attributes this type of party-controlled government is the clientelism that followed 
while delivering social funds. The ÔfratricideÕ between 1994 and 1998 consolidated 
even more the party interference in the institutions of the KRG. The third chapter 
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also highlights political and socio-economic opportunities that the KRG embraced 
after the invasion in 2003. It is also explained how the oil-based economy of the 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region has been double-edged. On the one hand, it has fuelled 
rapid socio-economic growth and prosperity; and on the other hand, due to lack of 
effective checks and balances, the Kurdistan Region fell into a state of 
institutionalised nepotism and corruption. This discussion presents a politico-
administrative context for social welfare provision in the region. In the last section of 
Chapter 3 I will present an overview of the development of social security policy and 
programmes of the KRG. 
In Chapter 4, an overview of the methodological approaches will be provided. It also 
outlines specific procedures that have been followed to conduct this research. 
Chapter 4 has been divided into six sections. After discussing the development of 
research aims and questions, it discusses how a pilot study led to a revised 
research approach of the research. The chapter also discusses why this research 
has adopted a qualitative methodology with a comparative case study approach. 
Furthermore, it justifies how and why a certain type of case study (multiple-case 
study) design was selected for this research. The two main methods of data 
collection in this research were semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The 
findings gathered from interviews were also supplemented with documentary data. 
As for data analysis, a thematic analysis of research findings was undertaken; this 
analysis appears in subsequent data analysis chapters. Chapter 4 also discusses 
the issue of accessibility of the case and data, sampling, and key characteristics of 
the research participants. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present an analysis of research findings gathered from interviews 
with implementers of both social security programmes, the ÔRights and Privileges to 
Families of Martyrs and Genocide SurvivorsÕ (RPFMGS) and the Social Protection 
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Fund (SPF), which later changed to the Social Safety Net (SSN). These two 
chapters also include an analysis of official documents and media reports about the 
implementation of the social security programmes. Chapter 5 is devoted to the 
RPFMGS programme and the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs (MoMA). After 
outlining the legal and organisational framework of the programme, the chapter 
analyses four key themes. The first theme is the preference of the programme and 
its beneficiaries by ruling parties and senior government officials, and its impact 
upon the implementation process. This theme has been pursued to demonstrate 
how the implementation process of social security in a post-war country has been 
influenced by political characteristics and interests that the social security 
programme and its beneficiaries have conveyed. As shown in this thesis, the 
implementation success of social security programmes widely depends on the 
political importance of the programme and its beneficiaries to those in power. In this 
context, relevant sub-themes are discussed about the extent to which the political 
conditions have impacted on the eligibility criteria and entitlement procedures. It is 
also shown that the government and its ruling parties prioritised the MoMA. Both 
political parties, KDP and PUK, have the most beneficiaries from this scheme. 
Another key theme is how beneficiariesÕ involvement as employees and staff within 
the MoMA has impacted on the implementation of the RPFMGS programme. The 
third theme discussed in Chapter 5 is how the beneficiaries are likely to become 
policy makers. This point has been examined in light of the bottom-up model of 
implementation. The last theme is the prospect of the clientelistic use of the 
RPFMGS programme as a social cash transfer for maintaining and consolidating 
party loyalty among beneficiaries. 
Chapter 6 looks at the implementation process of the Social Protection Fund (SPF) 
programme which later on changed to the Social Safety Net (SSN). As is discussed, 
this programme has been subject to changes in form, objective and name. These 
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changes have consequently created uncertainty and confusion among the 
implementers of the programme. I argue that the ambiguity of the programmeÕs 
objectives and the instability in its practice have impacted on its implementation. 
This chapter examines key aspects such as the objectives of the programme 
perceived by implementers and the policy deviation made from a top-down tendency. 
More importantly, some themes such as clarity in defining the social security 
programmes, a lack of transparency in social cash transfers (specially in the Special 
Salary sub-scheme), a lack of priority of beneficiaries by government, and a lack of 
social welfare vision in the programme will be explored.  
Chapter 7 analyses the research findings and key themes in a comparative 
perspective. Having presented the research findings in Chapters 5 and 6, some of the 
themes that are central to this thesis are discussed. This chapter aims to compare 
and contrast the two social security programmes in terms of their implementation 
problems, and to examine the plausibility of two sets of theories: the implementation 
theory and clientelist politics. In Chapter 7, the discussion focuses on some of the 
critical questions surrounding the implementation of social security programmes in the 
KRG. Three issues in particular have been highlighted: political factors, the status of 
social security beneficiaries, and the lack of social welfare vision in the KRG. It also 
discusses the ambiguity and contradictions evident in the formulation and 
implementation of the KRGÕs social security programmes. In Chapter 7, a section is 
also devoted to the issue of political interference in the implementation of these social 
security programmes from senior government officials and party leaders. In this 
regard, two attitudes have been distinguished. On the one hand, interference from the 
top could support the implementation success. On the other hand, party leaders and 
government officials intervene in the programme to pursue their political interests by 
shifting the programme from social cash transfers to a patronage system.  
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Comparing the beneficiaries of both programmes, two different groups of beneficiaries 
with different profiles and statuses have been distinguished. Based on the two types 
of interference and beneficiaries that have been identified, I have introduced and will 
try to substantiate my contribution to the policy implementation theory. I examine the 
implementation of social security programmes of the KRG based on the degree of 
salience the government attaches to the programme of cash transfers based on the 
political influences of beneficiaries. Having distinguished two types of beneficiaries, 
high-value and low-value, a contradiction in perception and implementation of social 
security programmes in the KRG has been highlighted. The research findings reveal 
that the government deals with the programmes based on the political value of 
beneficiaries. Bringing evidence from my research findings, two types of treatment by 
the KRG towards implementation of social security programmes have been 
compared. The first one is characterised as political/nationalistic and thus important, 
and the second as public and consequently neglected. This discussion will be justified 
through understanding the degree of importance attached to the beneficiaries of the 
MoMA and SPF programmes. From this point, a clientelistic benefit from these social 
cash transfers is explored. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the research findings and by applying 
and providing a critique of policy implementation theories with reference to the 
relevant literature. It also addresses the contribution of the thesis to implementation 
research in politically less developed countries, with the focus on the post-war 
Kurdistan Region. Finally, perspectives for future research on the implementation 
problem of social security programmes in developing country/regions will be 
presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND CLIENTELISM 
 
 
Introduction 
The thesisÕs main aim is to explore the critical factors in implementing social security 
in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the ideas behind these factors. This research also 
explores clinetelistic practice in social security programmes of the KRG. Thus, this 
chapter addresses two different sets of theories which will be employed by the thesis: 
implementation theory and clientelism. 
This chapter has been divided into four sections and the first addresses the terms 
ÔimplementationÕ and ÔimplementerÕ within the policy literature. Section two explores 
some of the key literature and theories on policy implementation. The third section of 
the chapter reviews policy implementation literature in developing countries. It also 
explores implementation of social security programmes in terms of their consistency 
with, or deviation from, policy regulations. The last section then discusses the relevant 
research literature on clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy. 
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2.1. Implementation: The Emergence of Concept and Research 
Implementation has been defined as actions directed at the accomplishment of goals 
set within a policy decision (Van Meter & Van Horne, 1975: 447). In the same vein, 
Pressman and Wildavsky, adopting Webster and RogetÕs definition of the word, used 
this concept to describe a stage following the policy formulation (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1984: xxi). Hall and Irving have also presented a traditional, yet important 
definition of implementation by arguing that it is about what happens between policy 
expectations (goals) and programme results (outcomes) (Hall & Irving, 2009: 76). 
Therefore, implementation constitutes the ability to achieve the predicted 
consequences after the initial conditions have been met. It involves both 
organisational systems and processes, and actions of implementers. Implementation 
research should include policy goals, structures (organisation or programme), 
regulations (law, guidance, and instructions), policy actors (implementers) and their 
practice. 
As for the implementers, they refer to officials who have the responsibility to 
implement programmes in a specific area of public policy. This group of individuals is 
frequently in touch with top officials on the one hand and, on the other hand, 
Òbeneficiaries of public policy programmesÓ (Grindle, 1980: 97). Implementers are 
therefore considered as multifarious individuals who work at different levels of policy 
implementation. It is also argued that implementers are more diverse than those who 
scholars such as Grindle have grouped under this name. Operationally, throughout 
my research, implementers are ranked in several government positions, such as 
frontline staff, programme managers, executive directors and also ministers at the top 
of implementation agencies. Therefore, they are classified according to their ÔpositionÕ 
in the policy delivery process and ÔinteractionÕ with higher or lower agents, or clients. 
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Usually, senior officials are taken into account either as policy makers at the central 
government and ministerial level, or selected party leaders who stay beyond the 
government and influence policy decisions. They directly and indirectly, as in the 
cases of some developing countries, run the administrative and governmental 
organisations (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983). In the case of the KRG, ministers are 
located, on the one side, in the policy-making level; on the other side, they play their 
role in the highest position of policy implementation. 
Implementation studies are found at the intersection of social policy, public 
administration, organisational theory and political science research (Schofield & 
Sausman, 2004). This field was previously covered under the heading of public 
administration. Public administration studied the policy implementation process with a 
more descriptive approach. 
Having looked at the policy implementation literature, it appears that almost all 
theories, models and approaches have been drawn from the context of the developed 
world. Regardless of their political contexts, they have been conceptualised, 
theorised, and tested in most democratic countries. Although researches have been 
conducted in the developing world (Grindle, 1980; Hadden, 1980; McClintock, 1980; 
Quick, 1980; Rothenberg, 1980; Sussman, 1980; Temple & Temple, 1980; Scott, 
1987; Bello-Imam, 1999; Hanekom & Sharkansky, 1999[1994]; Jain, 1999; Lane, 
1999; Mahler & Craig, 1999; Wollmann, 1999; Yuksel, 1999; Makinde 2005), the 
same developed-based models of implementation have been tested and articulated. 
More importantly, only a few of them emphasise the impact of political and 
administrative processes on policy implementation (Jain, 1999; Lane, 1999). Hence, 
their explanatory power might be limited and insufficient to apply to different political 
environments, particularly those in developing countries. In essence, as many 
researches highlighted (Hill & Hupe, 2009), policy implementation cannot be studied 
 18 
in a context-free manner. Hill and Hupe discussed the notion of implementation as 
governance and stressed the importance of political context. The political and 
administrative conditions within which they are set must also be taken into account.  
Policy-making research has itself for long been at the centre of public policy studies; 
however, implementation research emerged in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century. In comparison to policy making, studying policy implementation was almost 
neglected until 35 years ago. There have been significant publications since the 
classical work of Pressman and Wildavsky, Implementation (1984), which is mostly 
seen outside the field of social policy, suggesting that implementation research has 
become multidisciplinary and dispersed. Policy implementation prior to the 1970s was 
not considered as an important case for study. In the last century, following Pressman 
and WildavskyÕs classical investigation, few disciplinary researches were found in 
policy implementation (OÕToole, 2000: 263-4). 
Numerous authors have presented and assessed implementation literature (deLeon, 
1999; OÕToole, 2000, 2004; Schofield, 2001; Hill and Hupe, 2009). Schofield (2001) 
pointed out that understanding by whom, how and why policy is put into effect could 
be conceptualised under the heading of implementation theory (Schofield, 2001: 249). 
Policy implementation as a term was used for the very first time by Pressman and 
Wildavsky in 1973 during their study on job creation schemes in Oakland, California, 
considered as the first attempt to examine policy implementation explicitly (Pressman 
& Wildavsky, 1984). This study emerged as a reaction to growing concerns over the 
effectiveness of large-scale reform programmes. Until the end of the 1960s, it had 
been taken for granted that political mandates were clear and administrators were 
implementing policies according to the intentions of decision makers (Hill & Hupe, 
2009: 42). The process of Òtranslating policy into actionÓ (Barrett, 2004: 251) attracted 
more attention, as policies seemed to fall below expectations. 
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Implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal (policy), against which it will be 
judged. Therefore, studying the process of implementation includes the setting of 
goals towards which implementation is directed (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxiv-
xxv). According to the processed view, a perspective which looks at implementation 
as a process, implementation is considered as policy becoming action through 
programmes (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxv; Schofield, 2004: 284). However, 
this process will not be well defined without placing and taking it within an 
administrative and legal context. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) argue that what is 
needed before implementation is regulation and finance. In order to secure the 
predicted outcomes, the regulations need to be passed and finances committed 
before any step is taken towards implementing the policies. 
Implementation Òis the ability to forge subsequent links in the causal chain so as to 
obtain the desired resultsÓ (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984: xxii-xxiii). The linkage 
between policy and implementation has also been well analysed by Hogwood. He 
argued that the implementation stage can also contribute to the making of policy 
(Hogwood, 1987: 161). This can be explained within the mechanism of feedback. As 
we look at the implementation phase, it will be expected to explain why policies are as 
they are and why they have the effects that they do. This is a question towards the 
ÔeffectivenessÕ of a policy. 
In the history of implementation research, three generations have been distinguished. 
The first generation of implementation studies, which had dominance during the 
1970s, was characterised by a pessimistic attitude. This pessimism was fed by a 
number of case studies that represented clear examples of implementation failure. 
The studies of Derthick (1972), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and Bardach (1977) 
are amongst the most influential. Pressman and WildavskyÕs work, Implementation 
(1973), had an important impact on the development of implementation research, as it 
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helped to inspire a great list of literature. Hill and Hupe (2009: 18-27) point out that, 
prior to the 1970s, implementation research was conducted under different headings. 
Nevertheless, the most noteworthy achievement of the first generation of 
implementation researchers was to raise perception of the issue in the wider scholarly 
community and in the view of the general public. 
While theorisation was not a central duty of the first generation of implementation 
studies, the second generation began to put forward a whole range of theoretical 
frameworks and hypotheses. This period was marked by debates between what was 
later named the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation studies. The 
top-down approach was represented by scholars as, for example, Van Meter and Van 
Horn (1975), Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) and Mazmanian (in his shared work 
with Sabatier, 1983), who conceived of implementation as the hierarchical execution 
of central policy intentions. Scholars belonging to the bottom-up faction, such as 
Lipsky (1980) and Elmore (1980), instead emphasised that implementation consisted 
of the everyday problem-solving strategies of Òstreet-level bureaucratsÓ (Lipsky, 1980). 
The third generation of implementation research tried to bridge the gap between top-
down and bottom-up approaches by incorporating the insights of both groups into 
their theoretical models. At the same time, the self-proclaimed goal of third generation 
research was Òto be more scientific than the previous two in its approach to the study 
of implementationÓ (Goggin et al., 1990: 18). Third generation researchers thus put 
much emphasis on specifying clear hypotheses, finding proper operationalisations 
and producing adequate empirical observations to test these hypotheses. However, 
as observers such as deLeon (1999: 318) and OÕToole (2000: 268) noted, by the end 
of the last century, only a few studies had followed this approach. 
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2.2. A Review of Policy Implementation Theories 
Implementation is considered as one of the most important elements of policy 
process. It begins once policy is made to target a social problem or issue, starting 
somewhere in the later stage of the policy process. The start point in the policy 
process is a problem which compels politicians and high officials to come up with their 
agendas to deal with it (see Figure 1). Thus, officials formulate policy (policy-making 
stage) to overcome social and public issues. In that sense, implementation can be 
considered as part of the post-policy-making stages. In this section, after presenting 
an overview of contributions made to policy implementation research, I will discuss 
the key theoretical approaches of policy implementation. 
 
Figure 1 Social Policy Process 
 
The three generations of implementation research have led to three distinct 
theoretical approaches to the study of implementation. These three implementation 
models can be characterised as theories that identify how policy is translated into 
action by various actors in the policy process. Implementation models have been 
diverged according to whether assessments are developed from the perspective of 
the initial policy makers (centre), field-level implementing officials (periphery), or 
private individuals to whom the policy is directed (target group) (Mazmanian & 
Sabatier, 1981: 12). It might be taken for granted if I argue that policy process mostly 
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starts from a policy problem and seeking to resolve it. This will explain how various 
policy actors are involved in a policy and how they influence the implementation and 
the policy outcome through the process of interaction. 
 
2.2.1. Top‐Down Model 
This is when emphasis is placed on policy formulation and the ability of decision 
makers to produce explicit policy objectives. This model started from the assumption 
that policy implementation starts with a decision made by central government. 
Parsons argues that these studies were based on a Òblack box modelÓ of policy 
process inspired by systems analysis (1995: 463). Top-downers assumed a direct 
causal link between policies and observed outcomes and tended to disregard the 
impact of implementers on policy delivery. They essentially followed a prescriptive 
approach that interpreted policy as input and implementation as output factors. Due to 
their emphasis on decisions of central policy makers, deLeon (2001: 2) describes top-
down approaches as a Ògoverning elite phenomenonÓ. The following authors are 
considered classical top-down scholars: Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Van Meter 
and Van Horn (1975), as well as Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979; 1980; 1981).  
Pressman and WildavskyÕs original work followed a rational model approach. They 
started from the assumption that policy objectives are set out by central policy 
makers. In this view, implementation research was left with the task of analysing 
challenges on the way of achieving these objectives. Hence, they saw implementation 
as an Òinteraction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve themÓ 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973: xv). Implementation therefore implied the 
establishment of adequate bureaucratic procedures to ensure that policies are 
accurately executed. Furthermore, implementing agencies should have sufficient 
resources at their disposal, and their needs to be a system of clear responsibilities 
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and hierarchical control to supervise the actions of implementers. Pressman and 
WildavskyÕs Implementation highlighted the importance of the number of agencies 
involved in policy delivery. They argued that effective implementation becomes 
increasingly difficult if a programme has to pass through a huge number of Òclearance 
pointsÓ. As different agencies and actors were involved in implementation settings, 
especially in the US, the main idea of their analysis was rather doubtful as to whether 
implementation could work at all (Plzl & Treib, 2007: 91). 
The American scholars, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), offered a more elaborate 
theoretical model. They were concerned with the study of whether implementation 
outcomes corresponded to the objectives set out in initial policy decisions. Their 
model included six variables that shape the relationship between policy and 
performance. These six variables are as follows (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975: 464-
72). Firstly, policy standards and objectives provide concrete and more specific 
standards for assessing and evaluating the policy performance. The second is the 
resources and incentives made available, while the third variable is the quality of inter-
organisational relationships, which organise the linkage between national and local 
implementation agencies, and also formal and informal relationships within the policy-
making body. The fourth variable is the characteristics of the implementation 
agencies, such as organisational control and inter-organisational issues being an 
avoidable variable to address while studying policy implementation. In the fifth, they 
argue that the economic, social and political environment is of great importance to 
consider in the relationship between policy and performance. Finally, the disposition 
or response of the implementers should also be considered in the implementation 
research. This point also involves three elements: implementersÕ recognition (their 
knowledge and understanding) towards the policy; the direction of their response to 
the policy (acceptance, neutrality, rejection); and the strength of those responses. 
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While many of these factors had to do with organisational capacities and hierarchical 
control, the authors also highlighted two variables that slightly departed from the top-
down perspective. They suggested that the extent of policy change had a crucial 
impact on the likelihood of effective implementation and also that the degree of 
consensus on goals was important. Hence, significant policy change was only 
possible if consensus among actors was high. Unlike other representatives of the top-
down perspective, the model of Van Meter and Van Horn was less concerned with 
advising policy makers on successful implementation than with providing a sound 
basis for scholarly analysis.  
Sabatier and Mazmanian are also among the core authors of the top-down approach. 
Like Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Sabatier and Mazmanian started their analysis 
with a policy decision that was made by governmental agencies. Therefore, they 
proposed a clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation. Their 
model also lists six criteria for effective implementation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979: 
489-92, 503-4): (1) policy objectives need to be clear and consistent; (2) the 
programme should be based on a valid causal theory; (3) the implementation process 
should be structured adequately; (4) implementing officials should be committed to 
programme goals; (5) interest groups and (executive and legislative) sovereigns are 
supportive; and (6) there should be a condition with no detrimental changes in the 
socio-economic framework. Although Sabatier and Mazmanian acknowledged that 
perfect hierarchical control over the implementation process was hard to achieve in 
practice and that unfavourable conditions could cause implementation failure, they 
argued that policy makers could ensure effective implementation through adequate 
programme design and a clever structuration of the implementation process. 
Although each classical top-down scholar has their own approach to deal with policy 
implementation, they all define implementation in terms of the relationship with policy 
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as laid down in official documents. From this perspective, my research on the 
implementation of social security programmes analyses programme activities. It also 
examines the extent to which leaders of dominant political parties and government 
officials control and influence the direction of policy performance. It also explores the 
implementation of social security programmes in terms of its consistency with or 
deviation from policy regulations. Additionally, I argue that regulations and specific 
standards are not the only elements to direct policy performance. A number of 
elements are also involved in this process, for instance, implementersÕ discretion, 
politiciansÕ intentions and dominant party agentsÕ interests. The role of non-statutory 
factors is inevitable in the policy implementation process. 
 
2.2.2. Bottom‐Up Model 
In the bottom-up model the focus is on the role that middle actors play in policy 
implementation. It looks at local bureaucrats as main actors in policy delivery and 
conceives of implementation as negotiation processes within networks of 
implementers. Bottom-up theories emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a 
critical response to the top-down approach. 
Several studies showed that political outcomes did not always sufficiently relate to 
original policy objectives and that the assumed causal link was thus questionable. 
Studies belonging to this part of research typically started from the ÔbottomÕ by 
identifying the networks of actors involved in policy formulation and delivery. Bottom-
up researches rejected the idea that policies are defined at the central level and that 
implementers need to obligate themselves to these objectives as neatly as possible. 
Instead, the availability of discretion at the stage of policy delivery appeared as a 
beneficial factor as local bureaucrats were seen to be much closer to the real 
problems than central policy makers. Proponents of this model include Lipsky (1971, 
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1980), Elmore (1980), Hjern (1982), Hjern and Porter (1981), and Hjern and Hull 
(1982). 
Lipsky (1971; 1980) analysed the behaviour of public service workers (e.g. teachers, 
social workers, police officers and doctors). In his influential article, ÔStreet Level 
Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban ReformÕ, which was first published in 1971, 
Lipsky argued that policy analysts need to consider the direct interactions between 
social workers and citizens. Street-level bureaucrats are also considered to have 
substantial autonomy from their employing organisations. The main source of their 
autonomous power derives from the considerable amount of discretion that they are 
given. 
He also addressed policy relationships between top officials and implementers on the 
one hand, and on the other between implementers and beneficiaries. However, what 
is missing from his analysis on policy networks is the real or potential relationship 
between beneficiaries and top officials. 
According to Hill and Hupe (2009: 52-3), LipskyÕs work has been misinterpreted as he 
did not only highlight the difficulties in controlling street-level bureaucratsÕ behaviour. 
More importantly, Lipsky showed that street-level policy making created practices that 
enabled public workers to deal with problems encountered in their everyday work. The 
importance of LipskyÕs work lies in the fact that his approach was used as justification 
for methodological strategies that focus on street-level actors. His work also showed 
that top-down approaches failed to take into account the fact that hierarchical chain of 
command and well-defined policy objectives are not enough to guarantee successful 
implementation. 
It could be argued that bureaucratsÕ autonomy is more arguable and deeply restricted 
by political regime. In countries with poor experience of democracy, mid-level 
bureaucratsÕ powers and their discretion are threatened by over-centralised power in 
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the top-level. Top-downers give a special concern to explore implementation success 
or failure. This usually has been done using a quantitative method. In this perspective 
the policy outcome was evaluated to show the extent to which its impacts are 
consistent with prior policy decisions. 
Reversing top-downersÕ outlook, the bottom-up model considers local bureaucrats as 
the main actors in policy delivery and conceives of implementation as negotiation 
processes within networks of implementers. This model ignores the role of individuals 
outside the implementing agencies who might have a profound impact on the 
implementation process. 
LipskyÕs contribution to implementation research comes from his analysis of the 
behaviour of public service workers, or Òstreet-level bureaucratsÓ as he calls them. He 
argues that Òthe decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routine they establish, and 
the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively 
become the public policies they carry outÓ (1980: xii). 
I agree with Lipsky that public policy is not best understood as made by legislatures or 
from top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators. The influence of the latter could 
be seen in idea initiatives, policy advice and, more importantly, policy delivery. 
However, as discussed later, it could be argued that top officials have ultimate and 
undeniable impact on policy performance in developing countries. 
Street-level bureaucrats often seem to have a great deal of discretion and autonomy 
(Lipsky, 1980: 76). For Lipsky, the implementation of policy is basically about street-
level bureaucrats with high service ideals exercising discretion under intolerable 
pressures. He also emphasised that street-level workers face uncertainty about the 
personal resources necessary for their jobs. They find that work situations and 
outcomes are unpredictable, and they face great pressures due to the insufficient time 
in relation to unlimited needs. On the whole, control from the top to fight failures of 
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street-level workers involves the intensification of these pressures (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 
52). 
LipskyÕs street-level approach includes several points which I intend to examine within 
my research framework. Policy implementers, as non-elective officials, work in, and 
maintain jobs that enable them to accumulate experiences and skills, whereas top-
level officials are devoid of such experiences and skills. All they have is ÔpowerÕ to 
compel implementers and lower-level workers to perform on their respected direction. 
Describing street-level bureaucrats as civil servants who have substantial knowledge 
in the execution of their work is appropriate where they have authority to do what they 
want without constraints or annoyance. The political system, at least in the context of 
developing countries, is a determinant factor in this case. What Lipsky conveys is true 
in more democratic and less centralised administration. The political system, what I 
call in this research Ôpolitical context of policy implementationÕ, indicates whether 
street-level workers have a major impact on the actual direction and outcome of social 
policy or not, whether they can make the policy choices or just do what they are 
commanded. Political context may facilitate or constrain policy implementation in the 
way implementers intend to practise. 
What is implicitly understood from LipskyÕs theory is that he views policy 
implementation process as real policy making, and implementers as actual policy 
makers, a view which seems to contain only a relative truth due to its contextually 
constrained applicability. His perspective has been critically assessed in developed 
contexts. Furthermore, in a politically less-developed context, within which social 
policies have been highly politicised, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to implement 
without endorsement of power. Street-level bureaucrats are important to the extent 
that they can attract top officialsÕ approval and support for a policy to be implemented. 
In this way, they play a mediation role between top officials and policy clienteles. This 
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is in terms of making political leaders well-informed of social problems and peopleÕs 
needs on the one side, and managing and delivering policies on the other side. 
From another perspective, the main concern of Elmore (1980) was how to study 
implementation. Instead of assuming that policy makers effectively control 
implementation, his concept of Òbackward mappingÓ suggested that analysis should 
start with a specific policy problem followed by an examination of the actions of local 
agencies to solve this problem. ElmoreÕs valuable contribution is also treated in the 
light of mixed theory of implementation. 
Given the main points of LipskyÕs approach, we can understand the context in which 
frontline workers participate in policy making and actively implement policy ideas. 
The implementerÕs approach can help to show how government employees make 
sense of their work, take action, and interact with managers in their organisation, 
their clients and their superiors. By exploring these procedures, this approach will 
help to scrutinise whether they are active or passive, autonomous or compelled. 
Exploring the policy implementation process is mostly about the role of implementers 
as significant actors (e.g. implementation officials, managers, professionals and 
frontline workers). Equally it concerns the organisational and political contexts of 
implementation. In other words, the concept of policy implementation refers to both 
the performances and the politico-administrative and institutional context. Therefore, 
in my research on the implementation of social security policy, both spheres are taken 
into account. 
In order to overcome the divide between the other two approaches, some elements of 
top-down, bottom-up and other theoretical models were incorporated. Researchers 
such as Elmore (1985) and Sabatier (1986) tried to propose a hybrid model by 
combining elements of both approaches in order to avoid the implications of a single-
dimension approach. 
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2.2.3. Hybrid Theories 
As I mentioned earlier, Elmore was known as a member of the bottom-up camp, but in 
his later work (in 1985), Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the 
Analysis of Public Policy, he became one of the pioneers of the hybrid theory in 
implementation research. Elmore combined the concept of Ôbackward mappingÕ with 
the idea of Ôforward mappingÕ. Forward mapping is the traditional top-down view of the 
implementation process. The approach is based on the assumption of power at the 
top. In this view, highest-level policy makers have ultimate control over the political, 
organisational and technical factors that influence the implementation. By proposing 
backward mapping, Elmore tried to supplement the analysis of policy process. In the 
backward mapping analytic approach, the centre of the point turned to service 
delivery, where implementers and clients meet each other (Williams, 1982: 2). He 
argued that success of a programme depends upon both elements. Policy makers 
should therefore start by considering policy instruments and available resources for 
policy change (forward mapping). In addition, they should identify the incentive 
structure of implementers and target groups (backward mapping) (citing from Plzl & 
Treib, 2007). 
In the same way, Sabatier (1986), backing away from his earlier theoretical 
contribution with Mazmanian, gave an account of a different theoretical approach to 
policy implementation. In his influential article on implementation research, he argued 
that failure to distinguish between policy making and implementation would disqualify 
the study of policy change and evaluation research. 
The self-proclaimed founders of the Ôthird generationÕ of implementation research, 
Goggin, Bowman, Lester and OÕToole (1990), tried to bridge the gap between top-
down and bottom-up approaches. Like top-downers, they continued to accept the 
perspective of a centrally-defined policy decision to be implemented by lower-level 
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actors. Their goal of developing a general theory of implementation on the basis of 
exact methods also owes much to the top-down perspective. However, their 
conception of the implementation process included the fact that implementers are 
political actors and that the outcome of this endeavour involved complicated 
negotiation processes between implementers and central authorities. 
In sum, the hybrid theories of policy implementation recognise that policies are made 
within a dialectical relationship between top-level and lower-lever actors. Policy 
implementation does not occur in separation from policy making; they are both 
related. Consequently, policy implementation cannot be analysed without looking at 
the policy formation process. 
The mixed approach can to a large extent be developed to include two themes: the 
dynamic network of top officials, implementers and recipients on the one hand, and on 
the other the politico-administrative context which explicitly makes quite an impact on 
the implementation process. Almost all approaches and generation models of policy 
implementation emphasise the role of actors or groups of actors during the 
implementation process (Schofield, 2001: 255). As demonstrated in the policy 
implementation literature so far, the role of service user has been researched as that 
of a recipient or person affected by programme outcome, as opposed to being a 
significant actor in the process of implementation. Policy implementation research 
considers actual actors rather than potential actors. The potential role of a service 
user in the implementation process is often ignored because the focus tends to be on 
implementers rather than beneficiaries. I argue that beneficiaries of social 
programmes should be considered in policy implementation research. 
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2.2.4. Salient Policy, Political Preference and Control 
There are many concepts that pave the way of discussion in this research. In many 
places of this research I have repeatedly emphasised an argument that considers the 
political context is of great importance for understanding policy implementation in 
developing countries. It needs to be said that the policy context is in a dialectical 
relation with policy content. In other words, the policy implementation process needs 
to be examined as occurring within a political structure where there are established 
relationships, powers, norms and interests, which are being held by policy actors 
(mainly policy makers, policy implementers, and target groups). 
The power may control the policy implementation by changing the current policy 
through a process justified by securing better benefit for clienteles. Two kinds of 
instruments are used to control implementation agencies by power. First, legal 
instruments, which include administrative procedures and official directives, are 
available to policy decision makers to control implementation agencies, either for 
facilitating effective implementation and monitoring to evaluate their performance and 
programme outcomes, or constraining it through a number of procedures such as the 
reduction of budgets. The second is political instruments, which could be observed 
when party politicians and top government officials intend to interfere in the policy 
implementation process, directly or indirectly, seeking particular political interests. 
Political party leaders, apart from making policies and monitoring how they are being 
implemented, may interfere in the policies to steer them in their own favour. Having 
looked at their political interests, they prioritise policies according to their political 
interests. They may prefer policies in which their beneficiaries have a political 
characteristic and value (salient policy or programme), as opposed to those with lower 
political priorities (negligent policy or programme). 
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To elaborate more, the policy implementation process is influenced by two series of 
binary concepts: importance (salience) and negligence. This dichotomy will be used in 
this research to elaborate the degree of policy preference that would be given to 
different policy programmes based on the specific political norms and interests. 
In this framework, the concept of Ôpolicy position and salienceÕ proposed by Rene 
Torenvlied (2000) will be useful. Torenvlied (1996, 2000, and 2003 with Thomson) 
employed the concept of ÔsalienceÕ in implementation research. Although he used this 
term in the sense of decision making in organisations, it also implies norms which 
reflect explicitly on the policy preference in the implementation process. In his 
proposed Ôpositive model of policy implementationÕ, the relative salience of 
implementation agencies for policy decisions has been taken into account (1996: 26). 
Torenvlied in his book, Political Decisions and Agency Performance (2000), has 
discussed the political decision model of implementation. He highlights the concept of 
ÔnormÕ of bureaucratic loyalty as compelled by political control. He argues that this 
bureaucratic norm emerges whenever a group of individuals are required to perform a 
specific action which they would not perform in the absence of that norm, for instance, 
the loyal implementation of a political decision, or special concern to politically 
important clienteles (Torenvlied, 2000: 30). This norm would give higher priority to one 
policy over others. In my research I will examine the norm or norms which have been 
embraced by political KRG leadership. 
The operation of norms can offer an important explanation for the paradox of 
compliance. Neo-classical models doubt the existence of information advantage. They 
argue that political decision makers are apparently able to observe implementation 
agenciesÕ behaviour perfectly, to monitor, and to sanction (Torenvlied, 2000: 32). No 
one can disprove the argument that implementers have an information advantage. 
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What constrains their ability to realise knowledge, particularly in the case of 
developing societies, is political interference and control.  
According to Weingast and Moran (1983) policy makers and government officials use 
two instruments to control policy implementation: selections and sanctions. Although 
their model was developed from economic law, they lay the foundations for a theory 
which integrates economic and political behaviour of industries. Selection occurs 
through competition between implementing agencies for budget, and also when 
officials are being appointed to monitor implementation agencies (Weingast & Moran, 
1983: 769). On the other hand, sanctions are used by top officials in several ways, 
such as budgetary cuts, temporary and permanent suspension, demotion of agency 
members, judicial proceedings, and public humiliation (Torenvlied, 2000: 35). 
The political control over implementation will be realised by the implementation 
agencies through materialising the degree of salience attached to social policy 
programmes by government officials and ruling party leaders. As this research claims 
to examine, adherence to the norm of administrative loyalty is compelled more 
seriously and strongly in relation to the programmes to which are attached more 
salience by top officials. 
A number of studies have examined political control and administrative supervision 
over policy implementation and behaviour at the frontlines of service delivery 
(Matland, 1995; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Lane, 1999; Lazin, 1999; Torenvlied, 
2000). These studies support the well-defined approach to implementation research; 
the translation of political decisions into street-level actions. However, these studies 
provide little explanation of the importance of political and administrative structures in 
the implementation process. Most of the studies that explain political/administrative 
impacts on implementation practices mainly suggest that they play unimportant roles 
(May & Winter, 2007: 454). 
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I call on conceptualisations about key models of implementation as well as political 
and administrative control in formulating hierarchical models for examining the 
influence of political decisions and administrative actions on the performance of 
implementation agencies. I argue that interference and political control over social 
policy programmes would produce an uncertain policy condition. Power may control 
policy implementation by changing current policy through a process justified as the 
way to renew or adjust policies. A fundamental question which could be raised 
regarding the differences between policy as laid down in regulations and politiciansÕ 
intention is whether actions of implementation agencies are congruent with those laid 
down in regulations and policy documents, or that they follow politiciansÕ intentions. 
 
2.3. Policy Implementation Literature in Developing Nations 
As I mentioned earlier, most policy implementation theories, models and approaches 
have been drawn from developed world contexts. However, attempts have also been 
made in the developing world to apply, test and articulate these same models of 
implementation. For the purpose of my research, special emphasis has to be put on 
political and administrative grounds of policy implementation (Grindle, 1980; Temple & 
Temple, 1980; Torenvlied, 1996; 2000; 2003 (with Thomson); Lane, 1999; Lazin, 
1994; 1999; Makinde, 2005). This is because policy implementation cannot be studied 
in a context-free manner. Thus politico-administration conditions need to be 
considered in order to develop implementation theories in a developing context. 
This section addresses the importance of political context for implementation research 
and offers selective contributions to policy implementation research in developing 
nations. 
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2.3.1. Content and Context of Policy Implementation 
Grindle (1980), in his edited book Politics and policy implementation in the third world, 
addressed two broad questions about implementation. The first is concerned with the 
extent to which the content of social policy has an impact on its implementation 
process. The second is about context. By this, he discusses how the political context 
of administrative actions affects policy implementation processes (Grindle, 1980: 5). 
The contributors of his volume, which consist of several case studies, all share these 
two perspectives: content and context of policy implementation. 
Implementation, as defined by Grindle, is Òan ongoing process of decision making by 
a variety of actors, the ultimate outcome of which is determined by the content of the 
programme being pursued and by the interaction of the decision-makers within a 
given politico-administrative contextÓ (Grindle, 1980: 5-6). He argues that the content 
of policy affects programme actions. Some programmes that seek to introduce 
changes in social, political and economic relationships encourage considerable 
opposition from those whose interests are threatened by them. For instance, 
landowners are against agrarian reform in Mexico (Grindle, 1980: 8). Other 
programmes might exacerbate conflict and competition among potential beneficiaries 
and may be difficult to implement as intended. In the differentiation of programmes, 
providing devisable benefits such as housing from those delivering collective benefits, 
such as water and light, the second will always be readily implemented in the 
developing countries. Due to that, Grindle asserted that some social programmes 
require considerable behavioural adaptation and participation on the part of recipients 
(Grindle, 1980: 9). 
I widely refer to the concept of ÔcontextÕ in this research. It refers to a broader Ôpolitico-
administrative contextÕ, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter and 
will be explained with the particular example of the Kurdistan Region in the following 
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chapter (Chapter 3), as well as a legal and organisational setting (policy context). The 
context of programme or policy is often a critical factor because of the real or potential 
impact it may have on a given (social, political and economic) setting (Grindle, 1980: 
10). However, I argue that the policy context determines the policy content and its 
administrative process. This is because of the impact it may have on the legal and 
organisational framework of the policy. Therefore, it is necessary to consider it as a 
determinant factor. 
Several case studies in GrindleÕs edited book (1980) indicate that the implementation 
process may vary considerably depending on whether the political system is 
authoritarian or open. Both regimes acquire elements of responsiveness and 
compliance in their social policy making and implementation. They are to a certain 
degree responsive. While responsiveness in an authoritarian system is low and 
mostly depends upon clientelistic politics, in an open regime, elections impose a 
greater degree of responsiveness on high officials. 
Based on case studies from Asia, Africa and Latin America, Grindle argues that the 
process of implementing public policies is a focus of political participation and 
competition. This is true because of the characteristics of the political systems 
themselves such as the remoteness and inaccessibility of policy-making processes to 
most individuals and the extensive competition engendered by widespread need and 
very scarce resources (Grindle, 1980: 15). In developing nations, while participation is 
often limited to policy making, there still exists a great desire among citizens to affect 
the outcome of governmental decision making because such outcomes affect them 
vitally and personally (Grindle, 1980: 17). This is in spite of the fact that patron-client 
linkages are frequently the basis of political activities in some developing nations and 
these can influence the policy formulation and implementation (Grindle, 1980: 18). As 
I have demonstrated in data chapters, this political participation is apparent in two 
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ways. First, some beneficiaries are already in a political-partisan relation with policy 
makers. They have a great influence on policy formulation and the implementation 
process. These groups are provided with high services as a reward for their 
contribution to the Kurdish national movement and political parties (beneficiaries of 
RPFMGS). Secondly, other groups try to influence the decision of policy makers by 
showing their affiliation and loyalty to ruling parties (beneficiaries of Special Salary in 
SPF). 
Stephen Quick (1980: 40-63) in his research The Paradox of Popularity: ÒIdeologicalÓ 
Program Implementation in Zambia investigated how the political environment (in his 
case-study political impetus) given to a programme of agriculture cooperative 
influenced the way the programme was initially defined. The failure of the political elite 
to specify priorities in Zambia has been highlighted in his research as a case of non-
choice making with extensive consequences for the capacity of administrative 
agencies to carry out programme activities. He carried out his research on a case 
against policies extensively promoted but poorly defined. The policies that received 
extensive political support and limelight at the decision-making stage failed to achieve 
any development because of the ambiguity of the goals pursued. 
Grindle asserted that there are important strategic choices made for programme 
activities which determine the success and failure of the implementing process. That 
is to say, how programme goals will be pursued, which organisation is to be 
responsible for implementation, the extent of programme coverage, the speed with 
which programme results will be sought, and finally the mechanisms for establishing 
reporting and accountability within bureaucratic agencies. Decisions made on the 
basis of the above strategies clearly affect the outcomes of the programme 
implemented. These strategic choices are often made based on political reasoning or 
in response to political pressures (Grindle, 1980: 25). 
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In a case study about political constraints on rural development in Mexico, Grindle 
studied how the choices made during the implementation process affected the output 
of particular programmes. He was concerned particularly with two considerations: the 
influence of regime type and the impact of politics in the determination of who will 
have influence over resource allocation processes (Grindle, 1980: 197-223). He 
explored the interactions at local level between administrators, politicians, recipients 
and elite groups. 
While dealing with political inputs into administrative decisions on the local level, 
several studies explore why government allocation decisions are not generally 
responsive to the low-income population in authoritarian regimes. They indicate that 
there is a persistent structure in which it is embedded and to which it is responsive 
(Grindle, 1980; Temple & Temple, 1980). They also suggest that the conflict 
engendered by the content of redistributive policies may have a significant impact on 
allocation decisions. The relationship of regime type and local politics to 
implementation highlights the problem of compliance and responsiveness (Hadden, 
1980; McClintock, 1980; Quick, 1980). In some case studies on rural development 
and urban poverty in Latin America, it has been revealed that low-incomers such as 
farmers or urban residents are able to influence government policies. However, 
Grindle argued that in general the authoritarian regimes adopt bureaucratic 
procedures responsive more to the regime itself rather than concerning low-income 
clienteles (Grindle, 1980: 31). He asserted that the resources that are allocated to 
specific programmes might be redirected towards other programmes serving their 
support groups (Grindle, 1980: 201). In spite of principal implementers, Grindle 
highlighted that the clients of government programmes are also involved in the 
implementation process. The capacity of low-status clienteles to benefit from 
government policies in developing countries to a large extent depends on the 
congruence of their needs with broader political goals (Grindle, 1980: 223). 
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Temple and Temple (1980) conducted a research on public housing in Kenya. They 
analysed why this government programme had not responded to the needs of low-
incomers in Nairobi; instead it had served middle or high-income people. The 
government of Kenya built a large number of housing units to let and sell at an 
affordable price to the poorest among the population. At the end, the groups that 
benefited the most from this policy were political and economic elites or those with 
close ties to the government, instead of the original target groups. Temple and 
TempleÕs research findings are quite compatible with those of mine, especially in the 
case of Special Salary in SPF. Party-affiliated people are being integrated into social 
benefits, though the criteria of eligibility are not applicable to Special Salary 
beneficiaries. 
Taiwo Makinde (2005) identified some implementation problems taking two examples 
from Nigerian social protection programmes: the Better Life Programme and the 
Family Support Programme. In his research, he highlights three problematic factors 
such as corruption, lack of continuity in government policies, and inadequate human 
and material resources. He argues that Nigerian public officials and administrators, 
such as those of developing countries, misappropriate funds allocated to social 
programmes. Makinde also indicated that indiscipline in the continuity of the named 
social programmes was also a cause of its failure. The indiscipline occurs when 
originally planned projects are abandoned without justifiable reason thus resulting in 
policy deviation. 
 
2.3.2. Politico‐Administrative Context of Policy Implementation 
For researching the crucial factors in the implementation of government social 
security programmes in the KRG, I argue that political context is the most important 
independent variable. The political environment of administrative actions affects policy 
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implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 466) were the first to take the 
political condition into account as a constraint rather than as a policy resource. 
Another attempt in this regard has been made by Richard Matland. In his evaluation 
of the characteristics of policy, he distinguished two types of policy: ambiguity and 
conflict (1995: 155-9). His contribution in analysing the policy condition is clearly seen 
when he distinguished four types of policy implementation: administrative, political, 
experimental and symbolic. He argues that different factors determine policy 
outcomes in various political conditions. In administrative implementation the 
outcomes are determined by resources (1995: 160), while in political implementation 
outcomes they are decided by power (1995: 163). However, in the experimental 
implementation, Ôcontextual conditionÕ is likely to be important, which means the 
environmental influences on policy outcomes (1995: 166). 
In this research, political context will be treated as a condition which facilitates or 
constrains policy implementation. Of interest here is the degree to which the political 
condition of the Kurdistan Region is relevant in understanding the adaptation, 
prioritisation and implementation of policies. The region has entered a period of 
political transition and, during the last decades, it has lived and experienced a very 
difficult situation of conflict and relative peace. It must also be added that this region 
can be considered as unstable. This instability is at both regional and national (Iraqi) 
levels. With regard to the internal-regional level, although there have been free 
general elections, actual power still remains within the circles of the main political 
parties. They obtain and maintain power as part of their revolutionary legacy. Thus, 
the elected people are always in a lower position of political power in comparison with 
senior party politicians (mainly politburos). This will allow us to name the political 
system of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region as semi-democratic. 
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In addition, despite the Kurdish presence and contribution in the federal government 
in Baghdad after the 2003 invasion, there are still ongoing disagreements between 
the KRG and the Baghdad government about issues related to the Iraqi constitution 
and KRGÕs power. These disputes often become evident when their respective 
authorities oppose each other, especially about utilising oil wells and revenues, and 
the Kurdish armed forces (Peshmerga). This unstable political condition has had its 
own impact on the strategic choice of the KRG regarding policy implementation. 
Administrative directions are frequently changed and adjusted rapidly, causing great 
uncertainty. One could argue that the reasons why uncertainty is endemic to policy 
making and implementation in developing countries is not solely due to severely 
limited recourses, as some would argue (Caiden & Wildavsky, 1974; Lazin, 1999). 
Rather, weak political institutions, limited capacity for policy making and, more 
importantly, the level of political commitment in public administration are also 
variables which indicate uncertainty in governance. Lazin (1999) points out how 
political and administrative institutions of particular countries affect their domestic 
policy implementation process. The three major questions addressed in his book The 
Policy Implementation Process in Developing Nations are: firstly, to what extent can 
the developmental status of a particular country be taken into account for 
understanding its policy implementation process? Secondly, do the studies of policy 
implementation in developing countries, in their methodological aspects, favour top-
down or bottom-up, or a synthesis model? He also asked whether the dichotomy of 
policy formulation and implementation is helpful or is it preferable to be considered as 
one ongoing process? 
Jan-Erik Lane (1999) argues that policy implementation problems in developing 
countries are intertwined with basic economic and political conditions. He suggested 
that, while development requires economic growth, the reduction of poverty requires 
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political stability. Thus, both economic development and political stability are 
necessary conditions for effective policy implementation (Lane, 1999: 11-12). In a 
case study about public policy implementation in India, R. B. Jain argued that 
bureaucracy has no predominant role in policy-making processes (1999: 25). He 
points out an assumption that, once a policy has been formulated, it will not 
necessarily be implemented in the case of less developed countries (Jain, 1999: 28). 
Jain asserts that government policy is the outcome of a continuous interaction 
between political executives, senior level bureaucrats and other government as well 
as non-government actors. 
Fredrick Lazin in his book Politics and Policy Implementation: Project Renewal in 
Israel, addressed several characteristics of political constitution in Israel which 
asserted great influence over implementation. First, the Israeli governmental system 
has been characterised by coalitions comprising several independent oligarchical 
parties. Although the coalition parties committed to serve national interests, ruling 
party leaders can also use high officials and ministers in government to benefit party 
interests (Lazin, 1994: 3). Secondly, as a result, coalition politicians have dominated 
the ministries. Even from the beginning of the state, the Israeli government has lacked 
a tradition of natural professional civil servants. In other words, partisans from major 
coalition parties have controlled the public sector. Party leaders in Israel are in a 
position to appoint key bureaucrats, including the director-generals of ministries and 
heads of Jewish Agency departments. From this, Lazin suggested that, in the case of 
Project Renewal, ministers and agency professionals at the highest position are likely 
to be sensitive to party considerations (Lazin, 1994: 4). 
The third politico-administrative characteristic that Lazin mentioned was the 
fragmentation of national government and lack of unity of governmental performance 
in the public sector (1994: 4). He referred to the Jewish Agency which has served as 
 44 
an unofficial government. Although strongly influenced by the governmentÕs coalition 
parties, the agency has maintained considerable independence through its control 
over the funds raised by two major overseas fund-raising organisations for Project 
Renewal: the United Jewish Appeal in the United States and the Keren Hayesod 
elsewhere (Lazin, 1994: 5). 
Fourthly, the Israeli government has a centralised hierarchical system. This 
demonstrates a degree of vertical fragmentation that delegates authority from the 
national to municipal levels of government. The standing of municipalities varies, with 
some having more influence than others on ministries and their policies. In general, 
ministriesÕ influence and domination refers to the socio-economic and political 
situation of the particular municipality. As a rule, the more powerful those communities 
have been, mostly in central Israel, are those whose residents are veteran settlers of 
European origin and their children. The weaker are those communities on the 
periphery whose residents are more recent Jewish immigrants from Arab countries 
(Lazin, 1994: 6). 
Finally Lazin stated that, despite the near absence of ethnic parties, ethnicity has 
always been a factor in Israeli politics and social policy. ÒEvery government since 
1948 has used the distribution of public resources to win the votes of various 
immigrant groupsÓ (Lazin, 1994: 6). He declared that the ethnicity influenced the 
implementation of Project Renewal. Municipalities of some ethnic backgrounds have 
been of less concern to the Israeli government. 
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2.4. Clientelism and Implementation of Social Policy in a Developing 
Context 
Social security programmes can be looked at from the perspective of clientelism. This 
section discusses the second part of the research theory framework. It covers the 
relevant research literature on clientelism and the clientelistic practice in social policy. 
The existing literature suggests that the use of social funds and social policy in 
general is a phenomenon mostly found in developing countries and will increase, 
particularly in the context of politically instable and administratively less developed 
countries. I added ÔpoliticallyÕ here as a prefix to focus on the political dimension of the 
developing or less developed world. After offering a definition for the concept of 
clientelism, this section will discuss the clientelistic practice of social funds in 
researched cases in Latin America, Africa and the Asian countries. 
 
2.4.1. Clientelism 
Magaloni (2007: 4) has defined clientelism as Òexpenditures in divisible excludable 
goods delivered to individuals or to organised groups … examples of clientelistic 
transfers include selective scholarships, credit, granaries, and livestock, among 
othersÓ. The concept of clientelism refers to the distribution of social benefits to 
individuals or selective groups in exchange for political backing. 
In political exchange theory, the term ÔclientelismÕ is defined as a form of personal, 
mutual exchange usually characterised by a sense of obligation and often also by an 
unequal balance of power between the sides involved (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984: 
48-9). Eisenstadt and Roniger used this term within the context of unequal, 
hierarchical exchange characteristics of feudal society, in which patrons and clients 
were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty. 
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However, this old form of clientelism has been reshaped in the modern era in both 
developed and developing counties. 
 
2.4.2. Clientelism and Social Programmes 
Michael Penfold-Becerra, in a research under the title ÔClientelism and Social Funds: 
Evidence from ChavezÕs MisionesÕ, investigated how the government used social 
funds on a clientelistic basis (2007). By exploring ChavezÕs Misiones programmes, he 
declared that social funds can be strategically manipulated for electoral purposes. 
Bringing empirical evidences on the distribution of resources for the different misiones 
at the sub-national level, he indicated that those programmes were politically directed. 
Although it was claimed that these programmes were targeted at poverty alleviation, 
in reality they were also explicitly used to buy votes among ChavezÕs supporters and 
voters at the local level. 
Penfold-Becerra argues that politicians tend to promote clientelism among a lower 
income sector of the population. In this case, the Venezuelan government was able to 
buy votes through the distribution of funds to the poorest. Conversely, there were 
other programmes implemented based on political and geographical considerations. 
Municipalities loyal to Chavez were prioritised. In turn, the government wanted to 
make sure that voters would support Chavez in exchange for social benefits. This 
practice effectively consolidated the clientelistic network of ChavezÕs government. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to explain the clientelistic use of social funds 
in Latin America. Some researchers have argued that social cash transfers can be 
used in a neo-populist manner by presidents who follow a neoliberal approach to 
promote their claimed reforms (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1999). Through targeting 
low-income groups, votes can be targeted and support can be bought. Poor people 
are deemed to be more responsive politically to these types of rewards (Penfold-
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Becerra, 2007: 68). Some researches indicate that low-income voters are more likely 
to be subjected to a clientelistic practice than those on a higher income (Dixit & 
Londregan, 1996; Robinson & Verdier, 2003; Brusco et al., 2004; Calvo & Murillo, 
2004). 
The research literature on clientelism and social funds in Latin America has clearly 
indicated that politicians start using social funds in a clientelistic manner to boost their 
political support. This mainly occurs when there is a lack of strong institutional 
constraints. In other words, under certain institutional conditions, social funds can be 
allocated on the basis of a political rationale instead of social or economic 
considerations. Since 2000, Chvez in Venezuela has been able to accumulate all 
legislative and executive powers in his presidency office and keep a close grasp on 
the parliament and the judicial branch. Given these weak institutional constraints and 
the electoral competition of 2004 for recall referendum, the government had great 
motivation to manipulate politically the allocation of resources for the political agenda 
(Penfold-Becerra, 2007). 
Traditionally, clientelism involves hierarchical patron-client relationships, Òthe patron 
providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients 
reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and servicesÓ (Mason, 1986: 
489). However, the patron-client relationship could be reversed. The clients may fulfil 
their parts of obligation, seeking the governmentÕs turn to reward them. 
The importance of clienteles of social programmes is highlighted in a variety of 
literature conducted on clientele politics, especially in developing countries (Poitras, 
1973; Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente & Wantchekon, 2009). The social and political 
condition of citizens would unavoidably be translated into their inclusion within an 
informal network. In this sense it is important to state that implementers play roles as 
brokers in the clientelistic network. They facilitate a condition to use social cash 
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transfers for a political purpose. Social funds could be politicised and subjected to 
clientelistic practices. This appeared in two aspects. Firstly, high government officials 
and party leaders control the public administration. Directors of the programmes, 
middle-ranked and even frontline staff are being appointed or simply dismissed by 
party leaders. Secondly, social funds could be used to encourage party backing. 
 
2.4.3. Clientelistic Implementation and Policy Preference 
The main perspective in policy research tries to test the explanatory power of stages 
heuristic, in which it looks at policy implementation as entirely normatively subordinate 
to policy formulation. However, this research does not follow this tradition. As 
discussed earlier, political and administrative actors deal with and support social 
policy programmes on the basis of the importance they attach to them. This is true 
when the focus is on social security programmes in the poor welfare systems.  
Social security policy, which contains cash transfers, attracts politiciansÕ concern 
because they may feel that such programmes can be used and exploited for their 
political interests. These concerns encourage them to interfere in and control these 
programmes. This policy salience is inspired by political norms of senior politicians 
and high administrative officials. The hegemony of politicians is entirely visible in both 
policy formulation and implementation process. Winning political parties run the 
government and work behind the government by exerting influence on the decision 
makers. On the other hand, they impose their control upon implementers to 
accomplish their goals. 
The politicians deal with social policy programmes in two different ways: 
a. political leaders and top government officials give an importance and attach a high 
salience to policies according to the preference that they give to those policies and 
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interest groups concerned. In this notion, policy implementation would be interfered 
with by politicians and high government officials. They may attempt to support and 
monitor the way the policy is implemented so as to preserve clientsÕ interests. The 
programmes are implemented better within which the interest of beneficiaries and 
political parties are intertwined. The political interest and status of target groups are 
crucial factors that need to be monitored in order to understand how and why this 
style of implementation is encouraged by political leaders and pursued by 
implementation agencies. Clientelism puts forth the idea that important clienteles 
deserve an important programme which implies that the clients are political subjects, 
and the policy related to them should be as salient as they are. 
This style of policy implementation appears to follow a bottom-up approach. It takes 
into consideration the implementerÕs potential discretion and initiatives only on the 
condition that they do not discard political decisions made by policy makers. In other 
words, the implementers might be consulted or they may play their mediation roles 
between beneficiaries and policy makers, which are equally acting as agents 
translating policy into action, although the perspective in which the programme is 
being preferred from is mainly that of policy makers. However, due to the 
consideration put on the status of beneficiaries and the extent to which their needs 
and demands are being reflected in policy formulation and implementation, this style 
of policy preference can be considered as a mixed or a bottom-up model. 
b. The second style of policy implementation can be realised in a less important 
programme and tends to follow a top-down model. This is a passive style of policy 
implementation, which is followed in a context that its beneficiaries, certainly for 
politicians, are not considered as a significant group. Policy negligence is linked to 
policies that are politically marginalised and administratively constrained by top 
government officials. In this style of implementation, it appears that not only clienteles 
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but also implementation actors are neglected. They might neither be consulted in the 
policy formation nor supported in the policy implementation. More certainly, the policy 
negligence style is more close to the top-down model. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced implementation theory and clientelism as a combination of 
two series of literature and theoretical framework for investigating implementation of 
social security programmes in a developing region of Iraqi Kurdistan. It addressed 
mainstream implementation approaches to social policy processes by looking at three 
generations of implementation theories, and the classical top-down/bottom-up debate 
in implementation research. 
The inherent idea of classical approaches in conducting policy implementation is 
Òdrawing distinction between decision-making and policy performanceÓ (Mazmanian & 
Sabatier, 1989). The initial top-down and bottom-up models thus emerged from the 
heart of a debate to explain this relationship, and to understand how to make policy 
and who is in charge of transforming it into practice. Each model has tried to trace 
policy to its actual decision makers. Scholars of the top-down approach have 
endeavoured to explore how implementation starts with a decision by top officials in 
the central government. From this perspective, implementation becomes an output 
factor to achieve the outcome of policy goals set out in initial policy decisions. The 
effectiveness of implementation, achieving policy objectives, is one of the central 
factors which direct this type of research strategy.  
In response to this approach, the bottom-up model emerged, shifting the focus from 
top officials to middle and lower actors in the policy process. The bottom-up model 
considers local bureaucrats as the main actors in policy delivery and conceives of 
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implementation as negotiation processes within networks of implementers. This model 
ignores the role of top individuals outside the implementing agencies who might have 
a great impact on the implementation process, despite and behind their role as 
decision makers. 
The bottom-up model rejected the idea that policies are defined and formulated at the 
top level and that programme implementers need to unite themselves neatly to these 
objectives. Instead, bottom-up scholars emphasised the discretion available at the 
stage of policy delivery, which equips the implementers with an autonomous power. 
This perspective looks at local bureaucrats as closest policy actors to the real social 
issues. Bottom-up type of studies showed that policy outcomes did not always 
sufficiently relate to original policy objectives and that the assumed causal link, as top-
downers are more involved in, was thus questionable. Studies belonging to this type 
of research typically started from the ÔbottomÕ by identifying the networks of actors 
involved in policy formulation and delivery. Mainstream models of policy 
implementation address policy relationships between top officials and implementers 
on the one hand and on the other hand between implementers and beneficiaries of 
the programme. However, what is missing from implementation analysis on policy 
network is the real or potential relationship between beneficiaries and top officials. 
Though only top-officials are involved in policy making, political conditions could 
influence policy implementation. This means that, despite policy regulations and 
instructions, political interests of ruling parties might improve, maintain or suspend 
social programmes and services. In this respect, policy implementersÕ discretion and 
information have a lesser impact. From this perspective, a mixed model has to be 
adopted. In the mixed approach, two themes could be developed: the dynamic 
network of top officials, implementers and recipients, and the politico-administrative 
context that explicitly influences the implementation process.  
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As demonstrated in the literature on policy implementation, service users have been 
mostly considered as recipients of programmes rather than as significant actors in the 
process of implementation. Policy implementation research considers actual actors 
rather than potential actors. In this sense, it includes target groups and recipients as 
the population affected by social programmes not potentially involved in policy 
process. 
The autonomy of policy implementers seems to be more uncertain and deeply restricted 
to the political regime. In countries with little experience of democracy, their discretion 
could be threatened by over-centralised power. At the same time, the programme 
beneficiaries should be taken into account in the process of policy formulation. I assert 
that policy formulation should be differentiated from decision making. The first refers to a 
broader process in social policy, while the latter implies a stage of policy making. In this 
perspective, my research on the implementation of social security programmes analyses 
programme formulation and activities. 
This chapter also discussed the concept of Òpolicy position and salientÓ proposed by 
Torenvield (2000). I have added a concept of policy negligence to employ them as a 
dichotomy to examine the degree of policy preference that would be given to different 
programmes based on specific political norms and interests, and the status of recipients.  
Policy implementation research in developing countries should examine the extent to 
which the leaders of dominant political parties and government officials control and 
influence the direction of policy performance. There is also the need to explore 
implementation of social security programmes in terms of their consistency with or 
deviation from policy regulations. However, specific standards and regulations are not 
the only elements to direct policy performance. A number of other elements are also 
involved in this process, for instance, politiciansÕ intentions and dominant party agentsÕ 
interests. The role of non-statutory factors is inevitable in a policy implementation 
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process. I argue that the policy environment or context determines the policy content and 
its administrative process because of the impact it may have on the given social, political 
and economic setting. Therefore, it is necessary to consider it as a determinant factor. 
The last section of this chapter covered clientelism and clientele politics. It discussed the 
relevant research literature on clientelism and clientelistic practice in social policy. This 
appears be a widespread tradition in developing countries, particularly in the context of 
politically unstable and administratively less developed countries. The importance of 
clienteles of social security programmes introduced me to a variety of literature 
conducted on clientele politics, especially in developing countries. Implementers play 
roles as brokers in the clientelistic network. They use social cash transfers for a political 
purpose. Social funds could be politicised and subjected to clientelistic practices. This 
appeared in two aspects. Firstly, high government officials and party leaders control 
public administration. Directors of the programmes, middle-ranked and even frontline 
staff are appointed or simply dismissed by party leaders. Secondly, social funds could be 
used to encourage party backing. 
The application of the implementation theory suggests that three approaches should be 
followed. Firstly, policy implementation should be studied, taking into account the 
politico-administrative context. Secondly, the content of the policy, including political 
norms, interests, objectives and compliance, will determine the degree of policy 
preference, and consequently policy success and failure. Finally, the role and status of 
beneficiaries within the policy network defines whether a top-down or bottom-up 
approach has been followed while the policy is formulated and implemented. Both styles 
of implementation found in the implementation of the two researched programmes, the 
preferential style of implementation in RPFMGS and the neglected style of 
implementation in SPF, fit with bottom-up and top-down approaches respectively. 
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND 
SOCIO‐ECONOMIC BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY PROGRAMMES OF THE KURDISTAN 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a contextual analysis of the political, socio-economic and 
administrative aspects of the Kurdistan Region. It focuses on the politico-
administrative context that locates the Kurdistan Region as a case of a post-conflict 
developing country/region. In addition to this political overview, the chapter equally 
draws on reviews of current social security programmes of the KRG. The chapterÕs 
analysis is crucial in understanding the framework which influences social policy and 
its implementation in the country. Indeed, social policy in most countries is closely 
linked to the prevailing political and administrative system (Van Meter & Van Horn, 
1975; Matland, 1995). 
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section offers a brief history of the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region, highlighting the displacement, marginalisation, deportation, 
genocide and civil war which has characterised its past. The second section analyses 
the establishment of the KNA and KRG and the ways in which they operate. That 
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section also highlights key political and socio-economic strategies embarked upon by 
the KRG after the American invasion in 2003. The concluding section of the chapter 
offers an overview of current social security policy and programmes of the KRG. 
 
3.1. Political Background of Iraqi Kurdistan Region 
Many historians and political scientists trace the beginning of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region and its political struggle to the First World War (McDowall, 2004; Stansfield, 
2006). Historically, Kurds have been politically and socially victimised, and it is 
through such repression that political parties emerged. The development of Kurdish 
political parties consequently had a revolutionary legacy and embedded a Soviet style 
of politburos. When the KRG was established in 1992, it was a party-controlled 
administration in which nationalist figures and party members were prioritised. The 
repression, war and genocide experienced by Kurds in Iraq resulted in extreme 
political instability and social vulnerability. Kurdish political parties exploit this suffering 
by labelling themselves as freedom fighters or war victims as a political credit. 
Exploring the political past ultimately explains how, in the time of the Ôrevolutionary 
party-controlled KRGÕ, instead of adopting a public welfare system, a prerogative 
system for party-affiliated people and political victims (war and genocide) was created. 
 
3.1.1. A Historical Overview: Kurds as Stateless Nation 
The Kurds inhabited the areas located in the border regions of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and 
Syria (see Figure 2). After the First World War, with the carving out of new states 
from the territories of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdistan was incorporated into Turkey, 
Iraq and Syria, in addition to the eastern part of Kurdistan that was a part of the 
Gajar Empire in Iran (Stansfield, 2006: 1). The partition of the Kurdish nation by 
 56 
Allied forces in the 1920s was an unfortunate event in the process of nation building 
and self-determination of the Kurds. Although under the Treaty of Svres in August 
1920, provision was made for an independent Kurdistan state to be shaped out of 
areas called Kurdistan within the territories of the defeated Ottoman Empire (Treaty 
of Svres, Section III, Articles 62-64), the Treaty of Lausanne signed between Allied 
forces and Turkey in 1923 reneged on promises made to the Kurds (McDowall, 
2004: 137-143). 
 
Figure 2 Kurdish Inhabited Area (Great Kurdistan) 
 
© Source: Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division Washington, USA. 
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Since the formation of the state of Iraq in 1920 until 2003, the Kurds have always lived 
in constant struggle. There has been no period in the modern era of Iraq (and other 
countries with a Kurdish population in the Middle East) in which Kurds have 
experienced peace. They have had to fight successive Iraqi governments in order to 
get their voices heard. Their resistance was because they did not see themselves as 
partners since their ethno-national identity was never ÔpracticallyÕ considered in the 
Iraqi constitution. 
The 1958 Iraqi Revolution, similar to the post-World War One political re-alignment, 
made unfulfilled promises to the Kurds. When Abd Al-Karim Qasim (1914-1963) 
seized power by coup dÕtat in 1958, he announced that the new Iraqi government 
was to comprise all stakeholders of the territory of Iraq: Sunni, ShiÕite and Kurds. For 
the first time, the Iraqi constitution 1958 declared that Iraq consists of two main 
nations (Arab and Kurd) and other ethno-religious minorities. The Arabs and Kurds 
never shared power in Iraq until 2003. Protests by Kurds were met with oppression 
and violence by successive Iraqi governments. In 1961, Mustafa Barzani (1903-
1979), the leader of the KDP led a revolt against the Iraqi central government and, 
after eventual negotiations, for the first time in the history of Kurds in Iraq, an official 
agreement was reached. The 11 March 1970 Accord assured cultural, political and 
self-ruling rights to Kurds in Iraq (McDowall, 2004: 327-28). 
According to the agreement, after a period of four years, Iraqi Kurdistan would 
become autonomous. Between 1970 and 1974 there were so-called liberated areas 
under the control of the Kurdish forces, so-called peshmarga in Kurdish. These 
provinces, notably Erbil, Sulaimaniya and Dohuk were seen as de facto autonomous 
Kurdish territories and were governed by Kurds (see Figure 2). In addition, five 
Kurds were also appointed to the cabinet by the Iraqi government (Stansfield, 2006: 
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4). However, this arrangement did not last long due to mistrust between the BaÕath 
party and the Kurdish national movement. 
 
3.1.2.  Displacement  and  Destruction:  Kurds  Population  as  Victims  of  War  and 
Genocide in Iraq 
The conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government resulted in political 
victimisation and social casualties. McDowall (2004) argued that the Iraqi Kurds 
depended entirely on Iranian support in terms of military equipment, food and other 
basic needs (McDowall, 2004: 337-8). Iran supported the Kurds due to its own land 
disputes with the Iraqi administration. However, when the matter was resolved with 
the Algiers Agreement of 6 March 1975 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (then Shah of 
Iran) cut all support to the Kurds. With no further support, the subsequent collapse 
of the Kurdish revolution led to many casualties. Over 210,000 Kurds sought refuge 
in Iran between 1974 and 1975, and in 1978 about 1,400 Kurdish villages were 
razed by the Iraqi administration. Approximately 600,000 people were forced into 
MujamaÕat (collective settlement camps), so they could be monitored. Over 300,000 
Kurds were also driven away from the south-west and centre of Iraq or made 
homeless (for more details see McDowall, 2004: 338-9). 
Following this long-term civilian massacre and displacement of Kurds, every KurdÕs 
experience, including my own, shows that it is quite rare to find a Kurdish family in 
Iraq that has not been affected by displacement, the war or impacted by the 
genocide which occurred. Indeed, as a result of being constantly displaced, 
collective camps have emerged as a model of settlement and lifestyle among the 
Kurdish population in Iraq. 
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Nonetheless, though the BaÕath regime repressed Kurdish civilians, they did not 
necessarily exclude them from basic needs. Indeed, another strategy of the regime 
was to attract peopleÕs loyalty by awarding privileges to them. The Iraqi government 
offered services and basic needs, free study and job opportunities, but people who 
were deemed disloyal were excluded. Social welfare, health services and 
employment were provided primarily to Arabs, although the richest oil fields of Iraq 
are in Kurdish areas, including Kirkuk. However, instead of recruiting from the 
indigenous, local Kurdish population, initially Arabs were being employed. 
Throughout the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, Kurdish civilians in Iraq were most 
vulnerable. Any movements of peshmarga on borders or inside Iran affected the 
situation of Kurds inside Iraq. Both Iraq and Iran supported Kurdish parties against 
each other during the war, but the peshmarga found themselves fighting alongside 
the forces of Iran. Facing resurgent Iranian/Kurdish activity in the north of Iraq, 
Saddam Hussein adopted severe measures to permanently remove the threat 
posed by the rebellious Kurds to his regime. On 31 July 1983 and months later, up 
to 8,000 males over 13 years old of Barzani tribes were removed from their families 
in collective camp settlements of Qushtapa, Diyana, Harir and Bahirka. They were 
taken to Baghdad and, months later, executed in south Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 
1993: 41). The survivors were illiterate females and their children with no skills, jobs 
or any other source of income. The government left them on their own, cutting off 
water, electricity and other basic needs. 
The most catastrophic event however was the Anfal (genocide) campaign 
authorised by Saddam Hussein in 1988 against the Kurds. This was a plan for 
systematic depopulation of rural Iraqi Kurdistan in order to remove Kurdish 
rebellious forcesÕ presence from the region and to cut all facilities needed for 
resurrecting and maintaining the peshmarga (Anderson & Stansfield, 2004: 169). 
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The campaign was pursued with enthusiastic brutality by SaddamÕs cousin Ali 
Hassan Al-Majid, who became known as ÔChemical AliÕ due to his infamous 
activities such as the chemical attack on Halabja, which destroyed approximately 
4,000 Kurdish villages (McDowall, 2004: 360). 
The Iraqi government justified these campaigns on the basis of political and 
religious reasons. Iraqi Kurds were portrayed as rebels, ÔtraitorsÕ and Ôcollaborators 
with the enemyÕ, because the PDK and PUK had sided with Iran, the ÔenemyÕ of Iraq. 
The Iraqi regime also justified the Anfal campaign as religious excommunication 
(takfir) (Rogg & Rimscha, 2007: 828). 
It was not only villagers who were targeted in the campaign; indeed, the most well-
known mass killing during the campaign was in the city of Halabja on 16 March 
1988. Within a matter of hours, chemical weapons had been used to kill 
approximately 5,000 civilians (McDowall, 2004: 357-8). In essence, over the last 
century the Kurds of Iraq have been subjected to full-scale discrimination, violence 
and constant displacement. Attempts to change their situation, either through arms 
or negotiations have always been defeated by mistrust, and lack of compromise by 
successive governments, eventually leading to genocide. 
 
3.1.3.  From  ‘North  of  Iraq’  to  ‘Kurdistan  Region’:  Uprising  in  1991  and  the 
Establishment of Self‐Administration 
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 was a turning point in the status of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region. The Allied coalition war led by the US created complete conditions for Iraqi 
Kurds in the North (and ShiÕa in the South) to start a new uprising against Saddam 
HusseinÕs government. Within a period of two weeks, almost all Kurd-populated 
areas had been liberated. The peopleÕs celebrations lasted a very short time, 
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however, when they realised that the US and its allied forces were not happy to see 
Iraq broken up. Saddam Hussein had also come to this realisation and had 
regrouped his army for an advance into Kurdistan. 
With memories of previous brutalities still fresh on their minds, after the collapse of 
the 1991 uprising (Rapareen), thousands of Kurds fled their towns and cities to 
escape SaddamÕs vengeance. They entered into hiding in the mountainous border 
regions of Iran and Turkey where many died as a result of freezing conditions and 
hunger (Galbriath, 2005: 268-269). Hundreds of those who stayed behind were 
captured and killed by Iraqi forces.1 The peshmarga of most Kurdish parties at that 
time confronted the Iraqi army advancing towards liberated areas, and many died on 
both sides (Lawrence, 2008: 51-52). 
The only obstacle to SaddamÕs forces advancing into liberated areas in Kurdistan 
was the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No.688. Under 
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), which formed part of the resolution, a safe zone 
had been carved out to provide security and humanitarian aid to refugees who had 
fled to Turkish and Iranian borders. In this same context, a safe haven and no-fly 
zone had been implemented in Kurdish-populated areas. Through the OPC, the US 
and its allies persuaded people who fled from Iraqi forces to go back to their homes 
where they could be better supplied with basic needs. More than a million Kurdish 
refugees began returning to their cities and towns in May 1991. The Iraqi army and 
local administration were ordered to withdraw from these areas of Kurdistan except 
Kirkuk city. This gave way for the IKF to become the main legitimate (Kurdish) 
authority in the area. The IKF comprised several major Kurdistan political parties 
and controlled three main Iraqi Kurdistan provinces: Erbil, Sulaimania and Dohuk 
(Galbraith, 2005: 269). 
                                   
1
 Interview with Chnar Saad, former minister of MoMA, 28 March 2011. 
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Before the 1991 uprising, the Kurdistan Region under the command of the BaÕathist 
regime had the lowest proportion of public services in the country (Natali, 2010: 3). 
After the uprising, as Natali argues, international humanitarian aid and protection as 
regulated in UNHCR 688 helped to establish the KRG: 
[It] permitted international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to secure basic 
needs for local populations, and commence [the] rehabilitation processes. External 
aid also unintentionally advanced Kurdish nationalism by offering new forms of 
external patronage, semi-legitimacy, and internal sovereignty to the region. During 
this period the Kurdish elite took advantage of international support by commencing 
institution-building projects and creating a Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) 
(Natali, 2010: xxiii). 
The new condition confirmed the right of the Kurdistan Region as an autonomous 
region with self-government. Since 1991, the region has taken a different path of 
political development from Iraq. It was no longer seen as an integral province of Iraq 
as in the past. The KRG administration considers that it owes a great deal, its very 
existence, to national liberation and families of those who fought to uphold their 
sovereignty over the years. Consequently, this is reflected in social security 
provision and welfare programmes of the KRG. It created a style of distribution of 
privileges and benefits among the population based on political loyalty instead of 
needs. The implementation and provision of social welfare and security programmes 
is closely linked to the extent of oneÕs socio-political status and not necessarily on 
the basis of need. In the conflict-prone and volatile situation in which they live, the 
government prioritises social programme recipients over others on the basis of their 
contribution to the revolution and other political values. 
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3.2. Kurdistan Regional Government: Claims, Opportunities and 
Challenges 
ÔKurdistan RegionÕ as a term has not been used in this research as a geographical 
area in northern Iraq, but rather as an area under the jurisdiction of the KRG (see 
Figure 2). This means that Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, Khaniqin, Shangar, 
Makhmour and other disputed districts currently under the control of the Iraqi central 
government are excluded. 
Figure 3 Map of the Kurdistan Region (including disputed territories) 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, Brussels (cited from Natali, 2010: 107). 
 64 
 
Due to the vacuum created following the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and bureaucrats 
from more than half of Iraqi Kurdistan areas, the IKF tried to fill the gap and oversee 
public administration in the area. Schools and hospitals were still running despite 
the overwhelming obstacles due to infrastructural damage and shortage of basic 
supplies. In 1992, elections were held to choose a substantive government for the 
Kurds. Only residents of that part of Iraqi Kurdistan were allowed to choose 
members for the 105 seats of the KNA. These seats were hotly contested between 
the KDP and PUK and, at the end, there was a deadlock. Following negotiations, 
both sides agreed to share power and a council of ministers, 50:50 from PUK and 
KDP and five from the Christian minority, was subsequently sworn in at the 
assembly (Stansfield, 2003: 146). 
SaddamÕs isolation of the region from the rest of Iraq turned to a positive 
consequence for the Kurds. However, the power-sharing deal between the two 
major parties in the assembly did not resolve other prevailing and long-lasting 
disputes. The disagreement led to a civil war in 1994 which lasted until 1998 (for 
more details see Gunter, 1999; Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; McDowall, 2004; 
Galbraith, 2005). 
The civil war did not cease entirely until the 2003 invasion of Iraq. With the 
rebuilding that followed the war, feuding parties in the Kurdistan region also came to 
an agreement that they could also replace internal conflict with cooperation and 
development. Even when the US mediated between both parties in 1998 (known as 
the Washington Agreement) to agree a ceasefire, they did not step further to unify 
the two one-party administrations.  
In essence, several factors helped to transform the Kurdistan Region into an area 
distinct from Iraq and also improve the status of KRG as a semi-autonomous 
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administration. First, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 688 
condemned Iraq for the brutalities visited upon the Iraqi civilian population in the 
North (Kurds) and the South (ShiÕa) in the aftermath of the 1991 uprising. The 
resolution secured a no-fly zone in the Kurdish areas in the north and it was the first 
time since the division of Kurdistan that a high-ranking organisation such as the UN 
had recognised the Kurds in the north (McDowall, 1996: 373-75). Second, under UN 
Security Council Resolution 986 adopting the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) in 
1996, Kurdistan was formally recognised as a separate area from Iraq. The OFFP 
allowed the Iraqi government to export an agreed amount of oil in order to import 
basic needs for people under the supervision of the UN Office of Iraq. Thirteen per 
cent of this oil export revenue was earmarked for the Kurdistan Region. Thirdly, the 
KRG was also recognised as an official Kurdish administration by the Transitional 
Administration Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004 within the framework of adopting 
federalism as the basis for the system of government in Iraq (Stansfield, 2005: 197), 
a very significant step for Kurds in Iraq. Fourthly, the Kurdistan Region with its 
current borders was consolidated in the permanent Iraqi Constitution (backed by 78 
per cent of Iraqi voters in a referendum held on 15 October 2005). The new Iraqi 
Constitution openly confirmed that they Òrecognise the region of Kurdistan, along 
with its existing authorities, as a federal regionÓ (Article 117). Since the adoption of a 
new constitution, the KRG has gained legitimacy as a constituent state in the 
pluralistic democratic federal Iraq. An equally significant event was the integration of 
both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations and the reunification of the KRG on 7 
May 2006. 
Analysis addressing the political development of the Kurdistan Region evaluates the 
establishment of the KRG as the most important event in the history of Kurds in Iraq. 
Many argue that the formation of the KRG provided a unique opportunity to Iraqi 
Kurds to consolidate their jurisdiction and therefore refer to the region as a semi-state, 
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de facto dependent state or de facto state (Gunter, 1993; Galbraith, 2005; Natali, 
2010). 
 
3.2.1. The Profile of the Kurdistan Regional Government  
The above historical background was needed in order to understand how the 
Kurdistan Region has become a de facto state, and the KRG consolidated its entity. 
Geographically, the Kurdistan Region comprises three governorates, Erbil (the 
capital), Suleimaniya and Duhok, and covers an area of 40,643 square kilometres. 
According to the KRG website (2010), nearly 4.7 million people live in the Kurdistan 
Region (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2010; Khidhir, 2011). These populations 
dwell in 33 cities and districts and 136 towns (Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, 
2011). Despite the fact that the Kurdistan Region has an increasing urban 
population, the rural areas were re-inhabited and reconstructed gradually in the 
early 1990s after being systematically destroyed by Iraqi governments between the 
1970s and 1990s. 
In terms of the political life there is a pluralistic system approved by law. In the main 
time, the structure of political parties is similar to that of a soviet-communist style. 
According to KRGÕs Ministry of the Interior, 29 political parties are licensed in the 
Kurdistan Region, with 21 more awaiting formal licences (Kurdistan RegionÕs Party 
Spectrum in Rudaw, 2011). However, the ruling parties, KDP and PUK are still 
dominant inside and outside government. 
In the 2009 general elections, other political parties stepped in to the parliament 
after removing the threshold of seven per cent of votes as a minimum to enter. The 
111 MPs in the Kurdistan Parliament represent the following political lists and 
parties (see Table 1 on the next page). 
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The Kurdistani List Coalition has won the last two regional elections (2005 and 2009). 
It has made up this cabinet together with other parties. The current coalition 
government consists of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Islamic Movement (KIM), the Chaldean Assyrian Council, 
Turkmen representatives, Communists and Socialists. There were 42 ministers in the 
fifth cabinet (2006-2009); however, this number reduced to 19 after the sixth cabinet 
formed by Barham Salih in 2009. 
 
Table 1 List of Political Parties and Represent People in Kurdistan Region 
Parliament 
Name of party of lists and parties Number of MPs 
Kurdistan List: (Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan) 
59 
Change List 25 
Reform and Services List: (Kurdistan Islamic Union, Islamic Group in 
Kurdistan, Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, Future Party) 
13 
Islamic Movement List 2 
Freedom and Social Justice List: (Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan 
Toilers Party, Kurdistan Independent Work Party, Kurdistan Pro-Democratic 
Party, Democratic Movement of Kurdistan People) 
1 
Turkoman Democratic Movement 3 
Turkoman Reform List 1 
Turkoman Erbil List 1 
Chaldean Assyrian Council (Christian) 3 
Al-Rafidain List (Christian) 2 
Armenian independent MP: Aram Shahin Dawood Bakoyian 1 
Total 111 
Source: Adopted from the website of Kurdistan Parliament 2012, and the website of 
the KRG. 
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3.2.2. Victimisation and Social Vulnerability Continued: The Intra‐Kurdish Civil 
War 1994–1998 
Given the regionÕs history, the KRG saw it necessary to expand social assistance to 
cover war victims and adult students, as well as poor, low-income households and 
disabled people. Therefore, in the first two years of office, the Kurdistan Parliament 
amended a number of laws and regulations, including the social welfare law, to 
reflect this need. However, due to lack of sufficient budget for the first cabinet of the 
KRG, no step was taken to implement these social programmes. Most importantly, 
the major political parties developed party-based foundations to provide services to 
their party members and their families killed either in the war with the Iraq 
government or in intra-Kurdish conflict. 
With increasing unemployment and suspension of the food ration programme by the 
central government in Baghdad, the first, second and third cabinet of the KRG did 
not allocate any funds to operate social security programmes, i.e. pension scheme 
and SPF. In the absence of state welfare assistance, humanitarian relief was 
provided by external aid agencies as a source of the regionÕs social fund (Natali, 
2010: 30). The external aid provided some basic needs in the form of food and 
services to the Kurdish population, while the KRG had another source of income 
generated from border revenues with Turkey and Iran: the fact is, that has always 
been a reason for disagreement and conflict between the KDP and PUK. The civil 
war during 1994 and 1998 not only impeded the delivery process of external aid, but 
also crumbled the newly-emerged local government. This will be explained in more 
detail. 
The KDP and PUK have had long disputes over leadership and revenue linked to 
the Khabur border gate. Issues regarding the division of revenue generated from the 
gate have even resulted in physical confrontations amongst the two parties. The 
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KDP and PUK have been the main actors in the political life of Kurdistan from the 
1991 uprising onwards. The relation between both major parties has, in one way or 
another, always been strained. Their cooperation and opposition have marked the 
Kurdish national movement and government. The KDP was founded in 1946 as an 
uneasy alliance between two different social groupings. The first was characterised 
as tribal based under the leadership of Mustafa Barzani and the second was 
representing the intelligentsia and educated groups under the guidance of Ibrahim 
Ahmed and his young protg, Jalal Talabani (current Iraqi President and leader of 
PUK). Despite the differences in their political views and ideology, both groups 
gathered around one political party. However, the interfusion broke in 1964 and the 
KDP split into two wings. The first group is best known as a leadership wing led by 
Barzani and the second as a political bureau wing led by Ahmed-Talabani. The 
rivalry ended with the success of Barzani in gaining the March Accord 1970 
(McDowall, 1996: 315-320). After the collapse of the Kurdish revolution in 1975, the 
division appeared again. The KDP reorganised under the leadership of Idris and 
then Masoud Barzani (sons of Mustafa Barzani), while Jalal Talabani formed a new 
party from mostly moderate and leftist-minded nationalist groups (Stansfield, 2005: 
197). 
When the results of the 1992 elections were revealed, the PUK with 43.6 per cent of 
the vote did not accept its marginal defeat versus the KDP with 45 per cent of the 
vote (McDowall, 1996: 381). Again, it did not agree to take on the role of opposition 
party, as proposed by the deputy-leader of the PUK, Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin. 
After tensions and negotiations between major parties, they adopted a plan which 
satisfied both sides. According to the plan, the KDP and PUK equally divided the 
100 seats (in addition to five seats reserved for the Christians) of KNA between 
them. Executive positions were also divided equally in a deal which became known 
as the 50:50 power sharing system (Stansfield, 2003: 146; Stansfield, 2005: 200).  
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Yet, power sharing did not dissolve the mistrust and dispute which has already 
existed between them since 1964. Indeed, despite sharing power, partisan conflicts 
continued in the mountains and other areas outside the central government control. 
The rivalry and antipathy between party leaders was deepened and transferred to 
cities until the civil war, known by Kurds as Birakuji (Fratricide) restarted in 1994. 
Since then the Iraqi Kurdistan Region has been divided politically and 
geographically between KDP and PUK regions. Erbil and Dohuk is a KDP 
dominated region, and Sulaimanyia and Garmian is a PUK dominated region (see 
Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 KDP and PUK Controlled Administrative Zones 
 
Source: Kermanshahi, Wikipedia, April 2012. 
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This division created extreme instability and uncertainty in the socio-political life of 
the Kurdistan Region. During the civil war, people were asked to show their loyalty, 
and were threatened, arrested, tortured and even killed when proved that they were 
loyal to the opposite party. No official statistics on all casualties have been 
published; however, more than 2,000 Kurds were killed until the half-term of the civil 
war before the US brokered peace in 1995 (Plotz, 1996). This division was strictly 
enforced to the extent that party members were forbidden from visiting provinces 
outside of their partyÕs control. With regard to internal refugees, the KDP estimated 
that 58,000 of its party members and supporters had been expelled from the PUK-
controlled region between October 1996 and October 1997, while the PUK asserted 
that 49,000 of its party members and supporters were expelled from the KDP-
controlled region between August 1996 and December 1997 (Global Security, 
2007). 
The condition of tension and conflict continued even after several mediations from 
Iran, Turkey and the US, and a solution was found under the terms of the 
Washington Agreement in 1998 (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004: 177). In 1998, the 
KDP and PUK ended their conflict; however, they did not manage to wholly 
overcome it. Interrogation and expulsion of each otherÕs party members continued. It 
took nearly seven years of normalisation, negotiation and coordination until they 
managed to reunite their two administrations. 
The intra-Kurdish civil war raised the profile of the party and affiliated people to a 
high level. Both parties were competing in delivering better services to their party 
supporters to keep their support. For instance, the first public housing project 
(Sarwaran) in the period of the Kurdistan Region was constructed for martyrs of the 
KDP and those who fled from the control of the PUK to Erbil in 2002. 
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3.2.3. Particracy, One‐Party Administration of KDP and PUK, and Power‐sharing 
Another factor that determined the operation of the KRG is the political party 
interference in government. Here, I will explore how the major parties controlled and 
obstructed the governmentÕs function. This will help to explain the research claims on 
how and why the major political parties have pursued a clientelistic practice through 
implementation of government social security programmes. 
Not only were the executive positions of the KRG affected by the 50:50 power-sharing 
system, but the social life was politicised and defragmented as well. Until the 2009 
elections, there was very little space for independent associations or an active public 
sphere outside the parties. Almost every political party in the Kurdistan Region acted 
as mini cabinets in their own right. For instance, the two ruling parties, KDP and PUK, 
had a student union, womenÕs organisation, teacher association and security 
apparatus within their structures (Bruinessen, 2005: 66). Although there were KRG 
offices and the KNA as parliamentary bodies, they acted more as party organisations 
than a regional government. Natali argues that the KRG and KNA are actually 
operated by officials who also act as functionaries for political party leaders (Natali, 
2010: 11-12). Politburos and party leaders are the main and only reference of power 
rather than the KNA itself, to the extent that the Kurdistan RegionÕs MPs and other 
government officials have limited power of decision making and have little discretion 
to behave independently. They are selected among lower level party members in 
order to compel them to comply with top party leadersÕ commands. Top party officials 
have not passed authorisation to their lower party members in the government. Party 
monopolisation of politics, government and society limited the extent to which an 
independent (non-party-based affiliation) public service could emerge. Civil servantsÕ 
loyalty to the political elite and parties remained critical. 
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The legacy of favouritism in recruitment has a long tradition in the Kurdistan Region, 
which can be dated back to the Iraqi regime. Partisanship and particracy has been 
deepened in Iraq as a whole and the Kurdistan Region in particular. Recruitment and 
employment is tightly owned and controlled by both parties in power. This is what can 
be called particracy in administration, which appeared in imposing party power over 
the Kurdistan Parliament and KRG. In practice the party should stand behind every 
decision made by parliament or government executives. In some cases, it is very 
difficult to clearly distinguish government offices from party ones. For instance, 
Masoud Barzani, when first elected as president of the Kurdistan Region in 2005, built 
the Presidency Office near his home and his party presidency office in Sari Rash, 
40 km (25 miles) north-east of the capital Erbil and located approximately 7 km 
(4.5 miles) close to his party political bureau. Going to an example from my research, 
due to the weakness in government organisations and the clientage attitude of 
parties, in 2001 and 2002, the KDP offices in Erbil were in charge of registering lists of 
peopleÕs names eligible for social protection benefits instead of the relevant regional 
directorates. 
Coming back to the power-sharing system, in each KRG office the deputy or assistant 
enjoyed the same power and influence as the minister or director; each needed the 
support of the other to plan policies and implement programmes, and each possessed 
a veto. This arrangement existed throughout the governmental structures, from the 
cabinet to the town councils, and also included schools, hospitals and internal security 
positions (Stansfield, 2005: 201). Sitting on the top of the whole structure were the 
political bureaux of the KDP and PUK, led by Barzani and Talabani respectively. 
The emergence of two party-controlled zones in the region divided the KRG into two 
separate administrations, KDP-controlled KRG administration in Erbil and Dohuk 
provinces and PUK-controlled KRG administration in Sulaymaniyah. Each 
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administration was entirely controlled by one party with limited participation of their 
smaller allied parties. Although the unified KRG was announced following the 
strategic agreement between both major parties, potentially they had not been 
completely integrated up to the time of drafting this thesis. Even though there have 
been ongoing negotiations between the KDP and PUK, with constant criticism from 
opposition parties, the three ministries have not yet been merged, including the 
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance and Economy, and the Ministry of 
Peshmarga. 
The source of power has been practised beyond the government, and parliament has 
no power to investigate the (lack of) transparency in government offices. For example, 
as will be addressed in more detail later in this chapter, before the Presidency Order 
in 2011 to carry out investigation in corruption, the parliament and judicial power had 
not followed a single corruption case in the region. The decision-making process is 
unofficially directly in the hands of politburos or leadership of dominant parties. They 
regularly interfere in the administration process of the KRG. Major political parties 
obviously shape the government, but they assume an undisputed role due to the 
weakness of government institutions. 
Having merged the two one-party administrations, the power sharing system returned 
to KRG and continued but this time between the more powerful KDP and the weak 
PUK, especially after the cleavage that happened to the PUK, and the Gorran 
Movement (Change Party) emerged. This will be explained in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
Rather than bringing the Kurds together, the power-sharing arrangements acted as a 
catalyst to intensify competition between the KDP and PUK as they struggled to 
coexist within a unified government to the point where even slight disagreements 
could accelerate the conflict again (Stansfield, 2005: 201). However, the political 
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instability became more apparent after the KDP and PUK made their ÔStrategic 
AgreementÕ in 2005, under which Talabani and Barzani agreed to unify the two 
northern KRGs in order to help Kurds make the best of changes and developments in 
post-Saddam Iraq. 
The fundamental principles of the strategic agreement between KDP and PUK are as 
follows: (1) participating in the Iraqi and regional elections with a unified list; (2) all 
government positions in either Iraq or KRG will be shared by the two parties (KDP-
PUK) and both will support each otherÕs members, not only in Erbil but also Baghdad. 
Moreover, the PUK and KDP will share power in the cabinet for four years, with each 
party holding the prime ministerial position and controlling the cabinet for two years 
each. Under exceptional circumstances and upon the request of PUK leader Jelal 
Talabani, the first two-year period of the Nechirvan Barzani (from the KDP) cabinet 
was extended to four years after his term ended (Semin, 2012). After the 2009 
election, Barham Salih held the post of Prime Minister for the first two years until 
January 2012, after which he relinquished his position to Nechirvan Barzani. 
 
3.2.4. From Economic Embargo to Economic Growth 
As I argued earlier in this chapter, the first decade of the free Kurdistan Region lived 
under a condition characterised as a deteriorated infrastructure and economic 
blockade. However, due to the lack of vision and priority for an effective social 
welfare system, and also because of civil war, the KRG did not allocate any funds 
for social security programmes. This area, as it now relatively suffers from the same 
problem, gets less attention in the governmentÕs priorities. During the 1990s, it was 
up to international NGOs, or party-based organisations, to deliver such services. It 
has always been suggested that the economic blockade and lack of funds 
prevented the KRG from providing adequate social security and other public 
 76 
services during the 1990s. Yet, the same negligence prevailed even after an 
increase in revenue. The last section of this chapter will present some figures for 
public expenditure on social security.  
Before the Gulf War and emergence of the semi-autonomous entity of Kurdistan in 
1991, the Iraqi government had intentionally neglected the Kurdish areas. Despite the 
destruction caused to agricultural economy and infrastructural facilities as a result of 
displacing the rural population from nearly 4,500 Kurdish villages, the Iraqi 
government had set up rare industries, which would have offered a good job 
opportunity for forcibly-relocated rural and urban populations. 
In addition to all the repression and destruction mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
Kurdistan Region and Iraq were affected by the Gulf War and its aftermath. However, 
at the time of regime change in Iraq, Leezenberg (2003: 149) argued that, despite its 
political conditions since 1991, the Kurdistan Region has experienced moderate 
economic prosperity. He pointed to some distinctive elements of the Kurdistan 
Regional economy during the first decade of Kurdish ruling experience (1992-2003), 
such as: continuing to use the older ÔSwiss printÕ Iraqi Dinars, while in the rest of Iraq 
new, locally-printed banknotes became the official money; the role of foreign funded 
NGOs; the revenues of the transit trade in oil were an enormous source of wealth, as 
was the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP) of the UN, which from 1997 onwards 
allocated 13 per cent of Iraqi oil revenue to the Kurdistan Region (Leezenberg, 2003: 
149; Leezenberg, 2005: 631-8). However, due to an on-going insurgency in Iraqi 
Kurdistan, deliberate ignorance and even destruction of thousands of villages and 
several larger cities by the Iraqi government badly damaged the infrastructure and left 
an enduring mess in Kurdish-populated areas (Natali, 2010: 39). It seems that the 
Kurdish administration was incapable of doing anything to recover from the 
destruction. The dynamic actors were rather international, Islamic and regional aid 
 77 
organisations that played a great role to prevent the region from extreme scarcity in 
the early 1990s. In that period almost two-thirds of external aid funds in Iraq were 
allocated to the Kurdistan Region (Natali, 2010: 30). 
Despite external aid, internal sources of income in the Kurdistan Region during the 
1990s came from illegal transit trade in petrol products from Iraq to Turkey, which 
became a point of dispute between both major parties. Iraqi oil was illegally going 
through the Ibrahim Khalil checkpoint under the control of the KDP. As part of the UN 
sanctions imposed on Iraq, oil exports were forbidden, but it was still encouraged by 
Iraq, the Kurdistan Region and Turkey. Smuggling of other items such as cigarettes, 
alcohol, food, and luxury and household appliances over the Khabur border crossing 
(and the other cross-border trade with Iran) also generated substantial amounts of 
money. It was revealed that at the Iraqi Kurdish-Turkish border only, the KRG earned 
approximately US$750 million annually (Stansfield, 2003: 51; Natali, 2010: 44). 
However, instead of causing disagreements, this source of income should have 
encouraged the Kurdistan Region to thrive. ÒDisagreement over the division of these 
revenues was one of the main causes of Kurdish infightingÓ (Leezenberg, 2005: 638). 
At the beginning, the revenue was shared between the KDP, PUK, and the 
government. However, when the disputes arose, the latter was excluded. Although 
those in the Kurdistan Region were living under cruel conditions, if there had not been 
a civil war, and lack of transparency, the region could still have fared better. 
To better understand the deterioration of economic life of Kurds in Iraq, one also has 
to trace the two economic blockades imposed first by the UNSC and second by the 
Iraqi government on the Kurdistan Region in the 1990s until the collapse of the regime 
in 2003. The UNSC issued Resolution No. 661 on 6 August 1990 to ban Iraq from all 
trade, economic and financial activities abroad. 
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This blockade had an immediate impact on food availability in Iraq, which imported 
70-80 per cent of its food. The shortages increased food prices ranging from 200 to 
1,800 per cent between August and November 1990 (Provost, 1992: 584-86). To 
reduce the double impact of scarcity and inflation, the Iraqi government introduced a 
food rationing system in September 1990; basic food items such as flour, oil, sugar, 
tea, rice and baby milk were provided on a monthly basis at very low prices 
(Alnasrawi, 2001: 208-9). However, the blockade evidently left its effects on all parts 
of Iraq as, in a testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
5 December 1990, it was reported that it had effectively Òshut off 90 per cent of IraqÕs 
imports and 97 per cent of its exports and produced serious disruptions to the 
economy and hardships to the peopleÓ (New York Times, 6 December 1990, A16, 
cited from Alnasrawi, 2001: 209). 
In April 1991, Resolution No. 661 was replaced by the much-detailed Resolution 
No. 687 sanctioned by the UNSC. In addition to the international sanctions regime, an 
internal blockade was imposed by the Iraqi government on the Kurdistan Region in 
the aftermath of its withdrawal from the three northern Kurdish populated areas 
(internationally by the UN and internally by Iraq) increased the high rate of 
unemployment that already existed in Kurdistan (Natali, 2010: 47), particularly among 
the young generation. This fact compelled many to involve themselves in fraternal 
fighting for one of the major parties in order to secure an income for themselves and, 
in most cases, for their family members. 
When the UN OFFP came into effect, a change occurred in the economic situation of 
the Kurdistan Region. The OFFP entitled everyone to a ration regardless of need. 
Although it provided satisfactory aid, it failed to contribute in capacity-building that 
would bring about an effective social security policy. The programme only offered 
short-term relief, not long-term development. As Natali (2010) stated, the OFFP 
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reinforced the culture of dependency and peopleÕs expectation of the role of 
government based on the distribution of food and social services. ÒIt strengthened the 
notion that had emerged during the BaÕathist social welfare state that people should 
receive goods and revenues without workÓ (Natali, 2010: 63). Although corruption was 
noted about the OFFP (Volcker, Goldstone and Pieth, 2005: 149-62), there was still 
little space for exploitation of the programme by political parties in power. 
By 2002 about 60 per cent of the population of the Kurdistan Region lived below the 
poverty line, gaining an average monthly income per person of about US$5, or about 
US$280 annually for a family of five. Twenty per cent lived in extreme poverty earning 
less than US$200 annually per family (FAO, 2002: 21, cited from Natali, 2010: 70). 
In order to measure the collapse of the Iraqi economy, since 1980 the GDP per capita 
had regularly declined from US$4,083 to $627 by 1991 (Alnasrawi, 1994: 123). 
However, the trend reversed straight after the overthrow of the BaÕathist regime in 
Iraq. As Ali Sindi, the Minister of Planning Ð KRG declared, the per capita income in 
the region for 2012 had reached US$4,000 compared to US$300 in 2003 (Aswat al-
Iraq, 2012). 
The most effective steps in economic development started after the invasion of Iraq in 
2003. Nevertheless, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the Kurds now 
receive 17 per cent of the Iraqi national budget, compared with 13 per cent from the 
OFFP. Unlike the rest of Iraq, the KRG has succeeded in stabilising the security 
situation in Kurdistan, and paved the way for relative economic development. Foreign 
investors have started doing business in the region and this has helped establish 
direct communication channels with regional and Western countries. 
According to statistics recently published by the Board of Investment, from August 
2006 to May 2012, over 450 licensed investment projects have been conducted 
across the region. These projects are divided between sectors such as housing, 
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industry, tourism, trading, agriculture, health, communication, education, finance and 
sports, and performed by national, foreign and joint venture companies (Board of 
Investment-KRG, 2012). Since the invasion, despite the KRGÕs share in central 
petroleum revenue, regularly increased to ten times by 2012, it has its own regional 
taxation and customs revenue generated by investment, transit and external trade. 
Furthermore, in recent years, the public sector in the Kurdistan Region has become 
the major user of public resources and the single main source of employment. Indeed, 
with 1,500,000 people working in the public sector, it employs one-third of the 
countryÕs population (USAID/IRAQ, 2008: 15; Khidhir, 2011). There has been a 
tradition in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region that the government should recruit all 
university and college graduates every year in the public sector. It is very rare to find a 
household with no payment from a real government job or a fraudulent one (Mucha 
Khori bin diwar). The KRGÕs focus on trade and investment has encouraged private 
sector employment. Since its fifth cabinet in 2006, the KRG has stepped back from 
unplanned recruitment in order to lighten the load on the public sector, encouraging 
people to find job opportunities in the private sector. The government has launched a 
plan for public sector employment; however, a new form of nepotism has cropped up 
and party affiliated people still have chance to be employed outside announced job 
application procedures. 
In other areas, the KRG has made efforts to provide official guidelines on investment 
activities in the region. The new Investment Law from July 2006 is aimed at creating 
conditions for promoting investment in the Kurdistan Region. It refers to both national 
and foreign capital sources and removes legal obstacles to investment. The KRG has 
also been very keen to improve the law in parallel with its implementation (Law of 
Investment, 2006; Heshmati, 2010: 253). Particularly from August 2006 to May 2012, 
the KRG Board of Investment approved more than US$21.5 billion worth of 
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investment projects, mainly in sectors such as construction and housing, industry, 
tourism, and trading (see Figure 5). Companies from Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, the 
USA, Germany, Sweden, Canada and South Korea can be counted among those 
doing business in the Kurdistan Region at present (Board of Investment-KRG, 2012). 
 
Figure 5 Number of Investment Projects in the Kurdistan RegionÕs Three 
Provinces by Sectors 2012 
 
Source: Department of Information and Studies, Investment Board, KRG. 
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With its vast resources, especially the oil revenue from the Baghdad central 
government, the KRG assumed a leading role in promoting economic development. 
With the slogan of ÔKurdistan is open for businessÕ the Prime Minister, Nechirvan 
Barzani (2006-9) emphasised private sector development by supporting and assuring 
potential investors in their business (Natali, 2010: 86). The Kurdistan Region 
Investment Law was also helped by his initiative, through facilitating tax-free, minimal 
payments of land rent and the free transfer of money (Law of Investment, 2006). 
In terms of oil revenue, the Kurdistan Region has been receiving its 17 per cent after 
the regime change, which for the year of 2011 only was IQD 11,180,000,000,000 
(US$9,474,000,000). With other regionsÕ sources of revenue from custom, Petro-
Dollar and electricity it reached IQD 12,386,000,000,000 (US$10,496,610,000) 
(Kurdistan Region GovernmentÕs Budget, 2011). For 2012, officials estimated that the 
Kurdistan Region would get IQD 15,245,797,000,000 (approximately US$13 Billion) 
from the federal oil revenue (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament/Act of Budget No. 8, 2012a). 
After 2003, revenues have been increased but structural changes did not occur in the 
social security system of KRG. The issue of poverty in the Kurdistan Region has been 
one of the major challenges over the past two decades, though very little has been 
done to address this issue. In spite of the large developmental achievements over the 
past few years, many challenges and obstacles still threaten the social security 
system of the Kurdistan Region. The results of surveys and field studies of Iraq Ð 
including the Kurdistan Region Ð indicate that about 22.9 per cent (6.9 million in the 
whole of Iraq) of the population of federal Iraq are below the poverty line. The poverty 
line in the Kurdistan Region and the whole federal government of Iraq has been 
measured as IQD 76,896 (US$61) per person monthly (Ministry of Planning 
MoP/KRG, 2012: 171-2). 
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3.2.5. Corruption: Non‐transparency and Party‐Affiliation‐Based Privileges 
For overall understanding of the implementation of social security in the KRG, the 
hidden and institutionalised corruption that exists in the administration and economic 
development of the KRG is noticed. Exploring issues of transparency and nepotism 
will explain how public funds are being used in favour of ruling parties. I argue that the 
shortage in budget is not due to lack of public funds for social welfare services, but 
rather due to lack of transparency and favouritism. 
Leezenberg believes that in the Ôpost-civil war societyÕ of the Kurdistan Region, the 
heritage of domestic conflict has strengthened and institutionalised patronage 
relations. The party members persistently attempt to monopolise, and indeed 
institutionalise, clientelistic networks (Leezeneberg, 2005: 640). The dominant parties 
divided the population based on their loyalty. This tradition was transferred and has 
taken new forms in later political economy of the Kurdistan Region. If in the period of 
conflict financial incentive was used to mobilise people to fight in the civil war, in the 
post-conflict era people in turn have been seeking their privileges. 
Ultimately, all administrative procedures in the Kurdistan Region remained linked with 
nepotism and not meritocracy. This kept most of the public sector grounded in party-
based affiliation (Natali, 2010: 41). Both ruling parties have always manipulated public 
budget for their own benefit and for that of their patrons. There have been debates on 
the extent to which the KRG has fallen into corruption. As has been reported by local, 
regional and international media, even after the unification of both Kurdish 
administrations in the Kurdistan Region, the budget of the KRG was distributed 
between the KDP and PUK unfairly (Kate Clark, Radio BBC Radio4, 2008). Both of 
the major parties make monthly or occasional payments to very active party 
members, particularly those who advertise for and defend the party. Anyone who aims 
to secure his or her interests is obliged to cooperate with the KDP and PUK, because 
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these parties control all employment and education opportunities (Natali, 2010; 
Wilgenburg, 2011). As Heshmati stated, the Òhigh profitability of imports [in the 
Kurdistan Region] owned and operated by decision-makersÓ (Heshmati, 2010: 247). 
In the last decade, both parties have been criticised for not being transparent with 
public income and budget (Gorran- Economic Research Unit, 2012). For instance, 
Sayid Akram, former director of the Ibrahim Khalil security department from 2000-
2006, claimed that customs revenue was not being transferred to the treasury of the 
KRG; rather, the funds were being channelled to the personal office of Nechirvan 
Barzani, deputy of the KDP and current PM. Following AkramÕs claim, 50 MPs, mostly 
from opposition parties, and 11 MPs from the majority Kurdistani Bloc, signed a 
petition demanding transparent accounting of the revenue generated from Ibrahim 
Khalil.  
Their efforts were, however, undermined by the head of parliament, who reacted 
against the formation of an investigative committee, according to various newspapers 
(Ahmed, 2011). Indeed, often, instead of pursuing and exposing corruption cases, the 
Kurdistan Parliament tries to cover them up or deliberately ignore them. Following the 
mass protests of 17 February 2011 in Sulaimania, Masud Barzani, the President of 
Kurdistan, promised to form a Ôreform committeeÕ to investigate the governmentÕs 
flaws. After nearly 11 months of investigating KRG ministries and offices, the Reform 
Committee finalised a long report on suspected sectors involved in corruption, such 
as health, land, public and administrative recruitment, bureaucracy, watchdog 
institutions, government tenders, budget, investment, housing, and other sectors 
(Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012). Despite pointing out many corruption cases, no 
one was sent to court. Leaders of the major political parties put obstacles in the way 
of investigating corruption cases. Those cases have been safe from penalising due to 
the two-administration before 2005 and the Strategic Agreement of the two dominant 
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parties. Even those who are deemed culpable are not dismissed for fear that they 
may be recruited by the other side. 
The endemic corruption in the region has also been noted by foreign investors and 
governments who have criticised the KRG authority for poor transparency and 
corruption. US diplomats advised the KRG to act on Òdivesting the government of 
conflict-of-interest business dealings, enforcing new codes of conduct for government 
officials, and prying the party away from the workings of governmentÓ (Salih, 2011). 
Despite launching the ÔGood Governance and TransparencyÕ strategy by the KRG in 
2009 (Kurdistan Regional Government, 2009b), it seems that the government is too 
weak to oppose party interference. 
As a response to the mass demonstrations of February 2011, The Presidency of the 
Kurdistan Region set up the Reform Commission (KRRC) in March 2011. After 11 
months of investigation, the committee published a report within which it 
acknowledged that Òthere has been widespread corruption and mismanagement in 
several branches of the government, paying particular attention to malpractices found 
in the health sector, the allocation of public property to businesses, government job 
opportunities, administration and government bureaucracy, the tendering of public 
projects, budget transparency, investment policies, public housing projects, 
agricultural lands, market monopolies, and fuel and domestic energyÓ (Kurdistan 
Region Presidency, 2012). It was expected that a high number of corruption cases 
and people involved in them to would be disclosed. According to the report, among 
the 174 cases submitted to the commission for investigation, only 110 cases were 
pursued. Around 95 KRG lower and middle officials were identified as engaging in 
corrupt practices and were removed from their jobs. However, this investigation never 
reached high officials from both parties and government sides. The suspected cases 
followed were from the sectors of health, land and housing development, and 
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tendering of contracts. The oil sector was kept out of all investigations; the sector that 
was criticised most by non-government journalism and opposition parties. 
A number of people in the health sector involved with importing expired and low-
quality medicines were referred to judicial authorities. The Commission determined 
that excessive administrative red-tape in some KRG institutions is a main motivation 
for people to seek favours and resort to bribery in trying to process applications. 
The Commission also described the process of the tendering for contracts (in building 
and supplying contracts) as sometimes very underhanded, corruption-ridden, and 
lacking in transparency. A high number of government officials who have their own 
companies are awarded contracts (Kurdistan Region Presidency, 2012).  
The misuse of public budget to consolidate the hegemony of the ruling party has not 
been hidden from the public eye. It has always been a point for criticism and protest 
by a disadvantaged population, civil society workers, intellectuals and opposition 
parties. The dissatisfactions arose when people saw that the social inequality 
between poor and rich has been largely widened and the government continued 
practising clientelism in dealing with social funds. The argument was mobilised by 
less-advantaged political parties, especially when a new opposition movement 
(Gorran) emerged. 
Although opposing parties existed before the general elections in 2009, they always 
compromised for party privileges. The presence of a large number of Kurdish political 
parties in political life largely started with the uprising in 1991. Despite the diversity in 
their social orientation and political ideology from nationalistic to Islamist and from 
communist to more liberal, there has not been an active political opposition system in 
the Kurdistan Region. The 50:50 power-sharing system of the early 1990s eliminated 
any chance for an opposition system to manifest itself. Civil war therefore took the 
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Kurdistan Region far away from what is experienced in a stable pluralistic 
atmosphere.  
The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) tried to play a role of opposition; however, it 
suddenly decided to participate in the election as part of a broad Coalition of 
Kurdistani List with both major parties between 2001 and 2005. The KIUÕs decision to 
participate in a coalition with major parties minimised its popularity. Thus, it decided to 
withdraw from the coalition with ruling parties who were seen to be corrupt. Instead 
the KIU stuck with the role of opposition and formed an electoral coalition under the 
name of Service and Reform List with an Islamic Group in Kurdistan, the Kurdistan 
Socialist Party and the Future Party for the 2009 election. The KIU has been known 
by its reformative slogan and approach, but the majority of people and its supporters 
were unconvinced, and demanded more pressure on the ruling parties to accomplish 
real reform in the KRG. 
The voices of protest against inequality, corruption and lack of public services were 
formed in a quasi-left movement under the name of the ÒGorranÓ Change Movement. 
This is the reform party founded by Nawshirwan Mustafa Amin in 2009. Amin had 
resigned from his post as the number-two man in the PUK in December 2006 and 
eventually set up his own political movement. The new party was organised as an 
open movement instead of having a solid party structure and it intensively opposed 
corruption and nepotism. Gorran (Change Movement) advocated for transparency in 
all aspects of public life: party, government, and business versus corruption, a 
professional civil service against nepotism and clientelism, reform in election law, 
control of major parties and a large reduction of the public sector. Largely at the 
expense of the PUK, Gorran won almost 24 per cent of the vote and 25 seats in the 
Kurdistan parliamentary elections held on 25 July 2009. Thus, Gorran now has 
become the first real opposition party in the Kurdistan Parliament (Gunter, 2011: 105-
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06). Gorran, instead of reform, put real change in the political system in the canon of 
its agenda and mobilised the unsatisfied population, especially the younger 
generation of Kurdistan, around promises of a peaceful regime change, as it believes 
that the current system is no longer able to make any reform in its bodies. They 
argued that the entire political system in the Kurdistan Region is corrupt and non-
reformable; the only way out is to change it. Mustafa, the Kurdish opposition leader, 
claims that Òthe priority of our movement is to change the political system and not 
the personnelÓ (Mustafa, 2012, Official website of Gorran Movement, 16 January 
2012). 
Since public protests in Kurdistan started in February 2011, the Kurdistan President 
Massoud Barzani suggested that parliament discuss early elections, as a measure to 
calm the anti-government protesters who are angered by high unemployment, 
economic and political corruption and lack of basic services. These demonstrations 
have put extensive pressure on the KRG and its ruling parties to act in response to 
peopleÕs demands. 
 
3.3. An Overview of Social Security Policy in the KRG: Opportunities and 
Reality 
Having examined the administrative experience in the last two decades, we can argue 
that the KRG has not given social security programmes (except for the RPFMGS 
programme) any kind of priority. The Kurdish political question has attracted the most 
attention of Kurdish leaders. The priorities of the KRG have been determined by 
political consideration. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, during the 1990s the 
provision of social welfare was left to international and regional aid agencies. The 
Kurdish Parliament and government devoted numerous general directorates, 
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ministerial bodies and regulations dealing with social protection and community care 
for individuals and families. 
In this regard, the aims that have been highlighted are to recover and improve the 
family functionality and its continuity. It has been ensured to encounter problems and 
crises, which threaten disadvantaged people. One of the most important ministerial 
bodies that comprise government social funds is the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs (MoLSA). The KRG has devoted several ministry bodies and directorates, and 
adopted a number of regulations through which it delivers services and care to 
population in general and poor families in particular. The government aims to recover 
and develop the life of disadvantaged people through numerous social security 
programmes. These programmes have not been limited to merely cash transfers, but 
operated as parallel schemes comprising social care and awareness too. 
In this regard, the FPF, the older version of SSN, provided social assistance to poor 
and low earners, through allocating a monthly salary to each of the families and 
individuals having eligibility. It also provided social awareness to the family, in order to 
develop their capacity and potential, and protect them from breakdown (Qadir, 2006: 
78). Despite an efficient representation of the needs of the poor in ministry 
regulations, the fact that the MoLSA determined to commit itself to serving 
disadvantaged people, the implementation process can be impeded by many factors. 
With the UNSC economic embargo imposed upon Iraq as a sanction against Iraqis as 
a result of occupying Kuwait in 1990, it rapidly impacted on Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Region as the population and government were not prepared for such a sanction. 
An efficient social protection system has been adopted by the KRG for the poor 
through rectifying the SPF and other social cash benefits. The government wants to 
distinguish, though, between those who are included in permanent social protection 
allowances (disabled people, widows, older people, etc.) and those who are 
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temporarily in need of financial support until their condition changes. The social 
protection policy should observe the two important aspects of the poverty rate and 
social gap, the first being the standards defining the amount given as an allowance 
(MoP/KRG, 2011: 175-177). 
 
3.3.1. Legal Context: Social Welfare Law and Regulations 
The root of the social security programmes of the KRG can be traced back to the 
BaÕathist regime in Iraq. Although there has been a welfare state embodied in social 
insurance law and its implementation agencies in Iraq since 1956, none of the 
government social services took shape in Kurdish provinces until 1980. For the first 
time, the FPF was founded when the Iraqi authorities issued The Iraqi Social Security 
Law No. 126 in 1980 (Ghafur, 2003). This law was a considerable step forward with 
the aim of building a comprehensive social insurance and care system based on the 
ÔsocialistÕ ideology of the BaÕath Party in Iraq. This law subsequently helped to 
establish numbers of government programmes working for social assistance and 
development. With this new approved law, all directorates of the MoLSA at that time 
were revised and new programmes, including Family Protection (ReÕayat Al-Usra), 
were established, whereby a monthly salary was assigned to individuals and 
households simply described as needy, poor and of low income. The focus of this 
programme was on supporting the family as a significant social unit. FPF was 
considered as a means to support the family from disintegration and other social 
problems (Qadir, 2006: 2). 
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3.3.1.1. MoLSA Social Protection Programme 
After the uprising and when the KNA and KRG were established, local authorities 
became the heir to the remains of Iraqi government offices. In its early meetings, KNA 
revised the former Iraqi social protection regulations. Initial remedies appeared in the 
KNAÕs protocols within the law of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MoHSA) 
(KNA, 1993: 256-260). Apart from including cases like survivors of genocide and 
martyrs of Kurdish national freedom and their family members, or the married 
students on very low income, other cases were also claimed to be covered, 
i.e. widows, disabled people, and orphans. Although potential changes and 
enlargement were proposed to the programme by KNA, in practice there was no trace 
of its implementation. The first cabinet of the KRG did not include a specific ministry 
for social affairs. All directorates of social protection and social care were integrated 
within the MoHSA. For the first time in the PUK controlled administration of the KRG 
in 2001, a ministry was devoted to administer governmental social programmes. 
When the new law for the MoLSA, Law No. 34 was issued in 2004 (Kurdistan Region 
Parliament, 2004), it confirmed some general goals, none of which have been well 
supported in the ministryÕs social organisations. The Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament (IKP) 
amended this law, in law No. 12, 2007 (MoLSA, 2007), which in Act (2) mentioned the 
general points below: 
First: (Act 2, Section 2): The ministry endeavours to cover all workers in its social 
insurance scheme, and to provide social protection to them and their families. 
Second: (Act 2, Section 8): Paying attention to families of genocide and chemical 
weapon victims, and providing social and psychological care to them. 
Third: (Act 2, Section 11): Providing financial assistance to poor and those incapable 
to work and who have no income sources (MoLSA, 2007). 
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At the time of drafting the thesis, a social insurance scheme has not been put into 
effect. All MoLSAÕs social programmesÕ fund goes to the SSN which, as presented in 
Chapter 6, cannot effectively cover the living cost of its claimants. With regard to the 
second point, although the MoLSA regulations tried to cover war and genocide 
victims, they have been better treated in separate government programmes. These 
regulations were followed by some instructions issued by the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, which implied the intention to implement the SSN: an advanced 
programme which seemed to be more developed to merge all MoLSA social cash 
transfer programmes and open to cover new clients (MoFE, 2011). The change, 
implementing the new SSN, occurred after the February 2011 mass protests for public 
services and the criticism of parliamentary opposition parties about corruption in 
government social funds. The SSN programme instructions clearly address providing 
financial assistance to widows, divorces, married students, families of imprisoned 
people, females with no breadwinner or income, disabled people, elderly people and 
orphans (MoFE, 2011). 
 
3.3.1.2 MoMA’s Social Benefits 
The MoMA was first established in May 2006 with the fifth cabinet (unified cabinet) of 
the KRG. Before that time, each political party Ð especially the two major parties, the 
KDP and PUK Ð had its own Foundation of Martyrs to serve martyrsÕ surviving 
dependants. Both party-based foundations were merged to form a newly-created 
ministry, which was authorised by Law No. 8 (2006) issued by the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Parliament. 
The IKP issued the Law No. 9 of the RPFMGS in 2007 to define the beneficiaries of 
the MoMA social benefit programme. The RPFMGS identified its beneficiaries as 
heirs of Kurdish liberation fighters, genocide survivors, chemical attacks and other war 
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victims. The family member or closest relative of mentioned groups are entitled to 
receive a monthly salary and other non-cash benefits. 
Law No.9/2007 of RPFMGS defines the martyr as Òanyone who lost his/her life in 
battlefields or during political struggles in the national liberation movement against the 
brutal regimes of Iraq or in mass murder crimes or in any wars made against the 
Kurdistan peopleÓ (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, Law No. 9, 2007). Within this definition, 
three types of martyrs have been defined: Battlefield Martyrs, those to have lost their 
life in a fight with the Iraqi regime or were killed while in a political position; Genocide 
Victims, people who were missing and died in Anfal and other genocide operations 
between 1963 and 2003; Citizen martyrs, ordinary people killed in wars and terror 
attacks, during the time of uprising 1991 or afterwards during the forced exodus from 
cities to borders with Turkey and Iran. Political prisoners were added to these three 
categories of beneficiaries (MoF/KRG 2009). 
 
3.3.2. Humanitarian Aids and Social Protection 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, during the 1990s when the Kurdistan Region 
lived in extreme famine and the KRG was incapable of implementing social cash 
transfers, external aid became the main source of social security provision. While 
there was no viable social security programme in the region, international aid, in the 
form of food, cash and good services, was the only source available for the public. 
International aid to the Iraq and Kurdistan Region was an urgent response to the 
humanitarian crisis which resulted from the Gulf War and uprising. Indeed, the 
conditions and needs of Kurds, as victims of state repression and conflict, secured a 
short-term relief in the form of food and goods, which did not contribute in any way to 
establish an effective social security. As Natali argues, humanitarian aid commenced 
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as a replacement to public welfare assistance and became the most important source 
of income in the region (Natali, 2010: 30). 
Several international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) including the UN, Red 
Cross and Red Crescent organisations, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and World Food 
Programme (WFP), provided food, shelter and non-food items, but not cash (USAID, 
2003). The International Islamic Relief Organisation was one of the few charities that 
provided cash in the region to orphans and families with no breadwinners. 
When the UN OFFP came into effect, the economic lives of the population changed. 
According to the OFFP, everyone was entitled to rations (food and household 
cleaning supplies). It provided a satisfactory non-cash programme, but more or less it 
did not contribute in an effective social security policy for the Kurdistan Region. All it 
provided was short-term relief, not an institutionalised social protection. Neo-
patrimonial politics ultimately obstructed the effective implementation of relief 
programmes and potential private sector initiative (Natali, 2010: 41). 
 
3.4. Social Security Programmes of KRG 
I have selected two government social security programmes, SSN and RPFMGS, as 
case studies about which to conduct my research. These two programmes are 
considered as the largest government cash transfer programmes at the present time. 
Although the government recently discussed the proposal of social insurance to be 
put into practice, it has not yet been fully implemented. There is also a public pension 
scheme implemented; however, the research data are very limited for the last two 
programmes. 
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3.4.1. Social Safety Net 
The only social cash transfer programme of the KRG approved by parliament in the 
1990s was the SPF, which before 2009 was called the FPF, and recently in 2011 
became the SSN. Although there were guiding regulations and instructions related to 
social protection, the KRG did not put them into effect. The SPF was suspended after 
the withdrawal of the Iraqi government offices and the administrative vacuum in the 
Kurdistan Region. 
In addition to the economic blockade, which had put the region into a high-risk 
condition, there was also the lack of vital resources, i.e. sufficient funds and skilled 
staff, which thoroughly paralysed the newly established government from being able 
to adequately provide public services. A large majority of citizens were living with high 
vulnerability and risk, facing a lack of basic needs for everyday life. As mentioned 
before, the only organisations performing in the region were international aid 
agencies. The threatening socio-economic situation continued until 2001, when the 
economy of the Kurdistan Region was getting relatively better. Only by then was the 
SPF revived. 
Four periods in the development of the programme are observed in the KRG era 
(Qadir, 2006; MoLSA/KRG, 2009; MoLSA/KRG, 2011): Family Protection Fund (FPF) 
1992-2002; Family Protection Fund (FPF) 2001-2009; Social Protection Fund (SPF) 
2009-2011; and Social Safety Net (SSN) after 2011. 
a. Family Protection Fund (FPF) before 2002: The FPF in the early stage of this 
period, as captured earlier in this chapter, was almost dysfunctional and not being 
implemented. In this phase the programme existed just by name in ministerial 
regulations and as part of a marginal directorate which belonged to the MoHSA. 
However, in 2001, with the initiative of the deputy minister of social affairs, FPF was 
reactivated. The idea of implementing the programme came from a shared project 
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between MoHSA and the United Nations ChildrenÕs Fund (UNICEF) as a result of 
research which had been conducted on child labour in Erbil. The FPF started with 600 
beneficiaries (Interview with Dler Anwar, worked in the FPF since its reactivation, May 
2011). 
b. Family Protection Fund (FPF), between 2001 and 2009; which has been referred to 
throughout this thesis as a combined financial and social awareness programme. In 
its early stages, each beneficiary was receiving monthly IQD 200 in previously used 
currency (which after 2003 was replaced with the new Iraqi Dinar). This amount was 
close to that received by an unskilled employee in full-time work at that time. 
Although, in the middle of this period, a sufficient endeavour, time (one year and a 
half) and a large amount of money was spent to set up the SSN programme at the 
national level in Iraq between 2004 and 2005, the KRG refused to operate the SSN as 
a better alternative to the SPF. There was until recently an ongoing controversy 
between the Iraqi Federal Government and the KRG as to whether the funds should 
be supplied from Baghdad separately or should be paid from the 17 per cent share 
regional budget of the KRG. Therefore, the SSN as an Iraqi social programme was 
frozen before being implemented. 
The period of FPF was attributed to a combination of social cash transfer and social 
awareness programme. Social workers/visitors had been appointed to help 
beneficiaries with social, health and psychological advice and consultation. 
Implementing the programme through social workers/visitors was to ease the process 
of intervention into families. Every social worker/visitor was responsible for a number 
of families that had to be visited monthly. In this period the number of programme 
beneficiaries increased to 8,000 in 2003, then in 2005 it reached 12,699 in the 
province of Erbil and 400 in Duhok. 
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c. Social Protection Fund (SPF), between 2009 and 2011: In this round cash transfer 
minus social support (social awareness) began following a ministerial command to 
dismiss all social workers/visitors without prior notice and eliminate regular visits to 
households from the programme. One reason was to cut the cost of social 
workers/visitors which was thought to be worthless and the social awareness scheme 
was not considered as part of the social security programme. Another reason was to 
avoid any manipulation with beneficiariesÕ money by social workers/visitors, in which 
in couple of cases happened. The number of beneficiaries in Erbil remained the 
same, while in Sulaymaniyah it was about 20,925, and in Duhok it was 9,302, which 
by the end of this period in total reached 42,926 beneficiaries in all three provinces of 
the Kurdistan Region. 
d. Social Safety Net (SSN) after 2011: The SSN was proposed as a joint project by 
the Iraqi central government and the World Bank. The programme was now being 
implemented as an alternative to SPF. In fact it emerged from a combination of social 
protection programmes, such as Disabled Allowance, Blind Allowance, as well as 
SPF, which altogether would have about 180,000 beneficiaries. The SSN needed new 
regulations and eligibility guidance in order to be implemented. 
What accelerated the implementation of SSN was the mass protest of 17 February 
2011 in the region. It was expanded to cover a wider eligible population and the 
amount paid as social assistance was five times higher than was paid during the SPF 
programme. It can be argued that the SSN was used as a response to calm down 
protestors after 17 February. The SSN programme provides financial assistance to 
widows, the divorced, married students, families of imprisoned people, females with 
no breadwinner or income, disabled, elderly and orphans (MoFE/Financial Instruction, 
No.24, 2011). The new eligibility criteria came into effect following instruction No.22 
which announced the increase of the SSN monthly salary by 500%, from IQD 30,000 
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(US$25) to IQD 150,000 (US$125), retrospective with effect from 1 January 2011 
(MoFE/Financial Instruction, No.22, 2011). This programme had a budget of 
IQD 399,211,000,000 (US$319,368,800) for the year 2012 (Gorran Ð Economic 
Research Unit, 2012). 
 
3.4.2. RPFMGS Programme in the MoMA 
Another large social security programme is the RPFMGS implemented by MoMA, 
though it is not necessarily considered as a purely social security programme. Despite 
the social protection aspect of the RPFMGS programme, it is always highlighted that 
the MoMA will request compensation for all human and material losses and 
disadvantages resulting especially from genocide operations (Iraqi Kurdistan 
Parliament, Law no. 9, 2007). 
After the 1991 uprising, the practice of providing families of martyrs with services was 
developed among all political parties, particularly the PUK and KDP. Almost all 
political parties in the Kurdistan Region had offices dedicated to the affairs of martyrs. 
The MoMA was first established in May 2006 with the fifth cabinet (unified cabinet) of 
the KRG. However, before that time, each political party had already started serving 
the family members of martyrs and surviving dependants. Before a government 
ministry assumed this role, located within the cabinet, there were two foundations 
within each spilt Kurdish administration in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces. Those 
two Foundation of Martyrs were devoted to recording the names of all martyrs within 
their jurisdictions so that cash benefits and limited housing services could be offered 
to them all, for the first time regardless of political affiliation (MoMA Law, No. 9, 2007). 
Alongside the Foundation of Martyrs, there were also several Anfal Foundations in the 
region working mostly as non-governmental organisations to provide financial 
assistance periodically to families of genocide victims. The government combined all 
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those organisations and agencies into one governmental body to unify and improve 
service provision. 
The MoMA provides the families of martyrs and genocide victims with spiritual and 
material support and the means of a decent life. In most government statements and 
ministerial documents as well as in the media, this programme is referred to as 
ÔMartyrs and Genocide allowanceÕ. The programme provides regular monthly cash 
benefits in addition to health, education, housing and other social services. Due to the 
involvement of health and housing services for the victim survivors of wars and 
genocide and in some other aspects of financial reparation, it can be described as a 
compensation scheme. 
About 83,500 families of martyrs and genocide victims and families of political 
prisoners receive monthly payments from MoMA. The government equally offers them 
health, educational, social, and housing services (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 Numbers of Families of Martyrs and Genocide Victims, Benefiting from 
Services (2007-2009), by Service Types 
Types of Services 2007 2008 2009 
Health 46215 32932 65945 
Social Services 882 411 8672 
Education 490 3146 601 
Housing (Lands, Residential Units)     --- 2713 1780 
Total 47587 39202 76998 
Source: Adopted from ÔMoP/KRG, Regional Development Strategy for Kurdistan 
Region, 2011Õ. 
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Essentially, social security schemes are defined according to the functions, which are 
reflected in social security objectives. MoMA programme beneficiaries are not 
determined on the basis of need, rather selection is based on the experiences of war 
and genocide. This means that the MoMA programme is neither targeting those with 
insufficient income, nor is it a pension-based scheme. Nonetheless, we can argue that 
the scheme still caters for those on low income because most war victims were 
breadwinners in their families, and to give compensation to their living relatives cannot 
be deemed misplaced. 
 
3.4.3. Pension Scheme 
The Council of Ministers-KRG in 2003 decreed that all employees and workers should 
be covered by a public pension scheme. According to the decree the employer has to 
contribute to the fund an amount equal to twelve per cent of the basic salary of the 
workers every month, and the employees have to contribute five per cent of their 
basic monthly salary. Public sector employees have been automatically covered by 
the scheme. However, employers in the private sector try to avoid the contribution and 
workers have not been familiar with their rights to the social security. As per the 
decree, any company, factory, shop or organisation that has three or more workers or 
staff should be covered by a public investment fund under the name of the 
Employment Protection Network. However, apart from public sector employees, 
people in the private sector have little knowledge about the scheme and are not 
willing to register with it. It seems that time is needed for public sector employees to 
believe in the scheme. 
The pension is a contributory-based scheme. The funds are kept by the MoLSA-
KRG to protect the rights of labourers and to become a financial support for them in 
case they become unemployed or retired. The benefits that workers get from this 
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fund include the ability to transfer their years of working (contributions) from one 
organisation to another, as well as the ability to withdraw all the money they and 
their employers contributed to the fund when they lose their jobs. However, some 
employers do not want to pay their 12 per cent share of the contribution, Òtherefore, 
they try to keep the worker uninformed about their rightsÓ (The Kurdish Globe, 
2012). 
The decree was replaced by a wider law passed by parliament on 5 June 2012. Law 
No. 4, the Law of Pension and Social Insurance, came into force to cover all 
employees equally. Now it is compulsory for all private sector employees to be 
registered. 
 
3.4.4. Social Insurance 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Law of MoLSA addresses social insurance. 
Section 2 in Act No. 2 explicitly declares Òthe ministry endeavours to cover all workers 
in its social insurance scheme, and to provide social protection to them and their 
familiesÓ (MoLSA Law No. 12, 2007). Although a directorate general in MoLSA is 
devoted to social insurance (Directorate General of Labour and Social Insurance, 
DGLSI), until 2011 there had been no place for a social insurance scheme in the 
social benefit system of the KRG. Most activities of this directorate focused on work-
related training. The main part of the DGLSI, the social insurance scheme, has not 
been activated yet. 
In mid-2011, the MoLSA decided to reactivate and amend its ÔLaw of Pension and 
Social InsuranceÕ. However, as a response to mass protests held earlier that year, the 
MoLSA adopted a temporary scheme called ÔSocial Insurance For GraduatesÕ. This 
scheme was designed for a maximum period of six months, from September 2011 
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until the end of February 2012, through which accordingly an amount of IQD 150,000 
(approx. US$120) was paid monthly to unemployed graduates of university and higher 
education institutions who were below the age of 36 years. In the first phase, more 
than 16,000 claimants applied for this benefit (MoLSA/KRG, 2011: 22-3). The KRG 
did not have a comprehensive social insurance system until the Kurdistan Parliament 
passed Law No. 4 on 5 June 2012. This law was the first in the history of the KRG 
and was based on the Law of Pension and Social Insurance No. 39 in 1971. 
According to this law, for the first time all private- and public-sector employees should 
be covered (Kurdistan Parliament, Law No. 4, 2012b). 
The law now is in force, but little information has been disseminated amongst people 
to familiarise them with their rights. In spite of that, until now not all the employers and 
companies working in Kurdistan have been registered with the relevant directorate to 
pay the social security contributions for their staff. A large number of workers in the 
private and public sectors are not aware of their rights guaranteed by this law, and 
social security officials argue that the employers should be interrogated (The Kurdish 
Globe, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
Conducting research on social policy in the Kurdistan Region needs some historical, 
political and socio-economic elements to be drawn on. These backgrounds are 
necessary to understand the influence of political parties on the Kurdish administration 
in general and implementation of its social policies in particular. This chapter started 
to capture past and current political and socio-economic conditions, which I argue 
have determined the politico-administrative structure of the KRG. Without this 
background it was impossible to draw upon the framework of the KRG on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, its current social security implementation. 
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I have argued that social policy process in the Kurdistan Region cannot be well 
understood without information on how its politico-administrative system operates. In 
the first section of this chapter I offered a brief history of Iraqi Kurdistan Region, with a 
special focus on state repression, genocide, and Kurdish fratricide. I have used these 
events to underline the fact that repressive state policy against Kurdish civilians in Iraq 
led to the creation of a nation politically victimised and socio-economically vulnerable. 
Under the command of the BaÕathist regime the Kurds had the lowest proportion of 
social benefits in Iraq. 
Having brought up the ÔKurdish issue in IraqÕ in the last century shows that, despite 
the huge price the Kurds have paid with their blood to obtain self-sovereignty in the 
northern part of Iraq, they have rarely been able to taste their power even for a short 
period until the uprising in 1991. Afterwards, although for the first time a Kurdish 
parliament and government were established, it failed to implement any convincing 
social programmes. The unemployment rate was high and the populace suffered 
even more when food rations from the Iraqi central government were also suspended 
and yet the KRG still failed to allocate any funds to operate social security 
programmes, including pensions and social protection programmes, against these 
hardships. 
The Kurdistan Region was suffering from an extreme shortage in budget and broken 
public services. As a result of sanctions and a double embargo on the Kurdistan 
Region, the population continued to live in most disadvantaged circumstances. 
Although international aid and OFFP slightly eased these hardships, during the 
1990s, the governmentÕs own failure to act persisted. Perhaps an even more 
debilitating factor was the civil war between the regionÕs two major parties. This 
created a division of the KRG into two one-party administrations, in Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah. The Kurdish fratricide also consolidated a welfare tradition inherited 
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from the BaÕathist regime and already existed on the nature of Kurdish political 
partisanship, which I can call Ôparty-affiliated welfare provisionÕ. This type of party-
controlled governance of the KRG can be explained within the theory of clientelism in 
social funds. This means that the KRG and the ruling parties favour some groups over 
others, while delivering public services. In the war-prone society like the Kurdistan 
Region, which is still driven by revolutionary party-driven governments, distribution of 
public funds by government often tends to be on the basis of loyalty rather than need. 
Despite the political and socio-economic opportunities that the KRG embraced after 
the invasion in 2003, the KRG has developed a double standard. On one side it has 
facilitated rapid socio-economic growth, and on the other due to clientelistic practices 
it has ushered the KRG into institutionalised corruption. However, as discussed in this 
chapter, the emergence of opposition parties after the 2009 general elections and the 
mass protests in February 2011 awakened the government to endeavour to promote 
a degree of transparency in administration. In this respect the government initiated 
some plans for socio-political development. 
After decades of deprivation, an overall socio-economic progress in Kurdistan is 
appearing. The development is generated by the political stability the Kurdistan 
Region gained after Iraq was invaded in 2003. The oil-based revenue generation on 
the one side and foreign investment and trade-based economy on the other promoted 
a livelihood, however, and consequently increased inequalities in the society. 
I argue that there is no shortage in budget that caused the lack of public funds for 
social welfare services, but rather it is the issue of transparency and favouritism. In 
the last decade, the KRG has achieved a dramatic economic development. 
Economic development figures for 2004-2008 reveal that GDP at current prices 
(Table 3) increased from IQD 2,419.6 billion in 2004 to IQD 20,954 billion in 2008 at 
current prices, at a total increase rate of 110% and a compound growth rate of 68.9 
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per cent for 2004-2008, reflecting remarkably on per capita GDP which increased 
from IQD 524,426 in 2004 up to IQD 1,976,673 in 2007, and IQD 4,740,000 in 2008. 
This is expected to increase annually by 10 per cent (MoP, Regional Development 
Strategy for Kurdistan Region 2013-2017, 2011: 28). With this financial measure, 
the Kurdistan Region is now considered as a high-middle-income region. However, 
favouritism and not preferential practice have deepened social inequality. All 
administrative procedures in the Kurdistan Region remain linked with nepotism and 
not meritocracy and this has kept much of the public sector grounded in personality 
and party-based affiliation. Both ruling parties have always utilised public funds for 
their own benefit and that of their patrons. In other words, political parties make 
economic interests; in turn the financial incentives stimulate party affiliation, loyalty 
and intensive political engagement. In this respect, both major parties set monthly or 
occasional payments to their own parties, persistently to those who actively 
advertise for and defend the party. 
What relatively decreased party interference in all spaces of society and government 
institutions was the emergence of opposition parties and the strong presence in 
parliament. The KRG and ruling parties were compelled to respond to the mass 
protests after February 2011 by increasing social benefits and salaries. 
The chapter finally argued that the KRG has created a welfare system which 
overlooks the disadvantaged sections of the population in favour of those loyal to their 
political parties. This double standard appears when one compares the benefits 
delivered to beneficiaries of RPFMGS with those of the SPF or SSN. In terms of law 
and regulations, social protection programmes enjoy the same status. However, the 
legal framework of the KRGÕs social protection programmes does not necessarily 
result in an equal treatment by government. The data collected from both 
programmes (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) proves that there is a preferential treatment 
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practised in the implementation of KRGÕs social security. The RPFMGS and its 
beneficiaries are preferentially treated, while the SSN has been ignored. Having 
looked at both programmes, one could argue that, despite supportive regulations and 
instructions, their implementation and output are markedly different. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY, DATA COLLECTION 
AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodological approaches used and 
addresses specific procedures that have been followed to conduct this research. It 
has been divided into six sections. Section one addresses the development of 
research aims and questions. It also discusses how a pilot study might result in the 
revision of the entire approach of the research. Section two is devoted to discussing 
the research design and methods. This research has adopted a qualitative 
methodology with a comparative approach. As for that, it has been justified how and 
why a certain type of case study (multiple-case study) design has been chosen for 
this research. Section three addresses the accessibility issue, sampling and 
characteristics of participants of the research. Section four is about accessibility of the 
case and data, sampling issues and key characteristics of the research participants. 
The fourth section also discusses the methods that have been employed and 
procedures of data collection. The two main methods of data collection in this 
research were semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The data set gathered 
from interviews was also validated with documentary data. As for the data analysis, 
thematic analysis has been applied. Section five addresses ethical considerations, 
informed consent and anonymity. 
 108 
4.1. Research Objective 
During the first year of conducting this research, its theoretical framework, the 
research field and research sample were all subject to change. This is indeed a 
normal part of the research process because one usually starts from a broad topic. 
However, meetings with supervisors and further enquires about the topic might reveal 
that the approach being adopted is wrong or that the entire topic needs to be 
discarded. The first critique and comment which the researcher faces is Ôgo and think 
more about your topic and try to focus on one elementÕ, or Ôtry to narrow down the 
topicÕ. This might be considered as time wasting but in retrospect it becomes evident 
that it is exactly this process which helps to create a more focused and proper 
research framework. I experienced all of these, one way or another. 
 
4.1.1. Early Development of the Research Project 
In the early stage of this research project, I aimed to cover four social security and 
assistance organisations in the Kurdistan Region as a case study. I visited the region 
and did some pilot interviews with people working in public and charitable 
organisations which I had randomly selected. The programmes were from two 
government ministries (MoMA, and the SSN, and the charitable organisations 
Nanakaly Charity Organisation and Hewa Project for Talented Students). At that time, 
I found enough reasons to justify the inclusion of these four bodies in my research. 
However, in a second visit to the Kurdistan Region, certain theoretical aspects of my 
research had changed following consultations with my supervisors and some 
colleagues. Consequently, all of the organisations I had initially selected were no 
longer necessarily useful to the enquiries I had set out to make. Essentially, for 
reasons explained later, I decided to remain with only the two government agencies. 
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4.1.2. Pilot Interviews and Finalising Research Context 
It is often advisable to conduct a pilot study prior to the research fieldwork. This is not 
only beneficial for testing and revising the research instruments (Bryman, 2008: 247-
8), but it also guides researchers to review their research questions. Marshall and 
Rossman (2011: 95) state that pilot studies are not only employed to test your 
proposed research strategy, but also to underpin the rationale for style and strategy of 
the research. In this research, conducting pilot interviews helped, to an extent, to 
ensure that the data I was eventually coming back to collect were going to be useful 
to the study. I could return to the field knowing that my journey was no longer going to 
be purely speculative. 
I visited the Kurdistan Region twice prior to finalising the research context. Two pilot 
interviews were conducted over a combined period of five months (the first pilot study 
of eight interviews in spring 2009 and the second of eleven interviews in autumn 
2009). Though I was asking the selected participants to agree to an interview at these 
points, I also informed them that I may re-interview them in the main data collection 
process. For some of these early interviewees, this turned out to be the case. 
Feedback obtained from these pilot studies proved helpful in rethinking the 
appropriateness and representativeness of the research sample. Although this 
research does not involve any grounded theory approach, capturing the participantsÕ 
reflections prior to the final version of research questions was useful in selecting the 
two government social security programmes. In addition to the supervisorsÕ 
comments and feedback on interviews and research questions, I felt it was also 
necessary to get the participantsÕ own reactions to the topic and questions. The pilot 
interviews enabled me to make the interview questions less leading and allow 
interviewees to talk and explain more openly, rather than putting them in a 
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judgemental position by just focusing on advantages and disadvantages of the 
programme. 
As a result of the pilot study, the entire approach of the research was revised. At the 
start, my research objective was to make a comparison between government and 
non-government organisations working within the area of providing social security and 
assistance. However, following the testing phase, this objective was found to be ill-
suited to the field in which the research was to be conducted. It was unsuitable to 
compare these two sectors, especially in terms of organisational structure, coverage 
and delivering the services. There would have been a methodological defect if I had 
proceeded without the pilot study. 
For example, in terms of coverage and the size of the programme, government 
agencies are not comparable with non-government agencies because the latter 
mostly caters for locals and with 3,000-4,000 beneficiaries it does not cover all areas 
of the region. However, both government social security agencies on which I 
eventually focused covered all provinces of the region. Also, due to the nature of 
SSN, its entitlement procedures and service delivery have more similarity with the 
non-government programmes such as Nanakaly, both of which have nothing to do 
with war and genocide victims. Both programmes, SSN and the Nanakaly Charity 
Organisation, target the poor and low-income families. On the other hand, the criteria 
of entitlement of Martyrs and Anfal familiesÕ victims as a government programme are 
totally different and are based on loss of a member or members of family in wars and 
genocide campaigns. This is regardless of the fact that the beneficiary is not 
necessarily in need of financial support.  
The inappropriateness of conducting a comparison between government and non-
government agencies is due to the nature of their programmes. Although a 
comparison has still been made, this time it was within government social 
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programmes in terms of performance, priority and the importance given by high 
officials and politicians to them, and the way they deal with beneficiaries. Some pilot 
interviews were excluded from the data set, such as the Nanakali Charity 
Organisation, because a radical change occurred in the case study and its units. 
However, other pilot interviews, including all those conducted with participants from 
SSN and MoMA, were used when I realised they would contribute to the research 
findings, even though the research strategy and the focus were changed slightly 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 135). 
The first visit was made while I was still thinking of a different theoretical framework, 
structuration theory, which was found inappropriate and changed to implementation 
theory. Having changed my theoretical approach and literature review, the research 
interview questions were changed accordingly. Conclusively, the pilot interviews 
helped me to relate the interview questions to implementation research. The pilot 
study also provided me with advice to step into this exploratory study, reformulating 
research questions and to be more confident in relation to the accessibility to data and 
forthcoming participants responding. 
 
4.1.3. Research Question and Purposes 
Policy analysis is designed to supply information about complex social and 
economic problems and to assess the processes by which a policy or programme is 
formulated and implemented (Yanow, 2000: 2). The main objective of this research is 
to explore the critical implementation factors of social security programmes in the 
Kurdistan Region and the rationale behind these. To this end, as they are illustrated in 
Table 3, the following research questions were adopted to follow numerous primary 
purposes. 
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Table 3 Research Question and Purposes 
 Research Questions Purposes 
1 To what extent do political conditions have an 
impact on the implementation process? 
To examine the impact of the political 
setting in the region on the policy 
implementation process 
2 Why does the KRG prioritise some social 
security programmes over others? What 
bases are there for a social security 
programme to be prioritised while another is 
neglected by the government in the Kurdistan 
Region? 
To explore the relationships between 
policy makers and policy implementers 
To explain norms, reasons, factors and 
conditions leading to this policy 
prioritisation 
3 How and why are social security programmes 
used for political party interests in the 
Kurdistan Region? 
To understand implementersÕ perception 
of the policy and their performance 
4 How do different groups in the policy 
implementation process perceive policy 
implementation? 
To understand implementersÕ perception 
of the policy and their performance 
5 What are the implementation gaps in the field 
of social security and what accounts for 
these? 
To explore critical factors (i.e. actors, 
conditions) and problems (i.e. conditions) 
in the implementation of researched 
programmes  
6 How plausible are the key theories/models of 
implementation in a politically underdeveloped 
context? What lessons can be drawn from 
social security programme implementation in 
developing countries in light of my research 
findings? 
To test the applicability of main 
theory/models of implementation on the 
data set gathered for the case of social 
security programmes of the KRG  
To understand the characteristics of 
social security implementation in the 
Kurdistan Region within the broader 
developing countries/regions 
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4.2. Research Methods and Design 
In view of the research objective and questions, a case study was selected as part of 
an overall qualitative mode of research. As Creswell (2007) asserts qualitative 
researchers should rely on a few cases and many variables (Creswell, 2007: 38-9). 
After addressing multiple-case study design used in this research, this section will 
demonstrate how the types of research objectives, purposes and questions inevitably 
led the researcher to adopt qualitative and comparative methods. 
 
4.2.1. Multiple‐Case Study (Embedded) Design 
Creswell (2007: 73) states that case study is used to understand an issue or a 
problem using ÔcaseÕ as a specific illustration. It involves the extensive study of a 
phenomenon through one or more cases within a bounded system (i.e. a context, a 
setting). As Yin (2008: 8) indicates, making a decision on a sound research strategy 
is always affected by three key factors. 
1. The type of research question. 
2. The extent to which the researcher has control over events. 
3. The level of focus on contemporary rather than historical events. 
Yin suggests that, when there is no control over events, case studies are the 
preferred strategies. In this type of research strategy, how and/or why questions are 
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the researcher has little or no 
control (2009: 9). Given the research questions addressed earlier, the case study 
seems to be the most appropriate research method, providing an in-depth approach 
to the data collection and analysis. 
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The question about how and why a programme follows a top-down model and 
another follows a bottom-up one in their policy formulation and implementation 
needs to specify a multiple-case study or a single-case with two or more case study 
units. The unit of analysis in the case study determines whether a single-case or 
multiple-case study method needs to be chosen. For instance, there may be a 
single unit within a single case in one context (holistic design) or multiple-units of 
analysis (embedded) chosen within a context. The number of units of analysis 
determines whether the case study is holistic or embedded. It would also be 
possible to choose cases in different contexts, either with single-unit or embedded 
units of analysis (Yin, 2009). 
A unit of analysis in a case study is the kind of event to which the variables, themes 
or subjects under study as well as the research problems refer, and about which 
data have to be collected. Units of case study analysis can be individuals (such as 
policy actors, implementers), a programme or scheme (social security, policy), 
events or processes (implementation) (Huberman & Miles, 2002; Collis & Hussey, 
2003). Yin (2003, 2008) believes that evidence from multiple cases is often 
considered more compelling, as it provides more insights and raises the validity of 
the research. This study has adopted a multiple-case (embedded) design to gain 
more insights and robust understanding of the perceptions of the implementers 
towards the social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. 
One advantage of case study research design is that it allows for obtaining an 
understanding and providing pertinent answers to how and why questions about the 
event of process under investigation (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). Furthermore, due 
to the complexity and sensitivities of the issue targeted, and due to the researchÕs 
association with intangible perceptions, as advised by Yin (2003), case studies are 
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suitable research designs, which provide an in-depth approach to data collection 
and analysis. They are also useful for theory testing. 
 
4.2.2. Qualitative Research Approach 
Qualitative research was deemed appropriate because the research questions could 
not be answered by figures but by the words, views, opinions and realities of the 
participants. Instead of figures, which act as measures to explain underlying concepts, 
the qualitative approach in policy analysis is rather interpretative and focuses on the 
meanings of the policy and values; beliefs and feelings of policy actors could be taken 
to interpret policy actors and values (Yanow, 2000: 8). Implementation of social 
security programmes involves implementers at different bureaucratic levels. Their 
knowledge, perspectives and concerns relating to programme performance and 
relevant issues are an important part of understanding implementation in a given 
context. The exploratory nature of this research and its questions led me to follow 
qualitative research. Therefore, the qualitative approach meets the purpose of this 
study, concentrating on the comparative analysis. 
The policy implementersÕ experience, perception and relations cannot be observed in 
closed or open-ended questionnaires, as used in quantitative research. The 
qualitative approach to research holds that character that cannot be subsumed within 
numerical classification. It places emphasis on the validity of multiple meaning 
structures and holistic analysis, as opposed to the criteria of reliability and statistical 
categorisation (Burns, 2000). As noticed from the research questions, and in order to 
obtain knowledge on the implementation process of social security programmes, 
qualitative interviews were most appropriate in providing insights into policy practice 
and relations involved in the social policy organisations. To make sure that the 
potential participants had an understanding of the processes used by the social 
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security organisations, I targeted people in different levels of implementation. 
Essentially, how policy is viewed, understood and experienced, however, only 
appears once programme employees attempt to implement policy. In this regard, 
qualitative research reveals nuanced understanding of policy that could lead to more 
focused and in-depth investigations of policy implementation. 
Using qualitative inquiry for policy implementation research is mostly preferred in the 
areas of education (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Brigitte, 2003), health (Castellani, 1992), 
social care (Clark, 1997), housing development (Lazin, 1994), and organisational 
performance (Elmore, 1978; Torenvlied, 2000). Brigitte offered some empirical 
evidence to substantiate how qualitative research can be used to study policy 
implementation, generally in the case of education in developing countries and 
South Africa in particular. He used an interpretive, qualitative framework to design 
his study and present some empirical evidence to respond to the stated research 
question. 
I argue that qualitative research of social programmes offers substance and deeper 
understandings of the complexities at the levels of policy implementation. My 
qualitative research is based on an investigation into the experiences and 
perceptions of different levels of implementers in two government social security 
programmes in the Kurdistan Region. Having chosen two government social security 
programmes, and the nature of research purposes and questions encouraged me to 
explore and explain the differences in the way they are implemented. 
 
4.2.3. Comparative Method 
The comparison applied in this research is neither cross-national, as is usually seen in 
international policy research, nor between two or more sectors in a country, but it is 
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rather between two government programmes in one region. This type of comparison 
is rarely found in policy implementation research. I intended to employ a comparative 
method in order to explore the reasons for the differences in the implementation of the 
two programmes though they are both government-funded. 
My aim in utilising comparison is to explain why these similarities and differences exist 
between two government programmes in terms of the following themes. 
1. To understand how different policy actors perceive the performance and functionality 
of their programmes. 
2. To explain how different levels of policy actors in both researched programmes 
experience the implementation of the policy. 
3. To explain the degree of importance and priority given to both programmes by 
government and high officials. 
4. To show the relation between high officials, implementers and recipients in the 
formulation and implementation process. 
5. To highlight the factors that attracted politicianÕs and government officials to employ 
double standards in dealing with social security programmes. 
6. To explain how and why programme A follows a top-down model and programme B 
follows a bottom-up model in the formulation and implementation of the policy. 
7. To explain the implementation problems/gaps in each programme. 
8. Finally, the research findings are comparable in cross-regional or cross-national 
levels; though conducting such a comparison has not been emphasised, or given as 
much importance as the above themes in this research. 
Having selected two government social security programmes that provide services to 
two different groups of the population is a good reason to follow such a comparative 
policy analysis. To ensure comparability, both researched programmes are 
government social security programmes implemented within the frame control of two 
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ministerial bodies. The SSN is a directorate which operates within the MoLSA. It is 
specially designed to provide cash transfer to poor, low-income and disabled people. 
However, the RPFMGS is the main social fund programme of the MoMA, which 
delivers cash transfers to families of the war victims and genocide survivors. This 
provides for people who have lost their family members, in most cases their 
breadwinners, and through these means are entitled to a monthly salary. This 
research adopted a comparative analysis to explain the similarities and differences in 
the implementation of both programmes. This method is also important to unfold the 
differences in the administrative and financial support provided by government and 
ruling party leaders to both programmes. Through utilising this method, it has been 
shown that, based on the socio-political status of beneficiaries, each programme is 
treated differently by government and high officials. 
 
4.2.4. Researching Social Policy in Context 
Matland (1995) stated that in experimental implementation, contextual condition is 
likely to be important, which means the environment influences policy outcomes. As I 
affirmed in the theoretical background, this research concerns itself with political, 
administrative and organisational contexts of implementation. For researching the 
implementation of social security policy, contextual aspects are taken into account as 
determinant factors to understand how social security programmes work in particular 
political, administrative and organisational conditions. Implementation research in 
developing countries needs to put a great emphasis particularly on politico-
administrative settings that explicitly influence the implementation process. The 
ultimate outcome of policy implementation is determined by the interaction of decision 
makers within a given politico-administrative context (Grindle, 1980). The political 
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context may facilitate or constrain policy implementation in the way implementers 
intend to practise. 
What I mean by political context of policy implementation in the KRG is the political 
structure of the Kurdistan Region that has been developed from a nationalist 
perspective. It also implies a party-government relation, which is characterised by 
control of the former over the latter. The KRG is strictly directed by the ruling parties. 
Top party leaders and politburos are the only groups involved in the decision-making 
and administration. Attitudes of government and high officials towards the researched 
programmes cannot be understood without taking into account these contextual 
aspects. As I argued earlier in this thesis, in the politically under-developed Kurdistan 
Region, within which social policies have been highly politicised, it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to implement a programme without the endorsement of power. 
Taking all these into account, the policy action (here being implementation or 
programme performance), their meanings and values can only be best understood 
when placing and looking at the policy implementation within the broader politico-
administrative framework. 
Another contextual element is the organisational aspects of the social programmes. 
This means that the way the programme and relevant organisation are structured and 
administered has influence on the programme performance. In other words, the 
concept of policy implementation refers to both the performances and the politico-
administrative and institutional context. Therefore, in my research, both spheres have 
taken into account some differences in the implementation of both programmes that 
could also be explained through this research approach. 
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4.3. Accessibility, Sampling and Characteristics of Research Participants 
The issues which the researcher needs to consider as part of his/her research design 
are accessibility to data and good sampling. During the last visit to the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region, I checked the readiness of the participants of my research. I suspected that 
some of the participants, especially those working in government agencies were going 
to be less likely to cooperate with me. Obtaining information and data from 
government offices by press and newspapers is still restricted. There is a view Ð and 
in some cases probably a reality Ð which is stated among journalists that the 
government does not collaborate with investigators and researchers in terms of giving 
information and data, especially when the research matter relates to budget and 
money. I turned the interview strategy and interview questions to involve less of these 
matters, unless the heads of offices and ministers agreed to conduct interviews with 
their employees. 
I had made contacts and arranged appointments before leaving the UK. Although I 
worked under pressure, as I was doing three to four interviews some days, I could 
make proper use the whole time of my being in the research field. Being in contact 
with my fieldwork in the last one-and-a-half years was helpful to get to the participants 
easily. 
 
4.3.1. Sampling 
This research proposes to investigate the implementation of social security schemes 
in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region delivered by government agencies. For the purpose of 
obtaining such understanding and to answer research questions, two government 
social security programmes have been chosen to conduct this research: 
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(a) Social Safety Net which was first founded under the name of the Family Protection 
Box, then later changed to the Social Protection Fund, and recently, since 2011, has 
been changed to the Social Safety Net. This works as a directorate of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs. 
(b) Rights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and Genocide Survivors  in the 
Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs. 
As the research focuses on the implementation policy it needs to involve the 
administrators who perform social security programmes in the region. For the purpose 
of achieving that, a purposive sampling strategy has been used. In the next section 
about methods of data collection and analysis I will outline specifically my sample for 
each method and from each programme. 
From the SSN programme 22 interviews were conducted across the whole region 
(provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok), including the MoLSA, general directors 
of Social Protection and Development in each province, managers of SSN in all main 
cities, ministry advisors and senior officers, and frontline staff members of the SSN 
programme in all directorates in the Kurdistan Region. In the RPFMGS programme, 
23 interviews were conducted, including the former Minister of MoMA, general 
managers of MoMA in all three provinces, managers of Martyr Affairs in all three 
provinces, managers of Anfal Affairs in all three provinces, managers of Legal Affairs 
in all three Provinces, and the rest were frontline staff members of the programme 
who were in direct contact with beneficiaries. 
In choosing those two programmes Ð and on the basis of the research questions Ð 
several factors have been taken into account. 
a. Coverage: I had intended to focus on large agencies with a large number of 
beneficiaries as these have the most impact on social security in the region. 
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b. Diversity: agencies that held various objectives and criteria of coverage to appoint 
their programmeÕs beneficiaries were also taken into account. 
c. Types of Agencies: two slightly different types of government agencies have been 
selected as a sample in my research. 
 
4.3.2. Research Participants 
In each programme, four types of participant will be classified for methodological 
purposes. 
1. Lower office workers (civil servants or frontline staff): this includes lower level 
officers dealing with the recipients and their applications and cases. Before 
transforming the payment method to banks, they were distributing benefits and 
services to beneficiaries directly. 
2. Middle officials (senior officers, programme managers and directors): these people 
are either promoted because of their skills and obtained work experiences or 
appointed. They are in direct contact with beneficiaries on one side and high officials. 
During my fieldwork I realised that this group contains the most experienced workers 
in the social programmes. Most of them have been in the business for a long time. 
3. High officials (general directors and ministry advisors): they are high advisors or 
directors in the general directorate. Due to their position, they play an administrative 
role in managing programmes and assuring the transformation of policy into action 
and service delivery 
4. Ministers and Members of Parliament: ministers of the two ministries that are in 
charge of two of the social programmes and are mainly representing their political 
parties as they are appointed by their leaders that have direct power over them in 
taking any decision with regards to their governmental tasks. The only member of the 
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parliament that I interviewed is the head of the Social, Children and Family Affairs 
Committee in parliament. More details of all individual and group interviewees are 
listed in Appendix (1). 
 
4.4. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
Having taken my proposed sample and participants, which will be illustrated in more 
detail in the forthcoming sections, I met above 95 per cent of proposed interviewees 
for a relatively short period of time. All interviews were conducted after an informed 
consent form had been filled by participants and signed by the researcher. Forty-five 
people out of forty-six individual interviewees and all participants of the six focus 
groups agreed to have their names identified in the research. So anonymity was not 
provided as it was not a problem for most of the research participants. 
The only person on my list of proposed participants who declined to take part in the 
interviews was the current minister of MoMA. I had made contact with his office two 
weeks before travelling to the Kurdistan Region and visited the office thrice on my 
arrival. However, they did not understand (or maybe did not want to understand) what 
I needed. I sensed from his secretary that there was the suspicion that I was a 
journalist, although I had a letter from the University of Nottingham confirming my 
identity, and the relevant contact details were provided to verify the authenticity of the 
letter. I had also made a copy of the letter available in the Kurdish language. It was 
only at the end of the fieldwork that I received positive feedback from the office; even 
then, I was informed that the minister had passed the list of interview questions to his 
advisors to reply. 
As I had done with the ministerÕs office, I made contact with most participants and 
arranged appointments with them before leaving the UK. This was very necessary 
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because the Kurdistan Region has not been well researched and I aimed to avoid any 
last minute disappointments. During the fieldwork I also collected items from 
newspapers, administrative documents and projects, and web pages. Undoubtedly, 
secondary research on reports and journal articles are fundamental. However, to the 
best of my knowledge, there is no published research or report on the issues I had set 
out to explore. 
The field of my research in the Kurdistan Region has not been previously researched. 
Hence, despite employing semi-structured interviews as the main tool for collecting 
data, this research will solely deal with primary documents (newspapers, 
administrative documents and projects, and web pages). Undoubtedly, secondary 
research on reports and newspaper articles are fundamental; however, according to 
my knowledge there is no published research or report around this topic in my 
research field already stated. 
 
4.4.1. Interviewing: Semi‐structured Interview and Focus Group 
With regard to the methods that I used to collect research data, the qualitative semi-
structured interviews and focus groups were seen to be suitable. The main method of 
data collection used in this research was interview. As the nature of the research and 
the types of research questions require, semi-structured interview is the best 
technique for collecting data on policy implementation research. As Silverman 
suggests Òinterviewing provides a way of generating empirical data about the social 
world by asking people to talk about their lives. In this respect, interviews are special 
forms of conversationÓ (Silverman, 2004). On the other hand, Flick et al. believe that 
there are Òdifferent types and procedures of qualitative interviewsÓ (2004: 204). 
However, what most matches my purpose is Zhang and WildemuthÕs description of 
interviews, as the tools by which researchers access ÒpeopleÕs experiences and their 
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inner perceptions, attitudes, and feelings of realityÓ (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009: 
222). 
The individual interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, except one, which 
exceeded two hours, and two interviews took less than 30 minutes. All interviews 
were conducted in the Kurdish language, except for one which was done in Arabic. 
Essentially, we spoke any language of the participantsÕ preference in order to give 
them room to express their knowledge, experience, opinion and feelings more fluently 
and confidently. The fact that I, as an insider/researcher, spoke the same language, 
made it easier for me to do the fieldwork. In addition to that, as a genocide survivor, I 
had some experience of the services provided by MoMA. Despite the fact that I 
already personally knew many of my interviewees and was in constant contact with 
the research participants, the sampling design used was snowballing. They were, 
especially lower and middle level officials, knowledgeable, responsive and very 
cooperative with my research project. However, I made sure that my familiarity did not 
affect the interview responses. 
As for the focus groups, sampling for group discussion requires more careful thought 
than regular interviews. Ethical issues are important and need to be considered. 
Sometimes this technique is used in order to access views and attitudes of 
participants (Barbour, 2008). Hence, focus groups are useful to bring to light on how 
they view, assess and regard a process. I used focus group discussions because it 
seemed to me that this method could facilitate my understanding of policy 
implementation processes. As Barbour argues, focus groups allow researchers to 
invite recipients to ÔproblematiseÕ taken-for-granted assumptions (2008: 133-134). In 
my experience, focus group discussions helped to save time and to avoid 
temperamental views because I found that participants were more accurate and 
accountable in public, though it is also true that some were reluctant to express their 
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true opinions in front of others. In some cases, just after the group interviews, some 
interviewees contacted the researcher and started adding some more information 
which they hesitated to say in front of others, but they did not mind including into the 
actual data set. Nonetheless, it was also found that the interactional atmosphere of 
focus group discussions encouraged the participants to share and exchange 
information, which made for the collection of rich data at the end of the day. 
Before starting my first focus group, and as I was not feeling very confident to use this 
technique, I did a pilot focus group with seven students from the Department of 
Sociology at Salahaddin University. I requested from colleagues to select me to join a 
group of students sharing a problem; this helped me to expect what I had to do in a 
group interview, in terms of time managing, keeping a balance between all 
participants and encouraging them to participate. Finally, for the purpose of obtaining 
that, six focus groups, three per province for each programme, were held. Each focus 
group contained five to eight people from selected frontline staff and programme 
managers. The six focus groups were also recorded, translated and dealt with in the 
same way as individual interviews. 
All but a few of the interviews and focus groups were carried out in the participantsÕ 
offices. They were all digitally recorded. However, some participants (6) added 
specific information and comments, and requested to be off the record, so I tried to 
make as many notes as I could after the interview-recorded conversations. All 
participants preferred to speak in Kurdish, except one in Arabic. I usually asked them 
to speak in whatever language they felt confident with, which allowed them to express 
their knowledge, experience, opinions and feelings more fluently. Thus, the research 
involved translation from Kurdish into English, which obliged me to be selective with 
transcripts for translation. Most individual interviews (42) ranged in duration from 30 to 
90 minutes, except one which exceeded that time and two which were less than that. I 
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found a lot of irrelevant over-talking in some recorded interviews which wasted my 
time during transforming them into text. Another problem of the translation was with 
the idioms and expression, which perhaps most researchers conducting interviews 
other than the language of research/writing have experienced. 
 
4.4.2. Documentary Data Analysis 
Documents as a source of data, such as official documents deriving from the 
government and non-governmental sources, mass media outputs, and other textual 
and virtual outputs, are not considered as research materials to a particular study. 
Those documents have not been produced specifically for the purpose of social 
research (Bryman, 2008: 380-1). As Silverman states Òdocuments are Ôsocial factsÕ, in 
that they are produced, shared and used in a socially organised way. They are not, 
however, transparent representations of organisational routines, decision-making 
processes or professional diagnoses. They construct particular kinds of 
representation using their own conventionsÓ (2008: 58). 
In addition to the interviews as the main data set of the research, I have been 
observing news, public and official statements, reports published in newspapers and 
online sources. My research will draw upon two types of documentary data: official 
documents (policy proposals, parliamentary regulations, and public and policy 
statements by politicians, executives and relevant people) and media outputs (textual 
and virtual, and news reports). 
The rationale for using such a method is that there is no secondary research 
published in the area of my research in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. In spite of that, in 
this kind of source, one could have access to official correspondence, annual reports 
and mission statements. The reason for reviewing documents was to corroborate the 
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information gathered at the interview stage (Tellis, 1997; Yin, 2003). Integrating 
documentary data into interviews will be useful for validation, testing and further 
investigation of what has been said in an interview data set. It has also been used to 
follow updates and progress on the cases (programmes) under research. 
 
4.4.3. Data Analysis 
For the analysis of the interview and focus group data, thematic analysis was applied, 
which is exploratory and aims to understand rather than knowing the data (Mark & 
Yardley, 2004). The themes identified and categorised after the interviews are based 
on the answers obtained from interviewees and on research/interview questions. The 
process of data analysis was conducted after the main data collection (interviews); 
however, it has always been developed with the secondary data set (documentary 
data). Different sub-themes were categorised under topics and themes generated 
from the data sets; they were then used as the basis for coding the transcripts. It has 
to be said that the initial coding was conducted before transcription. As I mentioned 
earlier, I have been selective with the interview data and only those contents have 
been transcribed, translated and used for analysis purpose, which related to the 
themes and sub-themes. 
 
4.5. Ethical Considerations and Informed Consent 
In terms of ethical considerations, certain formal arrangements were also considered. 
I first filled-in the research ethics form which was approved by my school, Sociology 
and Social Policy at the University of Nottingham. Although my research did not 
involve any serious ethical issues and harm to participants however, certain 
arrangements were also considered. Interviewees agreed to contribute to the 
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research on a voluntary basis and gave written consent for the interview to be 
undertaken. 
Civil servants and government officials of the KRG had, and currently have, concerns 
towards leaking information to newspapers in the Kurdistan Region. I had to reassure 
the participants that the data would not be used outside the academic and research 
purposes. All research participants agreed and signed for their names to be revealed 
and their sayings to be used as quotes in this thesis, except three, who I kept 
anonymous in the research data analysis and the list of participants. The participants 
were given the informed consent form with key interview questions attached (see 
Appendices 2 and 3, which include the Kurdish and English version of informed 
consent and key interview questions) prior to making any decision. As the decision 
was made to take part in the interview, they were also given the right to terminate or 
withdraw their speeches during or after the interview. 
 
Conclusion 
The six sections of this chapter draw attention to the fact that a multi-methodology of 
qualitative case study and comparative policy analysis have been followed. Policy 
analysis is designed to supply information about complex social and economic 
problems and to assess the processes by which a policy or programme is 
formulated and implemented (Yanow, 2000: 2). The main objective of this research is 
to explore the critical implementation factors of social security programmes in the 
Kurdistan Region and the rationale behind them. 
After addressing the multiple-case study design used in this research, this section will 
demonstrate how the types of research objective, purposes and questions inevitably 
led the researcher to adopt qualitative and comparative methods. This study has 
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adopted a multiple-case (embedded) design to gain more insights and robust 
understanding of the perceptions of the implementers towards the social security 
programmes in the Kurdistan Region. 
Implementation of social security programmes involves different levels of 
implementers. Their knowledge, perspectives and concerns relating to programme 
performance and relevant issues are an important part of understanding 
implementation in a given context. The exploratory nature of this research project and 
its questions led me to follow qualitative research. Therefore, the qualitative approach 
meets the purpose of this study, concentrating on the comparative analysis. Besides 
this, in exploring the implementation of social security policy, contextual aspects are 
taken into account as determinant factors to understand how social security 
programmes work in particular political, administrative and organisational conditions. 
Implementation research in developing countries needs to put a great emphasis 
particularly on politico-administrative and institutional settings. 
As for the methods of data collection, this chapter proposes the use of documentary 
data as supplementary sources to interviews in policy research, which contribute to 
the validity of the research data. 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE: REFERRAL SOCIAL SECURITY 
PROGRAMME: THE RIGHT AND PRIVILEGES TO 
FAMILIES OF MARTYRS AND GENOCIDE SURVIVORS 
 
Introduction 
Based on an analysis of the data collected from research participants working in 
various positions in the MoMA, I argue that the effectiveness of the implementation of 
a social security programme depends highly on the political characteristics of the 
programme and the status of its claimants. This chapter initially explains why the cash 
transfer programme implemented by the MoMA has been given priority by the KRG. 
Again, as noted many times throughout the chapter, the extent to which the 
government commits itself to the implementation of the programme depends on the 
political significance of the claimants. High officials and political parties in power have 
constantly highlighted the profile of beneficiaries by honouring martyrs and offering 
assistance to their surviving dependants. 
Therefore, another aim of this chapter is to understand the political nature of the social 
security programme and the way in which it has been put forward by the KRG. The 
chapter begins by first explaining the background of MoMA, showing its roots as 
traceable to the Foundation of Martyrs, and how and why the change has taken place. 
It also analyses the objectives of the programme from regulating social protection to 
compensation. The discussion then moves on to the preference that the KRG put on 
the implementation of the programme. Another point of the discussion is devoted to 
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the political consideration of recruiting staff members, and how they deliver the 
services. At the end, the chapter will examine the strengths and the weakness of the 
MoMA programme. 
 
5.1. Institutional Settings of MoMA and RGFMGS Programme 
This section discusses the legal and organisational framework of the MoMA and its 
social benefit programme, the RPFMGS. It examines the implementersÕ perception of 
the programme and its organisational setting in accordance with the regulations of the 
programme. The section also addresses the development of the programme from 
what was a party-based activity into a government body and the reasons which led to 
this transformation. The section will equally refer to institutional settings from Iranian 
experience to show how the provision of special services to families of martyrs and 
war victims has actually been borrowed from othersÕ experience. 
 
5.1.1. Definition and Institutional Setting 
Prior to introducing the institutional setting of the RPFMGS programme and the 
MoMA, it is necessary to define two concepts: social security and the beneficiaries of 
the RPFMGS programme: martyrs. 
It is not entirely fitting to describe the services being delivered by MoMA as merely 
social security. Section 2 in the MoMA Law No. 8/2006 clearly describes the services 
that the ministry obliged itself to provide as financial and incorporeal support to meet 
family survivorsÕ needs and to assure a decent life for them. In order to define social 
security we have to distinguish between the social security system and social security 
provisions. The first refers to the full set of social security provisions operative within a 
country/region (Walker & Wong, 2005: 21). The social security provisions involve 
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various forms of contributory and/or non-contributory cash and non-cash distribution. 
Having adopted a rent-seeking system, the KRG takes responsibility for funding social 
assistance programmes. The RPFMGS is a non-contributory government-funded 
scheme for war and genocide survivors. Although the contribution in social security is 
limited to cash, I can argue that the contribution that is being made is for a victimÕs life 
and the suffering inflicted on their families. The KRG uses both social benefits and a 
broader concept of social services for the RPFMGS programme. It appears that the 
recipients have not been categorised based on their particular financial circumstances 
and family situation, but what is considered in this regard is the status or position of 
the victim within the hierarchy of the party and the case or the way the loss has 
happened (see Appendix 7: Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010). 
The term Ôsocial servicesÕ has been used when the political and legal (compensations) 
aspects are taken into account. However, it has been confusing for both policy 
makers and implementers as to whether the services are considered as a social cash 
transfer, social protection or compensation. The main social service provided involves 
a cash transfer. Nonetheless, when the programme is judged on the basis of how the 
RPFMGS is defined, there is no doubt that it counts as a social protection scheme. 
However, the benefit (as it is recognised as rights and privileges) indicates elements 
of compensation to the loss occurred: losing a family member in wars with the former 
Iraqi regime, civil wars and genocide campaigns. In most cases they were the 
breadwinners of the family. Taking into consideration the fact that martyrs and 
genocide victimsÕ families have lost someone, the survivors are victims too. The loss 
has occurred to victimsÕ families (claimants of the RPFMGS programme). As Chnar 
Saed, former minister of MoMA said: ÒWe are dealing with people that are considered 
as victimsÓ. 
Martyr and genocide victims are used frequently in this thesis to refer to victims of 
wars in general, Shahidy Hawlaty (citizen martyrs), and particularly to those who lost 
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their life in Kurdish national liberation activities such as Shahidy Sangar (battle 
martyrs). Law No.9/2007 of ÔRights and Privileges to Families of Martyrs and 
Genocide SurvivorsÕ defines the martyr as Òanyone who lost his/her life in battlefields 
or during political struggles in the national liberation movement against brutal regimes 
of Iraq or in mass murder crimes or in any wars made against Kurdistan peopleÓ 
(RPFMGS Law No. 9, 2007). Within this definition, three types of martyrs are 
identified: firstly, battlefield martyrs, whose lives were lost in battles against the Iraqi 
regime or while they were in a political position. The second group is genocide victims 
(including chemical attack victims), people who went missing or died in Anfal and 
other genocide operations between 1963 and 2003. The third group is citizen martyrs, 
which are ordinary people killed in wars or terror attacks during the 1991 uprising or 
the forced exodus from cities to the areas bordering Turkey and Iran. Under the 
definition offered by the RPFMGS Law No. 9/2007, a total of 150,000 people can be 
classified as martyrs (here including Anfalised people). Of this number, there are 
many who have no surviving relatives (consequently no claimants). As a result, the 
registered number of martyrs and Anfal survivors who claim the RPFMGS benefits 
amount to no more than 69,000 families. Political prisoners were also later added to 
these three categories of beneficiaries (Political PrisonerÕs Allowance Instruction, No. 
24 in 2009). Although these were all seen as martyrs or victims, the benefits each of 
these groups receive differ on the basis of the position held by the deceased or 
missing person in the political parties (MoFE-KRG: Financial Instruction No. 10, 
2010). In this regard, Chnar Saad, former minister of MoMA (2006-2009), described 
the necessity of establishing the MoMA as follows: 
Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs was established as an umbrella through 
gathering and re-organising both party belonged organisations.2 [MoMA-D1] 
                                   
2
 Referring to Foundation of Martyrs belonging to both KDP and PUK. 
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The above quote indicates that the KRG created a ministry in its structure specifically 
to deal with the programme at a national3 level and also to make it the obligation of 
the government to support these beneficiaries, instead of other non-governmental 
organisations. 
Nadir Rosti, the Director of Research in MoMA, summed up the objectives and duties 
of the ministry as follows: 
¥ Work extensively on collecting as much data as possible about martyrs, genocide and 
chemical attack victims, [former] political prisoners, their families and inheritors, and 
the losses incurred by surviving relatives in the aftermath of the genocide and fighting 
against the Iraqi government. 
¥ Secure the livelihoods and well-being of survivors by providing them with a monthly 
allowance as well as housing units and health services. 
¥ Support victimsÕ dependants with the cost of their studies. 
¥ Build the capacity of survivors through training and skills provision and help them find 
jobs.  
¥ Offer psychological consultation and advice in case of trauma and psychiatric 
diseases. 
¥ Prepare for the trial process of the perpetrators of Anfal and all other genocide 
campaigns, through a legal committee in MoMA. 
¥ Compensate all human and material losses and disadvantages. 
¥ Return the bodies of those killed in genocidal operations from the south of Iraq to their 
home in Kurdistan. [MoMA-B1] 
 
In one way or another, all these points are mentioned in the ministry laws Nos. (8) and 
(9) and, apart from cash transfers, all other proclaimed services are being provided 
either temporarily or on an irregular basis. One of the most important projects 
undertaken since the establishment of the ministry was the conduction of a 
                                   
3
 I have used ÔnationalÕ throughout this research, not as it refers to population of a territory 
(state), but as an identity by which accordingly an ethnic group distinguishes itself from 
others. Despite this differentiation and running its autonomous government, the Kurdistan 
Region is still considered as part of Iraq. Whereas, being Kurds in Iraq has not let Kurds feel 
integrated into one nation with a dominant Arab population in Iraq since this part of Kurdistan 
was linked forcefully to Iraq in the 1920s (more detail has been addressed in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis). The term ÔnationalÕ and ÔnationalisticÕ are preferred use for describing the political 
aspects of MoMA and the PRFMGS programme. 
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comprehensive survey on martyrs and genocide victims and their surviving 
dependants. This survey was carried out for the following purposes. 
First, to know the number of victims and the damages caused by these wars and 
genocide campaigns [quoted from participant MoMA-B1]. Collected information 
helped the MoMA to attain the most accurate data on the number of human casualties 
of the national liberation movement. This consequently resulted in reviewing and 
refining the list of claimants. During the instable period of the Kurdistan Region in the 
1990s many fraudulent names had been added to the list of beneficiaries, especially, 
as explained later in this chapter, in the pre-ministry period. 
The second aim is to prepare a national archive on victims of the Kurdish national 
movement, especially in the case of genocide, so that the information can be 
documented for historic purposes and also to internationalise the case [quoted from 
participant MoMA-C1]. 
The third aim of the survey is to provide and deliver the best possible services to 
survivors and those disadvantaged by these events [quoted from participants MoMA-
B1 and MoMA-C1]. Despite this, in the amount allocated monthly to beneficiaries, the 
size of the family and the physical damages inflicted on their properties have not been 
considered by the programme. Although the human and physical damages were 
relatively reflected in the survey, the monthly salary is fixed and the amount devoted is 
equally distributed to all of them. The only element that varies the amount of the 
money is in the case of battle martyrs and is based upon the position of the victim in 
political parties or the government before death (martyrdom). In the case of Anfal, all 
claimants get the same amount. The amount is varied between IQD 500,000 
(US$417) and IQD 1,186,800 (US$989). 
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Table 4 The Salary of MartyrsÕ Families Based on the Position of the Martyrs 
Salary Grade Army Grade of the Martyr Salary 
1 Immortal Barzani Friends (General) IQD1,186,800 
US$ 989 
2 General (Liwa)/High Commander IQD 1,092,500 
US$ 910 
3 Director IQD 1,055,700 
US$ 880 
4 Brigadier (Amr Hez)/Member of Legion/Army  IQD 1,012,000 
US$ 843 
5 Lieutenant Colonel (Amr Batalion, Jegr Hez) IQD 977,500 
US$ 815 
6 Kadri serbazi u Siyasi Peshkawtoo-2 IQD 920,000 
US$ 767 
7 Major/Kadri serbazi u Siyasi Peshkawtoo-3 IQD 862,500 
US$ 719 
8 Captain/Kadri serbazi u Siyasi Peshkawtoo- 4 IQD 805,000 
US$ 671 
9 First lieutenant (Sarliq) IQD 750,000 
US$ 625 
10 Second lieutenant (Sarpal) IQD 687,500 
US$ 573 
11 Deputy Officer (Grade 1)/Farmanday 
Farmnandayee/Amr Fawj 
IQD 662,600 
US$ 552 
12 Deputy Officer (Grade 2)/Farmanday Lashkr IQD 637,500 
US$ 531 
13 Deputy Officer (Grade 3)/Jegry Farmanday Lashkr IQD 625,000 
US$ 521 
14 Deputy Officer (Grade 4)/Farmanday Hez IQD 612,500 
US$ 510 
15 Deputy Officer (Grade 5)/Jegry Farmanday Hez IQD 600,000 
US$ 500 
16 Deputy Officer (Grade 6) IQD 587,500 
US$ 490 
17 Deputy Officer (Grade 7)/Farmanday Teep IQD 575,000 
US$ 480 
18 Deputy Officer (Grade 8) IQD 562,500 
US$ 469 
19 Dead of Sergeant (Jegry Fawj) IQD 550,000 
US$ 458 
20 Corporal (Areef) IQD 537,500 
US$ 448 
21 Deputy Corporal (Naib Areef) IQD 525,000 
US$ 438 
22 First Soldier IQD 512,500 
US$ 427 
23 Peshmarga IQD 500,000 
US$ 417 
Source: adapted from the MoFE, Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010. 
 
Table 4 shows the amount of salary allocated to each hierarchical category of martyrs 
and Anfal survivors. The position of martyrs needs to be verified by a political party, 
the Ministry of Peshmarga (Army) or the government Ð if the martyr had worked for 
the government (MoFE, Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010). 
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The salary of a civil martyr is IQD 180,000 (US$150). As for the Anfal family survivors, 
the amount of IQD 600,000 (US$500) is allocated for each claimant. 
 
5.1.2. From Party‐based Foundations to Government Body 
The change was first made from a party-based foundation (established in 1993) to a 
government institution in 1999, then to a government ministry in 2006. After the 1991 
uprising, the practice of providing families of martyrs with services emerged among all 
political parties, particularly the PUK and KDP. Almost all political parties in the 
Kurdistan Region had offices dedicated to the affairs of martyrs. Before a government 
ministry assumed this role, located within the 6th cabinet of the KRG in 2006, there 
were several foundations within each spilt Kurdish administration in Erbil and 
Sulaimaniya provinces. As mentioned earlier, both the Foundation of Martyrs and 
other foundations of genocide were devoted mainly to recording the names of all 
victims within their specialities in their jurisdictions so that cash benefits and limited 
residential units could be offered to their surviving family members and close relatives 
(MoMA Law, No. 9, 2007). Both major parties attached most of their internal 
organisations, including Foundations of Martyrs and genocide victims, to the 
government. This was because, firstly, they intended to lighten the financial burden on 
their parties and, secondly, they wanted to develop and regulate the programme and 
its services. 
It was confirmed by participants of the focus group in Duhok that the change in the 
Foundation of Martyrs to a government body (but prior to being formed in a ministerial 
body) was made for just two reasons. On the one hand, this change was made to 
organise the programme officially in an administrative form. It also relatively purified 
the list of beneficiaries from unreal names. Jiyan Tahi, Director of Martys Affairs in 
Duhok said: 
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Before the establishment of MoMA, anyone who had an intermediary or a 
relative [who] works in [the] Foundation of Martyrs could easily put his or 
her name on the list of beneficiaries. Even some people might have 
begged from employees and convinced them to have their name listed as 
a beneficiary. However, supported by the ministry law, we formed an 
investigation and filtering committee. I was on the committee and we took 
out about (2,000) names from the list of beneficiaries in Duhok province. 
[MoMa-B6] 
 
Another reason was that the parties were unable to afford it. The political parties in 
power came to the idea of establishing a government cash transfer scheme especially 
for martyrs and Anfal-survivor families to lighten the financial load on the parties 
[Focus group, Duhok Office of MoMA]. The martyrsÕ families were paid first by the 
party that the martyrs belonged to and, due to the financial crises in that period (as 
explained in the background chapter), it was not easy for the parties to allocate funds 
to the party martyrsÕ foundations. 
The MoMA was first established in May 2006 after the unification of two foundations, 
the Foundation of Martyrs and the Foundation of Martyrs of the Kurdish Nation. These 
two groups belonged to the two ruling political administrations in Erbil and 
Sulaimaniya respectively. The political parties Ð especially the two major parties, KDP 
and PUK Ð had their own Foundation of Martyrs to serve surviving dependants of 
martyrs who belonged to their parties. The integration of their martyrsÕ benefits 
groups, in addition to those of other parties into the MoMA, was authorised by a 
parliamentary regulation (Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament, 2006). At the time, the argument 
was that the MoMA would implement the programme and offer assistance to martyrsÕ 
relatives, and claim those monies back from the Iraqi government through a 
compensation scheme for the human and material losses through genocide 
operations (MoMA Law No.9, 2007). 
From the above, it is clear that this social security scheme operates on the basis of 
being a surviving relative of a genocide victim, rather than being in need. This means 
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that the MoMA programme is targeting neither those with insufficient income nor with 
a pension-based scheme. Nonetheless, an argument could be made that the scheme 
still caters for those on a low income because most war victims were breadwinners in 
their families, and to give compensation to their living relatives cannot be deemed 
misplaced. 
To support the idea of being entitled to this scheme, the MinistryÕs Regulation No.9, 
which was passed by the KNA in 2006, has clearly confessed that: 
Before the ministry, there was a regulation at the parliament for existing 
these two foundations, but there was neither any definition of martyrs and 
Anfalised people nor regulations to organise financial support and 
services to victim survivors. [MoMA-D1] 
 
Unifying all benefits was one of the challenges that this government ministry 
encountered at the beginning of reorganising administrative regulations and 
procedures. In each city and town, and according to their cases, the martyrs and 
genocide victim survivors were treated and served differently. With this unification, all 
different benefits and services were joined and amended in the new ministry 
regulations. 
In most government statements and ministerial documents, and even in the media, 
this programme is called either the Ôsupport allowanceÕ or Ômartyrs and genocide 
victim familiesÕ salaryÕ. The latter is the most used and accepted term in formal and 
legal documents (Legislation No.9, 2007, RPFMGS). Looking at the ministerial 
legislation and the ways that wide ranges of population have been entitled to benefits 
under the cash transfer scheme, led us to assert that the name of the programme can 
be translated under the title of Ôallowance for war and genocide victimsÕ familiesÕ. 
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5.1.3. Policy Change 
The idea of devoting a special government body to serve surviving relatives of 
martyrs, genocide and chemical gas attack survivors can be traced back to 
experiences in neighbouring countries, especially Iran. As mentioned by the Director 
General of Social and Health Services in Erbil Directorate, Rasool Hamad, devoting a 
special organisation to provide services to war victims relates to a similar experience 
in Iran: 
After [the] uprising [in] 1991, the idea of providing services to families of 
martyrs was raised by all political parties in general and [the] PUK and 
KDP in particular. Almost all political parties in [the] Kurdistan Region had 
an office within their organisations for martyrsÕ affairs, which is, to a 
certain degree, inspired by Iranian experience in this regard. We tried to 
get a benefit from what Iran had invented as the experience of Foundation 
of Martyrs, which was helpful for establishing a similar foundation and 
later on a government body at a ministerial level. [MoMA-B5] 
 
High officials and politicians of the Kurdistan Region are explicitly inspired by the 
Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans in Iran, which is devoted to the provision of 
services to families that lost one or more members during the 1978-79 revolution and 
later during the eight-year war with Iraq. 
The Iranian Martyrs Foundation (Bonyad Shahid) was founded when the spiritual 
leader of revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1979 ordered an organisation to be 
established with an aim to provide support and services to families of those killed in 
fighting with the former regime. A year later, the (First) Persian Gulf War began 
between Iraq and Iran lasting eight years. After the ceasefire, the Iranian 
government proposed to merge the Martyrs Foundation with two other bodies in 
charge of providing support for veterans and ex-prisoners of the Iran-Iraq war. The 
Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs (Bonyad Shahid va Janbazan) was 
founded as a new organisation in May 2004. 
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Before the establishment of MoMA, each major political party had its own Martyrs 
Foundation to serve the family members of their martyrs and surviving dependants. 
Until these programmes were taken over by a government ministry, they existed as 
two separate foundations within Erbil and Sulaymaniyah districts. Those two Martyrs 
Foundations were devoted to collecting all martyrsÕ names and providing cash 
benefits to them. With the changes, however, for the first time this was being carried 
out at the level of the entire Kurdistan Region, regardless of party affiliation (Iraqi 
Kurdistan Parliament, 2007). Indeed, running alongside this programme, there were 
also several Anfal Foundations in the region. These were also working mostly as non-
governmental organisations to provide financial assistance periodically to genocide 
(Anfal) victimsÕ families. The government combined all those organisations and 
agencies in one governmental body to unify and improve service provision. 
 
5.2. Programme Objectives of the RPFMGS 
The change of the programme from party-related foundations to a government-funded 
ministry favoured political parties and claimants. On the one side, it saved political 
parties from financial deficit. On the other side, it made the cash and non-cash 
benefits available to beneficiaries in a more regular and improved way. This section 
will discuss the three objectives of the programme laid down within the MoMA. 
 
5.2.1. Regulating Benefits 
Following the passage of the MoMA Law, the Kurdistan Parliament issued Law No. 9 
of the RPFMGS in 2007 to regulate social benefits to beneficiaries of MoMA. The 
RPFMGS programme identified its beneficiaries as heirs of Kurdish liberation fighters, 
genocide survivors, chemical attacks and other war victims as its beneficiaries. 
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According to Law No. 9, survivors or closest relatives of the mentioned groups are 
entitled to receive a monthly cash transfer and other non-cash benefits. In this section, 
I shall discuss further the content of the RPFMGS programme. 
The MoMA provides families of martyrs and genocide victims not only with material 
support and means of a decent life, but also spiritual support. In most government 
statements and ministerial documents as well as in the media, this programme is 
referred to as ÔMartyrs and Genocide AllowanceÕ. The programme provides regular 
monthly cash benefits in addition to health, education, housing and other social 
services. In essence, it is a true compensation scheme. Currently, about 83,403 
families of martyrs and genocide victims and families of political prisoners receive 
monthly payments from MoMA (MoP-KRG, 2012: 174). 
When the party-based foundation was established in 1993, a little monthly salary was 
allocated to martyrsÕ family members. But the government transformed it to a more 
legalised programme, and improved the services. The government linked it to a 
Council of Ministries and for the first time issued law and regulations for it in which the 
government was found committed to provide the benefits. This was why on 1 
September 1999, the foundation transformed to a government body related directly to 
the Council of Ministries in Sulaymaniyah. For the first time a categorisation was 
made for beneficiaries and their benefits according to instructions. 
Karwan Ammed, Director of Anfal Affairs in Sulayimaniya, said the regulations have 
not addressed all issues with regard to beneficiaries and their benefits. Sometimes 
employees of the RPFMGS programme take action based on their discretion: 
We sometimes work based on our discretions, because some cases are 
very complicated, and we decide on them only with our discretion and 
judgement. Otherwise they could not be sorted out by regulations and 
guidelines. [MoMA-B9] 
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Generally the programme is adequately designed. However, due to the complexity 
of the cases, the staff, especially the director of legal departments of MoMA, 
experience difficulties with the framed law while dealing with the cases involving 
bequeathing. In some cases, especially in the cases of Anfal or a martyr married to 
two different women, it is not easy to find the right person/s eligible for the benefit. It 
is not always possible to find out who is/are the real inheritors of the victim. There 
are many cases of martyrs in which the martyrÕs parents are alive and the martyr 
has brothers, sisters, wife and children. The Ministry Acts and Instructions have not 
sensibly expected and considered these cases. In such complicated cases, the staff 
would intervene according to their discretion. 
 
5.2.2. Non‐means Tested Benefits for Political Victims 
The nature of the programme and eligibility criteria of entitlement indicate that the 
family situation and income do not play a role in the cash transfer of the programme. 
Samal A A, Director of Martyrs in Sulymaniya, describes the situation of families of 
martyrs and why they should be entitled in such a programme: 
The families of martyrs are the most losing sects of society 
psychologically and financially, because the one whom they lost (who 
most of the time was the breadwinner) was the beloved one as well. 
[MoMA-B11] 
 
VictimsÕ families make up a significant number of the population of the Kurdistan 
Region. However, both previous MartyrsÕ Foundations had no clear regulations to 
define who was covered in this scheme. There were no terms and norms for 
entitlement. However, the RPFMGS programme has been designed specifically to 
cover a target population, comprising those people who are considered eligible for 
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benefits because they have lost a member/members of the family regardless of their 
income or dependants within the family. 
The Law (No. 8) of the MoMA takes the inheritors of the first two groups as well as the 
third group as its beneficiaries. The family or closest relative is entitled to receive 
benefits, which are paid as a monthly salary. According to the Act (8: 2007), the salary 
is paid to the victimÕs partner; her/his child/children in case s/he was married and has 
a child; her/his parent or brother and sister if s/he is single. 
Evidently, under this social security scheme, eligibility is not based on social security 
considerations alone. The RPFMGS programme determines its beneficiaries based 
on the loss of a family member through wars or genocide operations. This means that 
the RPFMGS scheme is not an income-based social security, which targets a 
population with insufficient income. Nonetheless, the RPFMGS scheme has some 
elements of income support because, as argued earlier, most war victims are 
breadwinners of their households. Therefore, their deaths left many of the target 
relatives in severe financial distress.  
In view of the above, the level of payments made were still highly criticised by most of 
the research participants. Ahmed Jameel, Legal Advisor in MoMA, said: 
This Act does not answer the question as to who needs to get benefits. If 
daughters and sons of a martyr or genocide victim got to the stage that 
they could stand on their own feet and be able to earn an income, why do 
they still need to receive benefits? If we help them in their whole life, 
implicitly we are incapacitating them. [MoMA-B2] 
 
The recipients of RPFMGS are not entitled to the benefits based on their income or 
needs. In other words, the RPFMGS is not considered as a means-tested benefit, but 
rather for most of its current recipients it is an extra salary. 
Izzat, General Director in Duhok Province of MoMA, pointed out some entitlement 
defects as follows: 
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A daughter of a martyr or an Anfal when she marries, she or her husband, 
or both, might be working but she has the right to get a third salary as a 
family member of a martyr or an Anfal. Nowhere in the world does 
someone who is over the legal childhood and youth age still benefit from 
their previous entitlements. If someone is in a good financial situation they 
should not be given the same financial entitlements as someone who is in 
a rather bad financial situation. For me, this is a negative point of this 
programme. [MoMA-C2] 
 
It appears that the MoMA as a ministerial body is established for two aims. Firstly, 
after the repression experienced by Kurds, the KRG aimed to make a record of 
material and losses of life incurred by wars and genocide operations to Kurds in 
Iraq. Through this record, the KRG and its leaders have endeavoured to introduce 
Kurds as victims to the Iraqi central government and international community. In 
front of Iraq, by showing the losses, the Kurdish leaders want to send a message to 
Iraq as a statement that what Kurds have inherited from Iraq are only damages and 
human suffering. On the other side, the KRG find it essential to remind the 
international community of what Kurds have experienced and to make preparations 
for Anfal so as to internationally recognise the genocide against the Kurdish nation 
(Barzani, 2008: 12). 
The second aim is to provide the best possible services. Devoting a ministerial body 
to delivering services allowed the KRG to make a special deal for these target groups. 
Forthcoming sections of this chapter will unpack the extent to which the services are 
delivered in the best way. 
A distinctive character of the RPFMGS is the idea of lifetime income support, which 
was criticised by some research participants. Ahmed Jamel, Director of the Legal 
Department in MoMA, made this statement: 
Who needs this governmentÕs benefits? I think that all daughters and sons 
of martyrs should arrive at the stage that they could be able to stand on 
their feet and earn enough money to afford their lives; there is no need for 
such a ministry or programme to support them. If they get financial 
support during their whole life, they will steadily get lazy and useless. This 
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ministry would play the role of transferring martyr families from a 
creative/productive people to just customers (recipients), who look forward 
to getting their feed from government. [MoMA- B2] 
 
The above quote shows a negative point in the programme. When the benefit is 
conveyed from a social assistance scheme to a long-lasting permanent benefit, it 
affects negatively on the population and encourages dependency instead of 
productivity in society. Under no circumstances would the RPFMGS benefits be 
terminated unless the claimants died. Another fault of the programme is that the non-
conditionality of the benefit facilitates a patron-client relationship. The benefit is 
provided, as a promise has been made by political parties to their affiliated population. 
 
5.2.3. Compensation 
The Iraqi High Criminal TribunalÕs final ruling in the Anfal case mentioned victimsÕ 
rights and the right of those who suffered losses as a result of the crime to claim 
their legal rights in civil courts. Also the Iraqi ParliamentÕs decision number 26 of 
2008, which considers Òwhat happened to the Kurdish people in Iraqi Kurdistan from 
slaughter to mass killings amounts to genocideÓ (International Conference on 
Genocide Against Kurdish People, 2008: 14-15) embodies this right and emphasises 
on the perpetratorsÕ responsibilities for their genocide operations. 
The genocide committed by the Iraqi state against Kurdish civilians inflicted great 
harm on their well-being and property. This was the result of the use of chemical and 
biological weapons and the execution of the infamous Anfal operations and mass 
execution, destruction and plunder. Therefore, the Iraqi state must undertake a 
process of reparation for the loss caused to the victims, including restitution (returning 
the situation to its original state), damages, rehabilitation and recognition (such as 
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recognising the victims and public announcement of the harm they suffered) and 
taking measures that guarantee non-repetition of genocide. 
Goran Mustafa, the MinisterÕs Office Administrator, addressed the compensational 
scheme of MoMA: 
It is the Regional governmentÕs major responsibility to secure 
compensation Ð not compensating them itself. This securing of 
compensation (I donÕt go in to the legal side of it) as for the Anfal case, it 
is [to establish] who is responsible for it; the Iraqi Government, the 
companies or those foreign countries which gave Saddam weapons? It is 
not my job to follow the legal side of it but, from its political side, it is very 
important; this is a responsibility on the part of government to take on. ItÕs 
important to secure compensation for the victims. [MoMA-C1] 
 
A Strategic Planning Committee has been established in the ministry to pursue the 
extent to which they can make financial, psychological and environmental reparations 
for damages caused by genocide. According to general rules of state responsibility in 
national and international laws and particularly the law of the Iraqi High Criminal 
Tribunal and the Iraqi civil law, the Iraqi Government is responsible to recompense 
those people by law (KRG-MoMA, 2009, 14). 
 
5.3. High Profile Programme 
There is a common agreement among all high and lower officials of MoMA that the 
beneficiaries deserve more than what government is providing. Almost all research 
participants argued that beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme are ranked higher 
than other benefits-receiving populations, and that MoMA itself is the most important 
social security scheme. 
The KRG seeks interest in the recipients of RPFMGS, and this is evident in the 
emphasis laid on their socio-political status. As will be discussed repeatedly, the 
nationalistic character of beneficiaries of MoMA has resulted in a great interest to 
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ruling party leaders and government. When it is compared with the SSN beneficiaries 
we can realise that they are lacking any political privilege. We can use these two 
statuses and interests in the dichotomy of nationalistic versus public. In this 
dichotomy, the implementation of social security programmes in the KRG has always 
been off-balance. 
With regard to the salience attached to MoMA, Samal, the director of Martyrs Affairs 
in Sulaymaniyah, said: 
Although our ministry is just a service organisation, it has a very high 
status in the Council of Ministries. [MoMA-B11] 
 
Kamaran Ameed, director of Anfal Affairs in Sulaymaniyah evaluated the importance 
given by the KRG to the programme as follows:  
Given the importance to the RPFMGS programme and MoMA by the 
Council of Ministries, Parliament and political leaders […] in all their 
speeches and public meetings, senior officials and political leaders praise 
the martyrs and genocidesÕ families. So far, they have done everything 
they could to serve these people. [MoMA-B9] 
 
It has been evidently pointed-out in every speech of political leaders that it is KRGÕs 
duty to honour the martyrs and serve their dependents. In this regard, an officer from 
the Director of Martyrs Affairs in Erbil said: 
There have been no speeches made by regional leaders without referring 
and respecting martyrs; they are always remembered. [MoMA-A1] 
 
Such dutiful attention is not limited to martyrs and genocide victims, but includes, and 
has been transferred to, their family members. Kurdish political leaders always 
remember Ômartyrs, genocide victims and their surviving membersÕ in public speeches 
(Barzani, 2006; 2009; 2010). Having paid such high attention to martyrs and genocide 
victims and constantly giving promises by political leaders to their family members 
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have raised expectations. The Director of Anfal Affars in Erbil, Fars T. Mho, talked 
about expectations of the target groups of RPFMGS as follows: 
We are dealing with a group of people that have the highest expectations 
from the government (KRG) to better treat them. The government has 
lived up to most of their expectations. [MoMA-B3] 
 
The MoMA services are not limited to the monthly cash transfer. The claimants of the 
RPFMGS programme are benefited by other services, such as housing units, part-
scholarships, and financial support for marriage to sons and daughters of martyrs and 
genocide victims. Despite that, these services have not satisfied the programme staff 
members. Chnar Saed, former Minister of MoMA, expects more from the KRG and 
criticises the leaders who deal with the programme as follows: 
In the political level and as a slogan, all politicians and high officials 
always promise to support these vulnerable people, but when it comes to 
the reality only 50 per cent transferred into practice. [MoMA-D1] 
 
Other staff members were also not fully satisfied with allocated services. For example, 
the research participants thought that the 50 per cent exemption of RPFMGS 
beneficiaries in study costs in private schools and universities is not enough. They 
were also demanding full cover of the marriage cost for family members of 
beneficiaries. 
Zahir Joiukhin, Director of Social Services in the Directorate General of Martyrs and 
Anfal Affairs in Erbil, created a good expression in regard to the importance of the 
MoMA: 
This is the home of the martyr, for serving relatives of the martyr. [MoMA-B8] 
 
Beneficiaries of RPFMGS are characterised as high-profile clients. They are not just 
ordinary citizens, but they acquire a political character. Most of them might financially 
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live in a low position, as the families of martyrs and genocide have in most cases lost 
their breadwinners; however, they are not classified and served based on their needs. 
Even the categorisation of RPFMGS beneficiaries is done based on the way the 
victim has lost his/her life, or the victimÕs status in the hierarchy of positions in the 
Kurdish forcesÕ peshmarga and political parties. Being a high or middle-ranked 
member of the party (see Table 4), especially the major ones, brings a privilege to the 
family in the case of loss of life, even in the case of natural death. 
 
5.3.1. Clients’ Representation in Policy Making and Policy Implementation 
Processes 
The service improvements are made by the government to gain the full ÔsatisfactionÕ 
from beneficiaries. Most of the MoMA staff members are at the same time 
beneficiaries of the programme too and, consequently, they are zealous defenders of 
the RPFMGS programme. The former Minister of MoMA, Chnar Saad, is the daughter 
of a martyr. She lost her father, Saad Abdullah, in the Erbil headquarters of KDP on 1 
February 2001 in a terrorist attack. Not only at the ministerial level, but also in higher 
policy-making positions, the RPFMGS beneficiaries have representatives. Both 
Masoud Barzani (uncle), the president of the Kurdistan Region, and Nechirvan 
Barzani (nephew), the Prime Minister of the KRG, have 38 close family members lost 
in genocide campaigns. 
The RPFMGS programme follows a bottom-up model of policy implementation. Policy 
makers and policy implementers are at the same time programme beneficiaries. They 
request more and more benefits for claimants of the RPFMGS programme, participate 
in policy making, implement by themselves, and get the benefit. Eventually other 
claimants can take their share from the services. In the MoMA the beneficiaries play a 
significant role in the policy-making and implementation process. 
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5.3.2. Victimisation 
As all participants of the focus group in the Directorate General of Martyrs and Anfal 
Affairs in Duhok Province stated, the KRG has an interest to serve these target 
groups for the future:  
The KRG always considers to serve this group for the future. This is for 
the future if our nation fell into a war, there should be some people ready 
to sacrifice themselves to protect this political entity. [Focus Group, 
Duhok] 
 
The idea of serving people to drive them to be motivated to fight for Kurdayeti 
(Kurdish national movement) also implies the clientelistic intention. The below quote 
shows the use of RPFMGS benefits in order to encourage people for future struggles 
the Kurdistan Region might face: 
Many things should be done for martyrs and genocide survivors ... If not, 
how would people ever be motivated to scarify themselves? When they 
see the way those families are treated, everyone would have peace of 
mind for after to sacrifice. [MoMA-A1] 
 
Honouring the sacrifices made by martyrs and victims of genocide in Kurdistan has 
always been one of the main objectives of the Ministry. Prime Minister Barzani stated, 
Ò[we] all have to make the memory of our sacrifices a driving force to encourage us to 
build a prosperous, stable, and bright future. We must be confident that the lives of 
tens of thousands of victims were not lost in vainÓ (Barzani, 2008: 19).  
 
5.4. The Ministry Regulations and High Officials’ Interferences  
As noted in the previous section, this ministry was formed as a combination of all 
martyrs and genocide victimsÕ foundations. Samal, Director of Martyrs-MoMA in 
Sulaimaniyah Province, who was involved in writing the MoMA law and designing its 
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operating framework, described the transition from the foundations to ministry as 
follows: 
The ministryÕs law relied heavily on the law, which was there at both 
institutions. It was set up on their basis but in a more progressive and 
inclusive form … we only made some changes, which were important, 
then gradually, to alter it from a narrow partisan form to a governmental 
and legal subject to include all the nation. [MoMA-C5] 
 
The Foundations of Martyrs considered martyrs as the partyÕs possession and 
fortune. This was true for their family members. They were treated as party clients, 
and there were political parties that are most proud of them. One of the changes 
which occurred in the period of the ministry was that the MoMA treats the 
beneficiaries in a broader national context, regardless of their party connection. The 
martyrs are now considered as symbols of national glory. 
But this transition did not eliminate politiciansÕ and higher officialsÕ power as admitted 
by a former minister, Chnar Saeed. She was assigned as a first minister and was also 
part of the creation of MoMA: 
[in the early period of MoMA] The lack of a regulation, which would have a 
parliamentary power, had eased to political party interferences, personal 
prerogatives and moods. Therefore, some ineligible people had been 
penetrated into the scheme illegally and we found them as beneficiaries 
without having any reason to be eligible to this scheme. This had caused 
unfairness and inequality. [MoMA-D1] 
 
Social security policy, which comprises cash transfer, attracts politiciansÕ attention. 
They may be more inclined to intervene in and control these programmes. As many 
participants argued, political and administrative actors deal with and support social 
security policies according to the salience they attach to the policy programmes. The 
hegemony of politicians is entirely visible not just in the process of policy formulation, 
but also in the implementation process. 
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Faris Tahir, Director of Anfal in Erbil addressed that: 
The partisanship and personal relationship have [a] huge impact in 
administrating the RPFMGS programme. [MoMA-B3] 
 
The former Minister of MoMA, Chnar Saed, also highlighted the party interference into 
the performance of the MoMa and the RPFMGS programme as follows: 
Both parties belonged [to] Foundations of Martyrs, which exist[ed] before 
the ministry, but were [lacking] clear regulation[s] to define the beneficiary 
and eligibility criteria of entitlement. As a result of such a law being 
passed through parliament, [it] eased the interference from party leaders 
in power and personal relationship in locating quite a large number of 
ineligible people within the MoMA programme. [MoMA-D1] 
 
The transition from foundations to the ministry brought all fraudulent names of 
claimants into the MoMA. The MoMA succeeded in taking away those names from 
the list of RPFMGS beneficiaries, but as some research participants argued there are 
still some fraudulent names that exist within the list of beneficiaries. 
There was also the point that party leaders or high officials, especially those in the two 
dominant political parties, misuse the programme. For instance, Hama Haji Mahmood, 
the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP) leader, pointed out in a TV interview 
an issue that dominant parties play with the programme to attract peopleÕs loyalty: 
Many of our martyrsÕ families have been persuaded to transfer the name 
of their martyrs into their lists. They have been promised [a raise to] their 
salary if they do the list transformation. 
 
What caused and eased the interference from political parties are the entitlement 
procedures, especially in the case of martyrs. Every martyr has to be approved and 
supported by a political party to be entitled to the cash transfer programme. This 
interference is being done just by dominant political parties by exerting influence on 
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the decision makers. They equally impose their control upon implementers to 
accomplish their goals. 
The interference can be turned in favour of the programme, as it has reflected on the 
services provided for RPFMGS beneficiaries. But at the same time, it has put 
obstacles in the way of applying the regulations and instructions to influential clients. 
 
5.5. Implementers: an Emotional Consideration of Recruitment 
5.5.1. Personal Motivation 
The personal consideration is more important than administrative procedure in MoMA 
directorates. Samal, Director of Martyrs in Sulaymaniyah believed: 
We do not do our job merely with an administrative mood but work with a 
career-emotional sentiment. We consider beneficiaries of our programme 
as our family members. Those people have a weak feeling. So, for us Ôthe 
respectÕ is more important than purely Ôbureaucratic and administrativeÕ 
procedures. [MoMA-B11] 
 
The staff members of MoMA showed their desire for their jobs. They perform as if 
they devoted their life to the case of martyrs and genocide victims (missing and 
survivors). Research participants always repeated that the government should do 
everything for the wellbeing of RPFMGS claimants. 
It seems that this deep engagement with the job and beneficiaries is dominant in all 
offices of MoMA. All participants expressed their direct engagement with their job and 
contact with RPFMGS beneficiaries. For example, Abdulkarim Halladni, Director 
General of Martys and Anfal Affairs in Sulaymaniyah showed his motivation towards 
the MoMA programme as follows: 
I have obliged myself to work for the case of genocide and serving the 
victim families. If I were in my position here or not, I would continue being 
with them. [MoMA-C3] 
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Fars T. Mho, Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil expressed his feeling towards the 
RPFMGS programme as follows: 
Two reasons explain my motivation to choose, move and serve here. 
Apart from not being happy with my previous job, the emotional impact 
strongly encouraged me to make this decision. Not merely the financial 
wage, but the emotional wage most influenced me to come here. [MoMA-
B3] 
 
Fars T. Mho also said that: 
I was a manager in the only official TV broadcasting of the KRG, Harem 
TV. I decided to change my job, choosing this ministry because two of my 
brothers are martyrs of the national liberation movement. [MoMA-B3] 
 
National motivation has strongly attracted many people to seek to work in the MoMA. 
The MoMA, since its establishment in 2006, has kindly welcomed people with high 
motivation to work on the case of martyrs and genocide. Despite that, most of the 
unqualified employees of former Foundations of Martyrs and anfal survivors were 
merged into MoMA. The former Minister of MoMA showed this: 
You rarely found people with psychology, administration, finance and 
social work qualifications amongst employees of MoMA. Most of them 
were those working in [a] previous Foundation of Martyrs. We were not 
able to dismiss those folk of unqualified employees. However, I tried to 
pick up new people with law, administration or financial certification to be 
employed in MoMA. [MoMA-D1] 
 
5.5.2. Political Account in Staff Recruitment 
As described in an earlier section of this chapter, most of the MoMA employees have 
been chosen on the basis of whether they have a martyred or a genocide victim 
among their family members or not. However, this is not enough for them to be 
recruited into the MoMA. They should be party members of or at least loyal to KDP or 
PUK. 
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In support of this, the former minister of MoMA said: 
Those who are recruited to work in government offices have been chosen 
(appointed) based on factors mostly not related to job description or 
qualification. In fact, other external factors have always played a role in 
assigning others and me here. Qualification, skills and professionalism 
have played fewer roles in this regard. Loyalty to political party sought to 
play crucial role. [MoMA-D1] 
 
This ministry has not been founded based on bureaucratic procedures, but based on 
political consideration. Other research participants also confirmed this claim. For 
example, the Director of Anfal Affair in Erbil said: 
The only condition that [was] taken into account [staff recruitment] is their 
party belongings and personal relationship, of which the latter is also 
influenced by political party relationships. [MoMA-B3] 
 
On the day that this person has chosen this fate, s/he has not expected any reward. 
S/he has not expected that one day someone will take care of her/his children, or 
even s/he has not been sure what is going to happen to them. 
 
5.5.3. Service Provider as Service User 
As I noticed from research participants, almost all employees from frontline to minister 
are chosen from families of martyrs or genocide survivors. Some participants asserted 
that the appointment in MoMA should not be made based on educational 
qualifications. As Nadir Rusti, Director of Research Unit in MoMA said: 
Recruitment should not be made based on certificate. In all offices of the 
MoMA the situation of employees themselves determined whether they 
could understand and feel [for] martyrs and genocide victim families. Heirs 
of martyrs are the best to be employed here. [MoMA-B1] 
 
Fars T. Mho, Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil also confirmed the above point: 
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If the employees (specially frontline staff) come from victimsÕ people: 
(1) they better deal with clients and understand their sufferings; (2) their 
situation will not be weak while dealing with clients who get angry and 
impatient; and (3) this will reassure clients that the members of staff have 
a total understanding of their situation and will respond to their demands. 
[MoMA-B3]. 
 
When I visited my research participants of RPFMGS in their office to conduct 
interviews, I noticed that they were highly motivated to work and passionately 
attached to their duties towards the claimants. I especially noticed this when I visited 
the three Director Generals of MoMA in the three governorates of the Kurdistan 
Region. They accepted my request for an interview, but did not agree with the 
condition I requested for our interview: not to be disturbed by others. They continued 
to deal with peopleÕs requests while answering my questions. We were interrupted 
several times during these interviews. Their office door was open to all, and people 
were walking in for their papers to be signed. The Erbil General Director of MoMA had 
no secretary in his office. 
Recruiting implementers from service users or victim families has its benefits. As 
Karwan Ameed said: 
Whenever a genocide survivor and relatives of victims come to my office, 
and when they tell the story of their son, husband, sister or wife, I go back 
to the time and situation of genocide operations as it is now happening. 
[MoMA-B9] 
 
5.5.4. Vulnerability of Service Providers 
Employees of MoMA, from the minister to an ordinary staff member, are directly in 
contact with claimants. The minister has a day every week to see the claimants that 
request a meeting. In other words, all employees of MoMA work as frontline staff 
members. The frontline staff are passionate to follow beneficiariesÕ papers urgently, 
because they share the claimantsÕ suffering. In addition to that, when you see the 
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implementers benefit from the programme, it is quite reasonable that they would 
support other beneficiaries, the same as they try to for themselves. The shared 
suffering of beneficiaries and implementers has a negative emotional reflection on 
later. Although the implementers work tirelessly, they are psychologically exhausted 
due to listening to claimantsÕ tragedies every day. The personal stories of families of 
martyrs and genocide survivors have an impact on the personal lives of employees of 
MoMA. As an officer in the Directorate of Martyrs Affairs Ð Erbil expressed: 
Those who are working in MoMA offices every day see cases of tragedy 
and trauma, which no one can embody in a movie scene. No one can 
draw a picture of moments of the life of those families. [MoMA-A1] 
 
Working with martyrs and genocide cases involves emotional aspects of the life that 
people suffered. The staff members hear touching stories and cases, which result in 
depression and distress. This is true more for those working with genocide survivorsÕ 
cases. As the Director of Anfal Affairs in Erbil said: 
Believe me or not, employees of MoMA offices experience depression 
and tragedy in their everyday work. [MoMA-B3] 
 
He also continued to say that: 
Before I started this job, I was working for the Ministry of Education 
among people who were always coming to the office wearing suits and 
French perfume, and always smiling. When I came to work here 
everything was different. I found myself in a totally depressive 
atmosphere. I should admit that this has had an impact on my personal 
and family life. You have to deal with people who have become older, 
mentally ill or suffered severe oppression and pain, and are consequently 
impatient. I was always coming to my office as before, but going back 
home psychologically tired. This even influenced my life at home as well. 
[MoMA-B3] 
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Most of the research participants asked for a kind of injury allowance on the top of 
their salary as they get injured psychologically every day at work. As Director General 
of MoMA in Sulaimaniya, Abdulkarim Haladini, stated: 
We are meant to be more compassionate rather than legal in dealing with 
beneficiaries and their cases. [MoMa-C2] 
 
5.6. Other Implementation Gaps 
Although the RPFMGS Law No.9 identified the beneficiaries of MoMA programmes, 
entitlement is still one of the legal issues in the implementation of the programme, 
especially in the case of Anfal. The complexity of cases and high interference have 
created constraints in some of the implementation processes. 
Samal, the Director of Martyrs in Sulaymaniyah, criticised the eligibility criteria of the 
programme as follows: 
There is a kind of patriarchy, centralism in MoMA, in which no one 
consults with lower level staff. For example, they cut the childrenÕs 
allowance without asking our view on that. That decision was totally 
wrong. How should a single person get the same amount of money as a 
family with six children? This is unfair. [MoMA-B11] 
 
Conclusion 
I can conclude from the research that the implementation process of the social 
security policy in the post-war country is strongly influenced by political characteristics 
and interests, which the social security programme has conveyed. As this chapter has 
shown, the relative success of the programme largely rests on the political importance 
of its beneficiaries to power. 
In this context, a question can be raised about the extent to which political conditions 
equally impact on the implementation process.  
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This ministry is prioritised by the government, which is led by the two biggest political 
parties. It is supported and prioritised because both political parties, the KDP and the 
PUK, have the most beneficiaries from this scheme. A region that has faced a 
genocide, national struggle and war is in dire need of such a programme to 
rehabilitate and compensate and support those people. 
However, the terms and conditions of entitlement are confusing. There are legal 
issues in the MoMA programme which have not been resolved so that the programme 
can be implemented sufficiently and equally. 
Non-means-tested benefit does not involve any sort of testing of the claimantsÕ 
income. Claimants can come to claim benefits with high capital resources, and the 
tests tend to focus on the criteria of the political victim (wounded veteran or prisoners) 
or first degree family member of the victim (family members of martyrs and genocide 
victims). No testing is done on the income of financial conditions. 
The amount paid as a monthly salary never replaces the emotional and psychological 
damage to families of victims. It has been highlighted that the socio-political situation 
of families of martyrs and genocide survivors has always been used for political 
interest by ruling parties. The parties in competition always show their interest in the 
beneficiaries of RPFMGS. Especially in the times leading to the elections, political 
parties in power are greatly attracted towards this group. 
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CHAPTER SIX: DOUBLE STANDARDS IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMME: 
THE CASE OF SOCIAL SAFETY NET 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the researcherÕs journey into the field of a social security 
programme whose implementation has faced many changes and constraints. In the 
last two decades, the SSN programme in the Kurdistan Region has been subjected to 
changes in its form, objective and name. These changes have consequently created 
uncertainty and confusion among the programmeÕs implementers. The inconsistency 
in the programmeÕs objectives and the instability in its practice have impacted on its 
implementation. 
The previous chapters have already illustrated the peculiar political and administrative 
context within which social security programmes are implemented by the 
administration of the KRG. The factors, which have led to the placing of the SSN on 
the backburner by administration, were also explored. 
This chapter looks at some aspects such as the objectives of the programme 
perceived by implementers and the policy deviation made from a top-down tendency. 
More importantly, some critical missing factors such as clarity in defining the social 
programme, priority of comprehensive social protection system, and lack of continuity 
in the implementation have been evaluated. But first, a very brief development of the 
programme is presented. 
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6.1. Background and Development: From SPF, FPF to SSN 
Throughout this research several names have been used, which all refer to one 
programme. Different names have been put on it at different times. The name of the 
programme changed from the SPF to the FPF between 2002 and 2009, but 
subsequently the old name was reinstated, adding ÔdevelopmentÕ to the name of the 
Directorate which administers the Social Protection programme. After 2011 the name 
of the programme changed to the SSN after broadening the programme to include 
several cash assistant programmes, i.e. Disabled PeopleÕs Allowance and the Blind 
PeopleÕs Allowance. 
The SPF programme was first established when the Revolutionary Command 
Council, the ultimate decision-making body in Iraq between 1968 and 2003, issued 
The Iraqi Social Treatment Law No. 126 in 1980 (Ghfour, 2003). This law aimed to 
build a comprehensive social care and assistance system based on the ÔsocialistÕ 
ideology of the BaÕath Party in Iraq. It helped to establish a number of government 
programmes geared towards social assistance and development. Under the law, all 
directorates under the MoLSA at that time were revised and new programmes 
including Family Care (ReÕayat Al-Usra) were established. The most significant impact 
was that a monthly salary was assigned to individuals and households deemed 
needy, poor and/or on a low income. The focus of this programme was on supporting 
Ôthe familyÕ as a significant social unit. 
The early stages of this programme (between 1980 and 1991) are skipped in this 
account simply because the programme is not the researchÕs main focus of enquiry. 
Besides, data on the programme during these stages are quite sparse. The focus 
from here on will be on the period after the Iraqi Government lost its political 
hegemony and withdrew its administrative control over the Kurdistan Region after 
1991.  
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The SPF was suspended after the withdrawal of Iraqi Government offices due to the 
administrative vacuum which affected all levels of administration and the provision of 
public services. Even where political leaders had taken over, due to their 
unpreparedness to provide public services they were unable to make any meaningful 
impact. 
When the KNA and KRG were established, local authorities took over the running of 
the previous Iraqi Government offices. In its early meetings, the KNA revised the 
former Iraqi Law of Social Affairs. Initial remedies appeared in the KNAÕs protocols 
within the law of the MoHSA4 (KNAÕs Protocols, Vol. VI, 1993: 256-260). These 
included new cases such as the existence of tens of thousands of familiesÕ survivors 
of genocide and martyrs of Kurdish national freedom, and the situation of married 
students. 
Although potential changes and enlargement were proposed and made to the 
programme by KNA, they were not implemented. This can be partly attributed to the 
double economic blockages imposed first by the UNSC over the whole of Iraq and 
second from Iraqi Central Government on the Kurdistan Region, which led to a lack of 
sufficient funds and skilled staff. Consequently the newly-established government was 
not able to provide public services adequately to citizens. As illustrated in the 
background chapter, Chapter 3, a large majority of people lacked the basic needs for 
everyday life. The only organisations that were capable of providing a meaningful 
amount of support in the region were international aid agencies, as illustrated in 
Chapter 3. This socio-economic situation continued until 2001, when the economy of 
the Kurdistan Region began to improve. It was at this time that the SPF was revived. 
                                   
4
 The first cabinet of the Kurdistan Regional Government did not include a specific ministry 
for social affairs. This ministry was integrated within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 
For the first time in the PUK-controlled administration of the KRG (2001) a ministry body was 
devoted to manage governmental offices of social affairs.  
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Recalling what has been mentioned in Chapter 3 about the development of the SPF 
after its idle period, this research covers only the last two periods, after being 
reactivated in 2001, as follows. 
The first is the FPF, between 2002 and 2009, which was referred to throughout 
Chapter 3 as a combined financial and social awareness programme. In the early 
stages of this phase, each beneficiary was receiving monthly IQD 200 in previously-
used currency (until it was replaced by the new Iraqi Dinar). This amount was nearly 
as much as that earned by an unskilled employee per month. 
Although a large amount of money was spent to set up the SSN programme at the 
national level in Iraq between 2004 and 2005, the KRG opposed switching from SPF 
to SSN. According to the Iraqi version of the SSN, claimantsÕ circumstances needed 
to be revised and considered, and the minimum payment increased from IQD 300,000 
to IQD 100,000. There has been until recently an ongoing controversy between the 
Iraqi Federal Government and the KRG as to whether this fund should be supplied 
from Baghdad or from the 17 per cent share of the regional budget paid to the KRG. 
Therefore, the SSN was almost terminated before being implemented. 
The second period started after 2009 when the name of the programme changed to 
the SPF. In this round, cash transfer minus social (public awareness) support began 
following a ministerial command to dismiss all social workers/visitors without prior 
notice and eliminate regular visits to households from the programme. 
 
6.2. Programme Objectives 
It is useful to examine implementersÕ understanding of the programme and the 
manner in which they attempted to meet its objectives. This section clarifies the 
objective settings of the public policy the government has already set. Any social 
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programme could be set to pursue more than one objective, and also more than one 
reason could be found behind its implementation. What is expected to happen here is 
that the implementers and frontline staff are supposed to be totally aware of clear 
goals set for the programme. 
Understanding the thinking behind policy leads to an understanding of the policy itself 
and how it is to be implemented. Participants of the research were therefore asked to 
explain the rationale behind the programmes. A surprising outcome of this was that 
implementers of the SSN perceived the programme and its ends differently. A wide 
range of conceptions was highlighted; some explained the SSN as a social 
awareness programme, while others focused on the social cash transfer aspect. 
Some of the research participants also suggested that it was a regular public service 
which should be run as a government-funded programme. Others equally explained 
that the SSN was a scheme which should be operated as the right of people to social 
security. As will be explained later, none of these objectives has been targeted 
sufficiently. The differences in implementersÕ perceptions indicate the expectations 
that they have from the programme, in which it may contradict with what one can see 
from the outcomes of the programme implementation. It does not necessarily infer 
that the objectives have been followed adequately. 
 
6.2.1. Right to Social Protection 
The SSN programme targets poverty in the Kurdistan Region. Considering the cash 
transfer programme as peopleÕs right to social protection has been clearly considered 
in the human rights declaration. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
states that Òeveryone, as a member of society, has the right to social securityÓ (Article 
22). The Declaration refers especially to the right to medical care and social services; 
to security in the event of sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and unemployment 
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(Article 25). The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966) similarly recognises Òthe right of everyone to social security, including social 
insuranceÓ (Article 9). These texts represent statements of intent on behalf of the 
United Nations member countries to extend social security to all residents. Various 
conventions adopted by the International Labour Office have sought to specify and 
operationalise the content of such obligations. The most important of these is the 
Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No. 102). It identifies nine 
social risk areas with a corresponding demand for social security: medical care, 
benefits in case of sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury, disability, 
family circumstances, maternity and surviving a provider (Overbye, 2005: 305). 
The concept of human rights in social protection literature entails a governmentÕs 
obligation to implement social transfers (Knnemann & Leonhard, 2008: 5). When it 
comes to implementers of the SSN, this goal should be stated as a point of concern in 
dealing with recipients. In the case of the SSN programme I asked research 
participants what aim they could find in the programme and how they see the way the 
target is being sought. Human rights Ð or in some cases, peopleÕs rights Ð was one of 
those terms that they mentioned. Respondents started from the point that the 
government has the obligation to care for the poor. However, this is not reflected in 
the content of the services provided. The SSN beneficiaries receive much less than 
what is needed to cover the minimum level of the recipientsÕ consumption. The 
programme policy claims a minimum right to welfare (not a privilege, as in the case of 
the RPFMGS programme); however, the policy has been violated on two levels. First, 
the right should be granted for all eligible people in society. This should not be 
restricted to a limited pre-registered population. The design of the programme does 
not include new claimants except in very rare cases. When a claimant is dead or no 
longer eligible for the benefit, only in this case can his/her name be replaced with a 
new claimant. 
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All research participants of SSN suggested that the programme should be seen as the 
fulfilment of human rights, yet they added that resources were not being distributed 
fairly. Indeed, other participants also shared the same view as the last-mentioned 
quote as, at times, due to this unfairness, they as implementers feel embarrassed 
when dealing with recipients. 
Abdulrezaq Mustafa, the former director of the programme in Erbil, who was at his 
post when big changes and expansion were made to the programme between 2002 
and 2005, made this observation: 
Although the amount that beneficiaries would get each month is very low, 
itÕs their right. I have always advised my frontline staff to treat and speak 
with beneficiaries respectfully and not as if they have sympathy for them. 
[SPF-B1] 
 
This quote shows that the employees of the SSN are not satisfied with the allocated 
amount of payment to claimants. Research participants agreed that what has been 
achieved from the programme is the right to get paid whatever the amount is. The 
extent to which the benefit is sufficient is another matter. It was also observed that the 
frontline staff found the stated right questionable as to how the right to adequate 
benefit has been achieved. 
Mrs Asos Najib Abdullah, the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, also expressed 
her idea towards the SSN programme as follows: 
[It] is being given to poor and low-income households as their right for 
minimum well-being, households [for] whom their breadwinners [are] 
incapable of work due to their particular circumstances ... It is [the] 
governmentÕs responsibility to take care of those people and provide basic 
needs for them in the best way. [SPF-D1] 
 
However, she also admitted that there is a fault in the policy of the programme, 
especially during the SPF period. A family with eight persons gets the same amount 
169  
as a couple gets from the SPF [SPF-D1]. Another senior officer who worked in the 
directorate of the FPF for more than two decades made this observation:  
The SPF, which is a social assistance scheme, [in practice] is considered 
as Ôpity or sympathyÕ to the people rather than as part of their ÔrightÕ Ð a 
situation which the implementers feel embarrassed about and [see an] 
internal contradiction in. [SPF-B8] 
 
A quote from an interview with the director general of the programme in Sulaymaniyah 
further buttresses this claim: 
What is being given to beneficiaries of SSN is not social protection. We 
cannot call this scheme as ÔsocialÕ in any kind of it just because of 
involving cash transfer. Adding to that, it doesnÕt take into account 
peopleÕs rights and demands at all. [SPF-C3] 
 
6.2.2. Cash Transfer to Eligible People or Assistance for Poor 
When it comes to the functionality of the SPF, another duality in the objectives of the 
programme appears. Cash transfers under the SPF were potentially categorised 
under social assistance programmes. Indeed, the programme is highlighted as an aim 
to secure an adequate standard of living for all people in the region. As asserted by 
some research participants, cash transfers are for those under the poverty line. Yet, in 
practice the programme does no more than provide enough to cater for the needy for 
only a couple of days per month. One of the main objectives of social protection is to 
approach poverty reduction in payments of direct income transfers. Effecting a 
change in the life of the recipients is one of the conditions for making the social 
protection system work effectively. 
This programme covers a wide range of the population in the Kurdistan Region who 
are distressed. A former programme director of the SPF describes the conditions of 
eligibility: 
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This programme covers those who are low-income or have no source of 
income for their livelihood. [SPF-B1] 
 
The most distressed group is widows as a result of past wars. For the same reason, a 
huge number of orphans could be found in the community. We all face the same, 
obvious, dilemma Ð age or die. The family might treat their spiritual and psychological 
needs, but not always their financial needs. The SSN programme covers older people 
in poor families in order to safeguard them financially within their family. Most 
importantly they need this benefit to avoid feeling that they are a burden to their 
family. 
However, there is an ambiguity in applying the eligibility criteria. Those with low 
incomes are seen as those with jobs or a source of income, but who cannot cover 
their expenses without assistance from the government. The following two quotes 
show us that the SPF is not being implemented on the basis of need. A social worker 
in the directorate of Social Protection and Development in Sulaymaniyah described 
the SPF as follows: 
SSN is a government body for providing social service to all households 
living under the poverty line, or in a bad financial condition, which need 
government intervention. [SPF-A7] 
 
But, afterwards, he expressed his view on the implementation of the programme: 
The amount of cash given to beneficiaries is just an aid, not social 
insurance. Who can survive a month with only IQD 30,000 (US$25)? 
Social insurance is something else. [SPF-C4] 
 
Unsurprisingly, many of the participants were quite negative about the real impact of 
the programme. Below is a quote from a programme manager in the town of Semel: 
Social Protection benefit is merely an aid to cover a very limited need of 
the poor people. [SPF-B9] 
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Other research participants also asserted that there is a contradiction in counting the 
SPF as a social cash transfer. Below is a quote from a senior social worker: 
When you look at the eligibility criteria of the SPF, you see that it 
considers families who are unemployed, and with no income at all. It looks 
like the government would look for families dying of hunger and then want 
to make them survive with IQD 30.000 (US$ 25). These are very tough 
and unreasonable conditions, so why were these eligibility criteria never 
implemented effectively? [SPF-GE2] 
 
Almost all research participants mentioned that despite the claim that the SPF is a 
social cash transfer, the reality is different. Cash transfers must reduce the extreme 
income inequalities, which affect a great number of people in less-developed 
societies. Hence, social cash transfers need sufficient funds to be run. The extent to 
which the SPF can become effective depends on whether sufficient budgetary 
resources are put into this programme or not. However, the whole experience of the 
SPF proves the opposite. Beneficiaries of SSN need full social security not 
assistance.  
 
6.2.3. Social and Human Development 
The variation in defining the SPF continues to the concept of social awareness for a 
particular end: social and human development. The idea of social development in the 
programme is traced back to 2001 when the programme was reactivated and 
reshaped in the FPF. The former Deputy Minister of Health and Social Affairs, Mr 
Abdullah Salih (1999-2003), was the first to argue that the programme should 
extensively include social awareness and this should be implemented with the 
assistance of social workers. Social awareness in the programme designated the 
social, health, education and psychological advice to families of SPF claimants. 
Besides distributing salaries, social workers would also educate the families on social 
awareness. The central thrust of the plan was that every appointed social 
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worker/visitor was to be responsible for a number of families and was required to visit 
them on a monthly basis to check on their well-being. 
In the FPF (2001-2009), cash transfer (social assistance) was basically seen as a tool 
to reach poor families and in the meantime give social, health and psychological 
advice. The Directorate of Social Protection and Development during the second 
cabinet of the KRG adopted the idea of empowering poor people using cash transfers. 
However, overcoming poverty is not just a matter of social security, it is also about 
promoting social development through raising social awareness. 
In this stage of the SPF, cash benefits were therefore combined with social 
awareness (social, health and psychological advice), and the programme was called 
the FPF. Besides the change in name, the programme was also functioning 
differently, as noted by the manager in charge at the time:  
In this way social workers/visitors got access to a number of very good 
cases for them to work on. For instance, there were families who had 
taken their children out of school for years to help the family earn some 
money, but they were returned to education through this programme. 
Even family issues between wife and husband and their misunderstanding 
have been solved, either through personal mediation or in court 
processes. [SPF-B1] 
 
The aim behind reactivating the FPF programme in 2001, after been suspended for a 
decade, was not merely because some people were in desperate need of cash for 
their livelihood, but the main aim was human development in society. Those people 
were in need of social awareness and rebuilding their personality rather than only 
financial needs. Putting the idea of social-human development into the political 
agenda of the KRG in the post-war Kurdistan Region was just an appropriate scheme 
at the right time. Priority should have been given to poor families, as they were more 
likely to be vulnerable to adverse health, educational, psychological and other 
adverse consequences from the wars and other social upheaval.  
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Within this context, we can understand how senior officers of the FPF have thought of 
employing such a programme for social modernisation: 
Most people, for instance, bring about a religious justification so as to not 
practise birth control. Step by step through our programme (cash besides 
awareness) these understandings were changed. We saw plenty of 
examples, which show that this has resulted in reality. We could convince 
some of our family clients to practise birth control. Our aim was twofold. In 
addition to health reasons for the woman, this birth control was affecting 
their financial situation as well. [SPF-B10] 
 
All research participants were satisfied with the process and outcome of the social 
awareness scheme in the programme. According to the plan, social workers/visitors 
had to make regular visits to beneficiaries. No data could be found, but cases were 
referred to by research participants which indicate what the raising social awareness 
achieved with regard to returning poor familiesÕ children to school, fertility and family 
problems. Despite the declared aims, the SPF was rather being used to pursue 
another target: raising public awareness as a part of social modernisation and 
development. 
 
6.3. Inequality in Distribution: Political and Social Clients 
During the field visit to the Directorate General of Social Protection and Development 
in Sulaimaniya I found that a large number of beneficiaries under the name of Special 
Salary had been attached to the SPF programme. Although they get paid within the 
same programme, the benefit rate of Special Salary is in no way comparable with that 
of regular SPF claimants.  
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6.3.1. Ignored Programme for Neglected Beneficiaries 
One of my interview questions was the extent to which the SPF is seen as an 
important social security programme by high officials in government. The answers I 
got during interviews, especially with middle and lower rank employees, imply that the 
programme has been largely neglected by the KRG. 
A senior social worker in the SPF Ð Erbil expressed the view that the government 
does not show any interest in implementing the programme: 
Despite changing in socio-economic life, the number of recipients 
remained the same. This indicates that the government has no plan for 
enhancing the SPF. I can confirm that the government (and the minister) 
have ignored it. [SPF-A5] 
 
Dler A Nuradden, a former senior employee of the SPF and currently Director of the 
Research Division in MoLSA, pointed to a reason why the government does not give 
enough attention to the programme: 
I see that the government looks at the importance of services in a 
sequential manner. The issue of education, health, electricity, roads, 
these are priorities everywhere. These are services for all, not for a 
particular group. [SPF-B3] 
 
This neglect is also linked to the situation and status of a service user: the recipient. In 
the case of the SPF or SSN I prefer to use the term ÔrecipientÕ instead of ÔbeneficiaryÕ, 
because taking the cash received by the eligible every month, and the outcome of this 
cash transfer cannot be seen as benefit. Almost all research participants agreed that, 
since a fixed monthly allowance (IQD 30,000) has been assigned to recipients, 
without any consideration of family situation or how many dependent children they 
have got, the programme has not played its financial role. With the benefit rate of 
IQD 30,000, the monthly payment covered only 10 per cent of monthly needs of a 
family of two people. Under the SSN this amount was increased to IQD 150,000 but 
still is less than what an unskilled worker can get for ten daysÕ work. Interestingly, 
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during the early period of the FPF (2001-2003) the amount was relatively higher. A 
senior employee of the SPF with nine yearsÕ experience compared the amount that 
was paid under the FPF in 2001 with current cash payments in the SPF, as follows: 
In 2001, when I had four yearsÕ working experience in this ministry, I was 
getting a bit more than what was being paid to beneficiaries of this 
programme. But now the lowest salary of an unskilled employee is more 
than what beneficiaries of SPF (not during SSN) receive every month by 
15 times. [SPF-A5] 
 
Another senior member of staff of the SPF expressed his view on why the 
beneficiaries of the SPF are not being taken seriously into account: 
The people who get these benefits are poor, so why are they useless and 
lack any value in the view of high officials? The government does not care 
about them. If they had any interest in them, they should have taken them 
seriously and provided a good service to them. [SPF-B4] 
 
Here I can highlight one of the research arguments: the view that the government 
ignores the programme because it sees no political value in the beneficiaries, the 
programme and its implementation. A civil servant in the Directorate of Social 
Protection and Development Ð Sulaymaniyah made an interesting point in relation to 
this: 
Unlike other groups, beneficiaries of the SPF havenÕt got an advocate. 
Others have got their organisations and societies to protect their rights, 
but who will fight for an old lady? [SPF-GS4] 
 
Although the programme covers a total of 39,363 families in the region [excluding 
another 23,000 recipients of Special Salary attached to the SPF in Sulaymaniyah 
province] it has no significant place in government policy. In the absence of an 
effective social security programme, SPF recipients are not viewed with genuine 
concern by the government. Contrarily, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, 
beneficiaries of RPFMGS are treated much better, and a high level of importance is 
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attached to that programme. Recipients of other programmes have been able to fight 
for an increment in their benefits through organisations and societies to which they are 
affiliated. Their voices have always been heard and have forced the government to 
respond. For instance, recipients of other benefits, such as disabled people, blind and 
deaf people, political prisoners and people with Thalassemia, forced the government 
to issue new regulations and revise their monthly benefits through demonstrations 
and street protests. The benefit rates of these groups of claimants were increased 
earlier, in addition to other benefits they receive, such as housing units. 
There have been some improvements to the SPF since the fieldwork was conducted. 
Beneficiaries embarked on demonstrations and protests in February 2011, which 
have compelled the government to increase payments. With the implementation of the 
new SSN programme, the aftermath of demonstrations of February 2011, the benefit 
was gradually increased up to five times (from IQD 30,000 to IQD 150,000). The 
modalities of the SSN are being worked out; its regulations and eligibility criteria and 
guidance are yet to be determined. 
 
6.3.2. Special Benefit Just For Special People 
In 2005, the PUK and KDP formed the unified cabinet in 2005 and they attempted to 
integrate many of their own party institutions into government. The reason was to 
reduce the financial load on the party, placing these burdens on the government. The 
Secretarial Office of Jalal Talabani, Secretary General of PUK and current President 
of Iraq, was one of the party arms which benefitted from and was involved in this 
integration. In its first step, the Secretarial Office of Jalal Talabani attached a 
department called Special Salary from its office to the Directorate of Social Protection 
and Development in Sulaymaniyah province. The Special Salary department mostly 
covered influential persons and tribe leaders and special party followers. This scheme 
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was used to keep the loyalty of recipients for the PUK. The eligibility criteria of the 
SPF have never been applied to beneficiaries of Special Salary, yet it is implemented 
as part of the SPF. Around 32,000 claimants are getting benefit from the SPF under 
the name of Special Salary, while they are not eligible to any kind of social security 
benefits. They are not in need of any financial or income help. They all have other 
sources of income, and some are in a very high financial position. Most of the 
beneficiaries of the Special Salary do not visit the Directorate of Social Protection and 
Development Ð Sulaymaniyah personally to receive the benefit. Instead they send a 
person or representative to collect the payment. 
We can argue that abandoning SSN from 2005 to 2011 was related to politics more 
than fund, an excuse which was made by the KRG that due to lack of sufficient funds 
the government could not afford it. However, the PUK was mostly against the 
implementation of SSN. 
In a focus group carried out with employees of the SPF in Sulaymaniyah, four people 
asserted that in Special Payment, even the staff get twice as much as any other 
employees of the SPF get in the same position. [SPF-GS4], [SPF-GS3], [SPF-GS1], 
[SPF-GS2] 
This process of integrating party organisations into government can in no way be 
confused with the notion of transparency in the party institutions. The Special Salary 
has always been hidden from public eyes, especially journalists. The only reason 
behind the integration was to put financial burden of the party on the government. 
This may explain the reason why the KRG, which has in the last two decades been 
controlled by the two political parties, KDP and PUK, has not made any attempts to 
operate the SSN. In the process, the names of recipients of Special Salary (nearly 
32,000 recipients) would have been exposed; the fact that they avoid it is because 
most of them are high profile people. 
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6.4. The Presence and Role of Implementers 
The FPF was always approved by lower and middle ranked employees of the 
programme. The involvement of social workers/visitors in the implementation of that 
programme, in both cash transfer and other social services, has always been 
respected. A social worker in the Directorate of Social Protection and Development Ð 
Erbil made this submission: 
Within this cash transfer a social sphere had been created. It was like a 
network, whereby the social workers/visitors were in a constant 
relationship with the recipients for both cash transfer and social 
awareness provision. This relation had even exceeded the work relation. 
It involves sharing personal matters with the social worker/visitor, 
consultation in personal or family issues, and even occasional telephone 
calls and greetings. [SPF-A5] 
 
All research participants of MoLSA and the SPF regretted the dismissal of social 
workers/visitors in the process of implementing the programme, except Phicri 
Khoshnaw, who had worked as a coordinator in the social programmes with coalition 
forces in Iraq after 2003. He criticised the massive presence of social workers in 
MoLSAÕs programmes as follows: 
MoLSA is full of social workers, while this programme does not need just 
them. There is a lack of competent administrative staff and IT officers, for 
which the programme needs their work. [SPF-C2] 
 
Social workers are considered key staff in the assessment procedures and delivery of 
social security benefits. However, they are not the only people that the programme 
can depend on to run it. People with other specialities, such as accountants, IT 
specialists and administrators, are also key people in order for the programme to be 
operated. 
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6.4.1.  Service  Providers  Welcomed  into  Households  Only  When  the  Cash  is  in 
Their Hands 
Social workers of FPF were very welcomed by claimants to visit their house in order 
to conduct regular assessments, provide social advice and deliver the payment. In the 
case of having problems, families of claimants would be more inclined to share their 
problems with the social worker, if they found they were in a position to assist. The 
cash payments were therefore meant to smooth the process of intervening in 
claimantsÕ families. 
The reason behind choosing this method for Ôvisit and pay cash in handÕ was to 
enable the social workers/visitors to work with the families easier. If a family had a 
problem, they would be more inclined to share it with the social worker. Ordinarily, 
most people will not put their private issues or problems before others if they do not 
feel that they are in a position to assist or that they have no interest in the matter. The 
amounts paid to beneficiaries were therefore meant to smooth the process of 
intervening in their families.  
A senior member of staff of the SPF, who had supervised one of the six areas of Erbil, 
mentioned the role of social workers in the SPF: 
This programme was getting implemented through social workers without 
having a specific place or office in order for the social worker/visitors and 
the people to meet outside the home, especially when there was a 
problem. Everything was reliant on the social workerÕs capability; he would 
provide social (non-financial such as health, social and psychological) 
services to the family inside their home according to his own knowledge 
and experience. [SPF-B3] 
 
A senior officer who worked as a social worker during the SPF period, made her 
comments on the job she did with families of recipients through visits: 
Even we, as social workers/visitors, were intervening in cases of 
misunderstanding between wives and husbands. Most of the time, we 
were following family issues in a financial situation. Our role was to help 
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them to not make prompt decisions about their family relations or to think 
of separation. [SPF-B10] 
 
Recruiting social workers/visitors cost a monthly allowance of IQD 90,000 for each 
member of staff, on top of their salary. This money was provided by the UNICEF in 
collaboration with MoLSA. Although the amount paid to them was very small, the staff 
were highly motivated to the work and enjoyed the experience. A social worker in 
MoLSA-Erbil also expressed how much humanitarian motivation was involved in this 
programme: 
The amount that we were getting for doing this job [visiting households] 
was very small [IQD 50.000 per month plus 40.000 for transportation]. 
However the humanitarian motivation was very powerful to keep doing so. 
[SPF-A5] 
 
6.4.2. Dismissing Social Workers/Visitors from the Programme 
The FPF had assigned a great role for social workers/visitors in its implementation. 
Many achievements have been pointed out with regard to their role. Yet, after 
dismissing them, nothing was done by the government to enhance and develop the 
programme. The measure can therefore be seen as a step backwards from a 
relatively satisfied period of the SPF programme. 
When social workers/visitors were in the FPF programme, they had the discretion and 
power of decision in cases. However, these powers were taken away under the SPF. 
Even the General Director of Duhok province faulted the social security system of the 
Kurdistan Region for not giving people in his position the authority to add or take off a 
single beneficiary: 
We have no authority to add one single eligible person to the list of 
recipients. [SPF-C1] 
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The government until then had no shortage in their budget, and no cut in public 
expenditure had been announced to explain the governmentÕs action towards 
dismissing social workers from the programme. Social workersÕ salaries did not need 
a huge budget to make it unaffordable for the government. Indeed, most of the social 
workers/visitors got their jobs and salaries from the MoLSA or the Ministry of 
Education. The only logical explanation for their dismissal was that the government 
did not see the Ôsocial awarenessÕ of the scheme and the role of social workers in the 
programme as necessary.  
The reason why a social worker/visitor was dismissed from the programme, and a 
step taken backwards in the programme to the theme of providing a small amount of 
cash to the beneficiaries through banks, was to: 
- avoid extra, unnecessary expenditure which was thought not to be part of social 
security policy; 
- avoid any manipulation with beneficiariesÕ money by social workers/visitors, which 
happened in a couple of cases. 
The above two points are found as unreasonable justification by almost all middle- 
and lower-ranked employees in the programme. UNICEF was paying social workersÕ 
and visitorsÕ salaries. When this was stopped, the government cut and dismissed 
social workers/visitors from the programme. 
 
6.4.3. Consultation and Decision Making 
Most middle- and lower-ranked employees of the programme also complained about 
the lack of meetings or any kind of relation between top officials and lower-ranked 
employees. All decisions (including changing the programme, dismissing social 
workers/visitors, transforming the delivery of benefits by social visitors to a committee 
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in MoLSA and then banks, and implementation and suspension of SSN) were made 
at the top without the involvement of social workers, advisors or even directorates of 
the programme. 
The SSN staff members blamed the high officials of MoLSA for not referring to them 
at all for consultation prior to making any decision. Most of them asserted that they 
neither had meetings with nor had been visited by senior officials of the MoLSA to 
discuss their problems or share their experiences. 
 
6.5. Interference in Implementing the Programme 
Despite the claim that the programme is ignored, it has not been safe from 
intervention by high officials and politicians. The intervention has been made to insert 
ineligible claimants into the programme, mostly by politicians. The Deputy General 
Director of Social Protection and Development in Duhok acknowledged that she has 
experienced cases of intervention by top officials: 
On occasions an influential public figure in an area demanded that a 
number of his relatives be included on the beneficiaries list. If we rejected 
that because they have reached the upper ranks within the party and 
administrative bodies, he tried to convince us with a number of 
justifications to dismiss our decision as unjustified and illegal in order to 
change our decision. [SPF-C5] 
 
Azad Hamad, Deputy Director of the SPF in Erbil mentioned obstacles made by high 
officials, as follows: 
Often you see that there are interventions and they donÕt let the 
programme go its own way. There are officials who have sometimes 
hampered and intervened in the working of this programme. [SPF-B1] 
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Political parties make the interference as a practice of nepotism for people to show 
loyalty to them. The former Director of the SPF in Erbil expressed that: 
It happened in some cases when influential persons have requested to 
put the name of their relatives and close people into the beneficiariesÕ list. 
If we did not respond to them, they would try to go to politicians and high 
officials and ask for help. They do not give up until they are ensured that 
something has been done for them. [SPF-B1] 
 
As many frontline staff mentioned, SPF services were misused by high officials to 
gain recipientsÕ loyalty to a political party. When social workers take money to a 
family, they are asked to pass the high officialsÕ message to the family that Nechirvan 
Barzani, the Prime Minister at that time, was behind this financial aid. This point was 
reiterated by a social worker, Farhad, as follows: 
We were asking recipients to bear in mind the fact that a political leader 
was behind the sums,[…], this was very normal. [SPF-GE3] 
 
Another senior social worker, Ayub A Husein, with six yearsÕ experience in the SPF 
noted:  
This has always been used as a political advert in favour of the political 
party in power. [SPF-GE2] 
 
Even the former programme director of the SPF in Erbil admitted: 
We were always mentioning to beneficiaries that Nechirvan Barzani (PM) 
has provided this fund. [SPF-B1]. 
 
6.6. Implementation Gap: Critical Factors still Missing 
To reiterate a central argument of this chapter, it is important to see how much priority 
is given towards the running of the social programme. As the research has pointed 
out, the political value of beneficiaries has a significant impact on the importance and 
184  
priority attached to the programme by high officials in government. Powerless 
recipients get less attention and less service than politically powerful recipients. Some 
critical factors in the implementation of the SPF could be analysed as follows. 
 
6.6.1. A Deadlocked Programme in Changing Socio‐Economic Situation 
There was not a continuous professional mechanism which was capable of self- 
innovation suitable to various time periods. Clearly, the mechanism through which the 
programme was working in 2004 was the same as that of 1998-1999. Yet the 
economic and social condition of the public had seen substantial changes. The 
concrete nature of the system on which the programme was working resulted in 
limiting the output of the implementer and led to further shortcomings. Jyan M Taher, 
Deputy Director General of the SPF in Duhok, describes the inflexibility of the 
programme: 
We cannot register anybody else. The higher tap is closed. We have to 
wait for someone to die or become no longer eligible. Then we can 
replace them with someone else. It cannot be guaranteed that only true 
beneficiaries will benefit. Within the existing programme, because it is not 
related to the network that connects all government departments, it is not 
known who has what. Besides, when someone is on a low income they 
are not going to be like this forever. [SPF-C5] 
 
A mechanism of updating claimantsÕ data should be applied to follow up changes in 
claimantsÕ circumstances. When claimantsÕ situations change, their living gets better 
and they get a well-paid job, they are not necessarily reporting to relevant people in 
the programme to cut their benefits. This has very rarely happened in the SPF 
programme. This programme has to observe and reassess the claimantsÕ situation 
regularly in order to avoid fraud. 
This mechanism is necessary to purify the beneficiariesÕ list. Only in this way could the 
programme be able to cut the benefit of ineligible claimants and let eligible people 
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benefit from the programme instead. Because it has not been updated, many 
beneficiaries are found in the list though they do not fit the eligibility criteria, for 
instance, those who needed the service at a particular period because they had 
young children. These children are able to work when they grow older; yet, due to the 
lack of update, there is no mechanism to take their names off in favour of those who 
now need the service. Consequently, there are people who are eligible for the 
programme, but cannot benefit from it; yet, even in these situations, as noted earlier, 
even the minister is not authorised to take off or add a name. 
The Deputy Director General of Social Protection and Development in Duhok, on 
several occasions, pointed out the immobile state of the programme: 
This programme has not progressed, but it has fallen behind. In the last 
eight years, apart from some minor cuts and additions, no activities have 
happened in it. For example, ten years ago the amount of cash which was 
set up for a beneficiary was more than the salary of an ordinary employee, 
but today it does not last them for two days. [SPF-C5] 
 
Despite the rapid economic changes in the last decade, the programme has not 
revised the benefits so as to reflect inflation and the high cost of living. As a senior 
social worker in Erbil stated, the programme is dead now. Because it has not been 
updated in parallel with the changes that have occurred: 
It is not able to meet basic demands of the poor. Its existence or non-
existence is the same, not at all important, as it has lost its functionality. 
[SPF-A5] 
 
No one has been registered in Erbil and Duhok provinces since the higher tap was 
closed. Sulaymaniyah has had a different case, which will be discussed later. New 
eligible persons have to wait for someone to die or become ineligible, before they can 
go on the list. Unless SSN is implemented it cannot be guaranteed that only true 
beneficiaries will benefit. Only SSN can control eligibility criteria. 
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Jiyan T Taha, Deputy General Director of the programme in Duhok mentioned 
problems relating to the lack of organisational network between KRGÕs ministries and 
how this has affected the implementation of the programme: 
Besides, when one is on a low income they are not going to be like this 
forever. A mechanism should be implemented to follow up changes in 
claimantsÕ circumstances. When a claimantÕs situation changes, their 
living gets better and they get a well-paid job; they are not necessarily 
coming to us to stop their payment. This has happened, but very rarely. 
This programme has to control these things by itself. The SSN would 
control this to a great extent. [SPF-C5] 
 
Despite the changes occurring in the name of the programme in the last decade, and 
maximising the number of beneficiaries in each stage of the programme, the static 
condition of the programme has negatively affected the process of filtering the 
claimants. 
A question could be raised about why did the KRG carry on implementing a deadlock 
programme rather than implementing the newly-designed SSN? It has been declared 
by the KRG that the reason is the budget shortage. In a question to the Minister of 
Labour and Social Affairs, ÒAfter your evaluations and reviews, will you expect the 
KRG to give enough financial and spiritual support to develop the SPF or to 
implement the SSN programme?Ó, she answered as follows: 
I will spend all my efforts for that to be implemented. Obviously there is an 
issue on the financial side of it. Our budget in the Kurdistan Region 
depends on Baghdad; the fund which central government allocated for us 
from Iraqi oil revenues. But I believe this time we can operate the 
programme. Last month I obtained the Council of MinistriesÕ agreement to 
recruit (32) IT officers to help us in operating the SSN programme. Firstly, 
the technical site of SSN should be reorganised. Then for its 
implementation, which needs a big amount of a fund, we might be able to 
implement it. [SPF-D1] 
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The Minister of MoLSA gave some details about KRGÕs attempt to implement SSN: 
A month after I took the ministry office I asked the Council of Ministries to 
operate the Social Safety Net (SSN) programme [exactly on 15 December 
2009]. Just recently, a high committee (The Salary and Benefits Review 
Committee-MoLSA) has been founded for that which includes members 
from three ministries: Labour and Social Affairs, Planning, and Economy 
and Finance. We have to come to a decision on SSN by May 2010. [SPF-
D1] 
 
However, this did not happen in the time stated. Going back to the time of 
implementing SSN (March 2011), we can argue that what pushed the government to 
activate SSN was demonstrations. Research participants also stated that: 
What is now there in the process I donÕt know; what justification does the 
government have for it? Is it budget shortage or other things? [SPF-C6] 
 
A senior advisor in MoLSA highlighted some obstacles in the way of implementing the 
programme which delayed the implementation of SSN, as follows: 
I think it there is technical, economic (finance) and political obstacles. All 
relevant officials say we are trying to operate it, but itÕs not easy to find the 
main switch to turn it ON. [SPF-C2] 
 
The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs with all her power tries to 
operate it, but constraints will start to appear when the official papers get 
to the Ministry of Finance. Even the Prime Minister is interested in the 
programme to be operated. The issue is the Ministry of Finance does 
accept orders from the President of Kurdistan Region but not from the 
Prime Minister! [SPF-C2] 
 
Most research participants are not convinced about MoLSAÕs excuse for not 
implementing SSN. A Senior Advisor in MoLSA, Phicri Khoshnaw, also asserted that: 
I do not believe that the problem is finance (lack of funds). I have very 
accurate statistics about the money that MoLSA is spending on the five 
programmes [Disability Protection Allowance, Income Generation Fund, 
Social Protection Fund, others not found in the MoLSA programme; he 
might have meant to name all three types of disabled Ôblind, mental 
disorder and disabled peopleÕ as separate programmes] is more than the 
fund required to operate SSN even after combining all previous 
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programmes as intended together within the SSN. Especially the 
administrative expenditure will be decreased dramatically, as you no 
longer need five general directors as it will be decreased to one, and no 
longer need five managers of finance and so on. [SPF-C2] 
 
As the above quote indicates, integrating all social security programmes of the 
MoLSA in SSN decreases the administrative expenses. 
Another defect I found was that there are still two KRG administrations. I noticed that 
almost all MoLSAÕs benefits were being distributed differently. They are being 
implemented in Sulaymaniyah in one way and in Erbil and Dahok in another way: 
What politics has done to this should have been stopped after the budget 
bill was approved. All three provinces of the Kurdistan Region should 
implement social programmes similarly. One of my duties in these four 
years of the sixth cabinet is to unify benefits at regional level. [SPF-D1] 
 
6.6.2. Adequacy of the SSN Benefit 
The way SSN benefit has been designed and implemented does not seem to achieve 
equality and does not serve the notion of social security for all needy people in the 
Kurdistan Region. If there is any point to be pursued in the programme it is the extent 
to which it responds to minimum standards of the livelihood of poor, not merely as 
small amounts of cash specified to be delivered to people entitled to the SPF. 
Contrary to the claim that it is recipientsÕ rights to be covered by the government, it 
was also evident from some responses that the programmeÕs implementation was 
characterised by sympathy as opposed to rights. None of the research participants 
asserted that the programme meets beneficiariesÕ rights. Their rights would not be 
met by just respecting them as human beings but by considering their circumstances 
temporarily or permanently as poor. In accordance with SPF instructions, eligible 
families or individuals were provided with benefits amounting to IQD 30,000 
(approximately US$25) per month, which did not cover the life of an individual for 
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more than 4-5 days. This amount is less than 10 per cent of the monthly salary of an 
unskilled worker. During the SSN period, the amount increased to IQD 150,000 
(US$125). Having considered the recent rise in the cost of living and the increase in 
the salaries of government employees, the SSN benefit is less than one-third of the 
minimum wage of an unskilled worker. 
Some research participants consider the SSN system as a cash transfer policy in 
name, but something else in practice. The Director of Research Division in MoLSA 
with eight yearsÕ work experience in SSN described this ambiguity: 
It is something in the system while something else is seen practically. [SPF-B3] 
 
The eligibility criteria set for the SPF indicates that proper cash transfers are being 
made. For instance, SPF recipients should not have received any sources of income 
or property. However, as noted earlier, it is hard to consider payments under the SPF 
as a viable source of income or even as an alternative for the household. The poverty 
line has been defined as the eligibility criterion for a person to be entitled to social 
cash transfer. This is set at an income of less than US$30.00 per month. Yet even in 
very low-income countries this quantitative criterion is problematic. It is therefore no 
surprise that in a middle-income region like Iraqi Kurdistan, US$30.00 does not cover 
a single personÕs needs for even a week. As stated earlier, recipients of SPF 
payments are mostly families between two and eight persons, and yet they all receive 
only IQD 30,000 (US$25) per month between them. In essence, the amounts paid 
under the SPF are actually less than the target which marks absolute poverty in the 
region (US$30). Thus, the SPF cannot be seen as an alternative income source for 
poor people. 
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The following quote from a member of staff of the SPF in Erbil Directorate explains 
what implementers expect the programme to be and what it represents: 
I can mention that the aim of this programme is social economy. This is 
the main objective of the SPF programme … This programme aims to 
relieve the financial situation of low-income families. But if we ask to what 
extent this aim has been met or even an attempt has been made to 
accomplish it, I can tell another story. [SPF-A4] 
 
A question raised here is how a social protection system could become an instrument 
for social awareness dissemination, and how social awareness dissemination would 
become a tool for the implementation of a social security programme. In reality the 
decision to transform the programme into the FPF in 2001 has actually not been 
officially completed. There are no official documents to prove that the programme has 
been changed. Rather, this change in direction has been engineered by the MoLSA, 
with no written agenda. 
With the change in direction of the programme, an emphasis was placed on raising a 
social awareness scheme for beneficiaries. The Ôsocial awarenessÕ element was to 
support people with their lifestyle (health, i.e. birth control) and everyday life problems 
due to their financial situation. However, as noted in the previous section of this 
chapter, there were actually no procedures laid down or guidelines on how this was 
meant to be done. 
 
6.6.3. Overloading Social Awareness to the Social Security Programme 
The period during which social cash transfers were combined with social awareness 
was found by implementers of the programme to be the most effective in terms of self-
satisfaction. Middle- and lower-ranked employees in particular found themselves 
capable of making effective inputs into the programme. A senior officer who had 
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worked for the FPF/SPF for eight years, explains his achievements as social adviser 
in the programme: 
Despite encouraging boys to leave work and attend school, we 
contributed to making a change in the dominant stand towards girls to go 
to school Ð as implied in the statement Ògirls do not need to go to schoolÓ, 
especially in peripheral neighbourhoods of cities and remote villages. 
People in those districts were giving more priority to boys, while due to 
cultural reason girls were discouraged to pursue their study. But we did 
change their views towards gender-based discouragement of children 
attending school. [SPF-B10] 
 
A senior social worker in Duhok, Salah Usef, also pointed out that social 
workers/visitors in the period of FPF played crucial roles: 
For me the theme of social awareness was the best and unique point in 
the FPF programme. Even advice was given to parents by social 
workers/visitors appointed particularly for them on how to bring up their 
children, what are the problems in bringing up their children, and finally 
what are the right ways of doing so. [SPF-B10] 
 
It can be argued that integrating a social awareness scheme into a cash transfer 
programme has the potential to overload the main contents of the programme. Yet, as 
many participants intimated, the public awareness aspect has been much more 
effective than the social cash transfer side of the programme. 
What has been discussed in this section implies that a deviation has occurred in the 
programme. Rather than focusing on the key objective, it was in a certain sense put 
aside or minimised in favour of the social awareness scheme. This was not 
necessarily out of the ordinary for certain reasons, as subordinate functions have 
always been inserted into the programme: 
Some cases to which we drew the attention of the government, like 
providing housing units, have been done by the mayor, and it was beyond 
the capacity of this programme to provide this service by itself. [SPf-B1] 
(Former Director of FPF in Erbil) 
 
192  
6.6.4. Policy Deviation as Uncertainty 
The lack of clarity and identity of the social security scheme of the KRG could be 
traced to persistent changes and deviations to the programme from the top. 
Payments were not made on a regular monthly basis as proposed. This made 
recipientsÕ lives uncertain and unstable: 
I donÕt consider myself guilty of anything as I donÕt have a smallest 
decision in my hand in this directorate, even in my job. If things are not 
running in a good manner, if the clients have complaints, it is not me who 
is guilty. [SPF-A3] 
 
6.4.5. Contradictions 
Some participants, while working in different sites of the programme, found no point in 
the implementation of the SPF. Social cash transfer is expected to meet minimum 
standards of living in the region; although, on paper, the eligibility criteria for the 
programme are quite stringent and the programmeÕs implementation was without any 
meaningful ambition of improving or changing recipientsÕ livelihoods. This was evident 
in the account of the programmeÕs deputy director general in Duhok: 
Someone would be eligible for this programme who in most cases had no 
other income from the government. But in turn the government [the 
programme] does not think about their needs, even if the cash being 
given is much too small to provide a minimum level of livelihood. [SPF-C5] 
 
The only aspect of the programme of which the majority of participants were proud 
was social awareness. This is understandable when the outcome of the programme is 
considered. The SPF has not played a proper role in social cash transfer due to not 
contributing in household incomes in any way. In contrast, many examples were 
mentioned by implementers in all different ranks that illustrate the positivity of the 
social awareness scheme of the FPF. 
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Conclusion 
The household was the focal point of this social security programme. The idea behind 
upgrading the FPF was to meet public awareness and social modernisation. This 
seems far away from being considered as a mere security programme. 
SPF guidelines and eligibility criteria have changed many times during the last 
decade, but this has not resulted in improvements to the programme. This will only 
happen by providing a reasonable financial capacity to operate the SSN. The KRG 
has not dedicated adequate resources (financial and human: funding and recruiting 
sufficient numbers of staff) for the programme. 
The aim of social security is to assure a minimum well-being for needy people in 
society. It seems that the SSN programme is implemented as a bureaucratic 
procedure without paying much attention to the objectives that any social security 
programme is designed for. The concept of human rights was not taken into account 
in the drafting of the SPF or in its implementation officially. Indeed, there is no clear 
social security policy by the KRG on which a social security programme can be 
based. Without a solid social security objective, peopleÕs right to an adequate 
livelihood cannot be guaranteed. What is noticed in the case of the SPF is that it is not 
being implemented as a public right to social security. Rather, it is mostly provided as 
charity by the authorities. Besides this, the programme has experienced an 
inconsistency between policy and practice. Despite the rapid economic changes in the 
last decade, the programme has not revised the benefits so as to reflect the inflation 
and high cost of living. 
It has been discussed that the real problem is not necessarily due to lack of funds, 
rather it is the programmeÕs lack of importance to high officials. 
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The SPF has experienced a total ignorance by government, until the demonstrations 
that occurred in the Kurdistan Region on 17 February 2011. This suggests that the 
KRG does not attach any importance to social protection programmes unless there is 
political value placed on beneficiaries. A high proportion of people were entitled to the 
SPF, but this fact has not attached any salience to the programme and has not been 
prioritised in the social security system of the KRG. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICS AND POLICY CLIENTS  
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMMES – KRG 
 
 
Introduction 
Having presented the research findings in the last two chapters, some of the issues 
that are relevant to this thesis can now be discussed. This chapter aims to compare 
and contrast two social security programmes in terms of their implementation 
problems, and to examine the plausibility of two sets of theories: implementation 
theory and clientelist politics. 
Beginning with a comparison between the two social security programmes of the 
KRG, the SPF/SSN and the RPFMGS, the discussion firstly focuses on some of the 
critical questions surrounding the implementation of social security programmes in the 
KRG. Three issues in particular have been highlighted: political factors, the status of 
social security beneficiaries, and the lack of social welfare vision in the KRG. The 
second section of the chapter is about the ambiguity and contradiction present in the 
formulation and implementation of the KRGÕs social security programmes. A section is 
also devoted to the issue of intervention in the implementation of these social security 
programmes from high government officials and party leaders, interference as support 
from the top for successful implementation and interference as policy deviation from 
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those seeking to turn the programme from the agreed objectives. In this context the 
issue of corruption and non-transparency in the implementation of social security 
programmes will be discussed. 
In view of the two different profiles of beneficiaries and interference that have been 
identified, I have introduced and will substantiate in this chapter an implementation 
model: a preference model of implementation. This model will be examined based on 
the degree of salience the government attaches to beneficiaries of social cash 
transfers. Having distinguished two types of claimants, high-value and low-value, a 
contradiction in perception and implementation of social security programmes in the 
KRG has been highlighted. Bringing evidence from my research findings, two types of 
treatment by the KRG towards implementation of social security programmes have 
been compared. The first one is characterised as political/nationalistic and thus 
important, versus the second as public and consequently neglected. All these 
discussions have been justified through understanding the degree of importance 
attached to both RPFMGS and SPF programmes. From this point, a clientelistic 
benefit from these social cash transfers will be explored. Finally the research findings 
need to be examined in light of the policy implementation theories. 
 
7.1. Comparison Between the SPF/SNN and RPFMGS Programmes: 
Contradictions and Ambiguity 
Throughout the last two chapters of research finding analysis, Chapters 5 and 6, it 
has been shown that the two researched programmes, RPFMGS and SPF, could not 
be considered purely as social security schemes. Not only in terms of their 
functionality, but also the declared regulations (especially in the case of RPFMGS) 
articulate an ambiguity. In addition to the social assistance-based duty of both 
197  
programmes, they have both been, in all or some stages of their development, loaded 
with a wide range of services such as health cost assistance, social housing, 
studentship support, and social and psychological counselling. 
The programme objectives of SSN are not consistent. Policy changes do not always 
entail improvement. In the case of the RPFMGS, changes are directed in favour of the 
programme beneficiaries, while in the case of the SSN, changes are much more in 
the way of considering the beneficiaries or something to more effectively implement 
the programme. 
We can argue that the RPFMGS programme has been effectively implemented, while 
the SPF/SSN has failed to be so. SPF/SSN and RPFMGS are both the broadest 
social cash transfer programmes of the KRG. The first is run by the MoLSA, while the 
second comprises a big part of the MoMA services. The sources of funds of both 
programmes are non-contributory and fully funded by the government. The SPF/SSN 
covers people on low incomes, disabled people, widows, orphans and married 
students with very low incomes, while RPFMGS targets families of martyrs, genocide 
survivors, chemical attack victims and prisoners detained by the former Iraqi BaÕathist 
regime. We can describe beneficiaries of SPF/SSN as people with particular socio-
economic situations. As for the RPGFMS, the beneficiaries are victims of wars 
(including intra-Kurdish civil wars) and their families that are characterised as political 
figures by the government. 
The funds and services that the KRG make available for the SPF/SSN are very 
limited. In some cases, especially until 2011, the fund was provided seasonally every 
three months. However, the government generously treats the RPFMGS programme 
with sufficient funds. For example, the government paid monthly only IQD 30,000 to 
claimants of the SPF which increased to IQD 150,000 in the SSN period after 2011. 
While beneficiaries of the RPFMGS get much more based on their categories (see 
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Table 4). The minimum payment provided within the RPFMGS programme starts from 
IQD 180,000 for civil martyrs, to IQD 600,000 for genocide survivor families, and up to 
IQD 1,186,800 for high-ranked martyrs. That is in addition to the housing units and 
scholarships in private universities, and limited tax exemption (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Comparison Between the Social SPF (and SSN) and RPFMGS Programmes 
Comparison  SPF/SSN RPFMGS 
Conditions and 
criteria of eligibility 
No income or very low income, 
disabled people 
Victims of war and genocide 
operation, former veterans 
Target groups People on a very low income or no 
income; Disabled people; Widows; 
Orphans; Married students on very 
low-income 
MartyrsÕ family members; 
Genocide survivors and their 
family members; Political 
prisoners attained by previous 
regime; Chemical attack victims 
Resources Non-contributory; regional budget Non-contributory, regional 
budget 
Services Limited monthly cash Decent monthly cash; Help with 
health costs; Exemption from 
tax; Housing unit; University fees 
support for their children 
Types of benefit Means-tested benefit Non-means-tested benefit 
Level of benefit Income support Additional salary 
Coverage Limited: fixed number of beneficiaries, 
if maximum number is reached 
Open-ended; accept new clients 
Feature Public; Neglected Nationalistic; Preferred 
Administration MoLSA MoMA 
Models of 
Implementation 
Top-Down Bottom-Up 
Achievement Failed Effective; Successful 
Source: adopted from research findings of the two social security programmes. 
 
7.1.1. Social Security as Compensation 
The idea of devoting a special government body to serve inheritors of martyrs, 
genocide and chemical gas-attacked families is traced back to several non-
governmental foundations belonging to political parties. The KRG adopted the idea 
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since the sixth cabinet of the KRG in 2006 after combining several government and 
non-government organisations and merging them in a ministerial body; the MoMA.  
The RPFMGS, implemented by MoMA, gives cash (plus service) benefits for war 
victim families and genocide survivors of the Kurdistan Region. The programme 
provides regular monthly cash transfers plus other services to the eligible population. 
Perhaps what appeared to be ambiguous is that the programme regulation (RPFMGS 
Regulation no.9, 2007) is translated to a total compensation for the life-loss that 
occurred. The social security documents indicate that the compensation is a financial 
reparation, not a social benefit. Consequently it cannot be categorised under social 
security programmes.  
As research findings revealed, the RPFMGS programme is not implemented merely 
as a needs-based programme. The monthly salary is not specified based on the 
financial situation of the needy but rather implemented based on the status the victims 
and their families have had in the wars, national liberation movement, and Kurdish 
political parties. For instance, if the beneficiaries of the RPFMGS are categorised as 
Ôwar martyrsÕ, Ôcivil martyrsÕ, and Ôgenocide victimsÕ, then we are faced with 
implementing a programme which functions to reward the families of victims. 
 
7.1.2. Social Safety Net for Non‐income Poor 
The SPF has been subjected to many alterations since its reactivation in 2001. During 
this period it has experienced several expansions. Despite being implemented mainly 
as a cash transfer scheme, in some phases of the development of SPF/SSN it has 
also been added with social awareness to the families. When it comes to the SSNÕs 
function, a contradiction could be realised in the implementation of the programme. 
The SPF/SSN is potentially defined as a social assistance programme which aims to 
secure an adequate standard of living for all people in the region. The type of benefit 
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in the SPF/SSN programme is means-tested and is considered as income support 
(see Table 4), while in the case of the RPFMGS programme the entitlement to benefit 
is not means-tested and considered as additional salary to beneficiariesÕ privilege. 
Taking into account the amount paid monthly to recipients, I have come to the 
conclusion that the implementation of SPF does not make any change in the life of its 
recipients. This programme covers those who are low-earners or have no source of 
income and are not recipients of any government benefits. Here an ambiguity 
appeared in implementing the eligibility criteria. A low-incomer is someone who has a 
job or a source of income, but cannot afford his/her life expenses without getting help 
from another source. However, the amount being paid monthly in no way covers even 
the very basic needs of a person. 
Within the framework of SPF/SSN, Special Salary is delivered to certain individuals 
selected as party patrons directly by party offices and mostly by the PUK General 
Secretarial Office. None of the SPF eligibility criteria could be applied to them, yet the 
amount of the cash paid is more by many times those of SPFÕs ordinary beneficiaries. 
 
7.1.3. Social Policy Provision: National versus Public 
These research findings have revealed that the KRG is dealing with social security 
programmes discriminately. As argued, the discrimination has resulted from the 
differentiation that the government puts between social security beneficiaries. The 
duality of the KRGÕs interest in social programmes is evident in this differentiation 
between the clients, based on their socio-political status. As has been repeatedly 
emphasised, the national character (as was conceptualised in Chapter 2) of 
beneficiaries of RPFMGS has resulted in a great interest to ruling party leaders and 
government. When it is compared with the SPF beneficiaries, we realise that they are 
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lacking any political privilege. We can use these two statuses and interests in the 
dichotomy of national versus public. 
In the dichotomy of national versus public, the implementation of social security 
programmes in the KRG has always been off balance. The research results 
presented earlier show the extent to which the social security policy implemented in 
the KRG is far from serving the public, and to what extent the concept of public policy 
has occupied a central place in the KRGÕs agenda. As the research findings 
explained, social security programmes have been used as a tool in the hands of party 
leaders to expand the patronage system in the region. 
 
7.1.4. Policy Designer, Policy Maker and Policy Implementers 
One of the points that notably deserves to be highlighted here is the revisiting on 
concepts of policy designer, policy maker and policy implementer. As the research 
findings show, the actual designers of both programmes are middle- and lower-ranked 
officials. However, the designed programme does not bring full power over the 
programme implementation. Policy designers come from selected middle-ranked 
implementers, but they are free from possessing any power of decision making behind 
the top officials. They are aware of the programme and its legal and service provision 
framework more than top officials and ruling party leaders. Middle- and lower-ranked 
officials prepare everything about the programme. They are the ones who come with 
initiations. Designing policy is always done between middle-ranked implementers and the 
government. 
But for a programme to be implemented, it has first to be approved by the government 
and parliament. During the process of approval and authorisation, the Council of 
Ministries can verify, ask for revisions or refuse the policy draft before passing it to the 
parliament. It should finally be met with the governmentÕs approval. The Council of 
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MinistriesÕ duty is to give a prior approval on the draft before sending it to parliament, and 
endorsing and authorising to implementers afterwards. Thus, the role of the parliament 
comes peripheral to the government. 
After the programme regulation is approved and redirected to the relevant institutions, it is 
not the competency and discretion of implementers that guarantees the programme to be 
implemented successfully. The constant support and financial resources allocated by 
government are critical. More importantly, the high salience attached to the political 
implication of the programme is crucial too. Therefore, the policy-designing and decision-
making processes should be separated. As the research found, the potential policy 
designers are mid-lower ranked officials. However, after the programme has been 
approved by parliament, they are not able to implement the programme accordingly. The 
top officials control the implementation process. They drive the programme in their 
preferred direction. The whole administration procedures should run according to ruling 
party leadersÕ and top officialsÕ preference. 
The suggestions proposed to revise and renew a programme are usually made by 
middle- and low-ranked officials. The way a policy is structured is different from how a 
programme is designed. The structuration of policy is more complicated than the explicit 
process of designing and making policy. The structure of social policy, despite including 
the regulation which clearly defines target groups, objectives and procedures to 
implement the programme, involves power and interests. The programmes of social 
security should obtain top officialsÕ and politiciansÕ acceptance and support for 
implementers to be able to conduct satisfactory performance in light of programme 
objectives. As for the case of RPFMGS, implementers could not have achieved any 
relevant results from the RPFMGS programme if they had not already been victims, or 
had special support from ruling party leaders. They are representative guarantors of 
RPFMGS target groups. 
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Having looked at the position of implementers and policy makers as beneficiaries, the 
RPFMGS follows a bottom-up style in its implementation process. The case of the SPF/SSN 
programme indicates that all decisions are made from the top. The role of implementers in 
SPF/SSN has been neglected, and implementers have left with little discretion. 
 
7.2. Critical Factors in Social Security Implementation 
As in the early stage of the study, I started examining critical factors that influence the 
implementation process of the government social security system in the Kurdistan 
Region. This has been a central topic throughout the research journey. In a post-
conflict developing region like Iraqi Kurdistan, social policy takes a particular form 
which is different from those of developed and even stable developing countries. In 
developing countries, arguably social policy suffers mostly from insufficient financial 
resources and lack of the governmentÕs capability (Lane, 1999; Karshenas & 
Moghadam, 2006). However, in addition to this common factor, in the case of the 
KRG, three other critical ones have been identified. These are first, political 
consideration, second the role of beneficiaries of the social security programme, and 
the third is the poor social welfare system in the KRG. 
 
7.2.1. Political Consideration 
In order to understand how politics influence and direct the implementation of social 
cash transfers, it is necessary to consider the political and administrative conditions 
and social politics of the Kurdistan Region. Following the civil war and two economic 
blockades during the 1990s and early 2000s, the Kurdistan Region has not managed 
to establish a stable social welfare system. Current research findings in the case of 
the Kurdistan Region, like most ÒÔcase studies in the Middle East and South Africa 
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show that social policies are shaped by political objectivesÓ (Karshenas & Moghadam, 
2006: 20). Hanekom and Sharkansky (1999) confirm the relationship between political 
uncertainty and policy implementation. They chose South Africa and Israel as case 
studies in their research and, by referring to past events, they emphasised that 
political uncertainty has a close linkage with characters of politics, policy making and 
policy implementation in the two countries. The political uncertainty of the Kurdistan 
Region is that, firstly, it faced constant threats from the Iraqi regime until 2003; 
secondly, it lacks formal recognition by the international community; and thirdly, it has 
also experienced a civil war. All of these factors diminished and maintained the 
Kurdistan Region as a weak and vulnerable political and administrative entity (see 
Figure 6) 
Figure 6 The Determinant Political and Administrative Factors in Implementation 
of the Social Security Programmes in KRG 
 
Source: adopted for analysis of research findings. 
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The findings of current research presented in the last two chapters indicate that party 
politics determines the performance of social policy. Taking into account the historical 
background of the Kurdistan Region, a socio-political circumstance has been created 
by the former Iraqi regime, which has influenced the social life and party politics in 
Iraq in general, and the Kurdistan Region in particular. The Kurdistan Region inherited 
depressed social and economic conditions caused by the intentional ignorance of 
socio-economic life and programmed repression of the Kurdish population by the 
BaÕathist regime in Iraq. Furthermore, as elaborated in the second chapter, the 
Kurdish civil war during the mid-1990s doubled the burden of Kurdish society and 
government. It seemed that the claim for social service provision in general, and 
social security in particular, during the intra-Kurdish war was entirely useless. Despite 
the limited financial sources of the KRG, the budget of the government was controlled 
almost entirely by the two warring factions, the KDP and the PUK. 
The civil war also weakened government institutions in favour of party institutions. 
Party leaders had ultimate control over resources generated from border imports and 
exports and limited tax revenues. These finances were spent without any 
accountability. Often, public administration and expenditure were the last to be 
catered for; party affiliation was also the basis on which social cash transfers were 
made, and even ordinary war victims who did not belong to either of the warring 
factions were excluded. In other words, the regionÕs income was owned and 
controlled by the ruling and, later, fighting parties who spent the income on 
themselves and only on others affiliated to their parties.  
The civil war ended in 1998 but these conditions continued until the US and Allied 
forces invaded Iraq in 2003. Although the Kurdistan Region saw relative economic 
growth as a result of the implementation of UNSCR no. 986, the OFFP started to 
reconstruct its social programmes and the KRG still continued in the direction of 
partiality in the implementation of social programmes. The party cash transfer 
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programme, like the Foundation of Martyrs, was embodied into government but, 
instead of integrating into the rest of the governmentÕs social programmes, it was 
directly attached to the Council of Ministries in both KRG administrations, Erbil and 
Sulaymaniyah. In 2006, the unified government announced all foundations of martyrs, 
genocide victims and veterans were to be merged into the RPFMGS within the 
MoMA. Only after the MoMA was set up were non-party victims covered by the 
programme. 
As for the other programme, SPF/SSN, which at the beginning of its re-activation in 
2001 was called the FPF, the offices of two major parties were in charge of making a 
list of eligible people. For instance, the first, essential list of (8,000) FPF benefit 
recipients was made by the KDP in its party offices in Erbil. This list formed the basis 
for later development of the programme. The political party offices were in charge of 
registering people instead of relevant directorates of social security programmes; the 
point which led to misusing FPF and later SPF. In other words, party leaders and high 
government officials continued to exploit the cash transfer programme, turning it into a 
reward system for loyal party members and supporters. As confirmed by almost all 
past FPF staff members interviewed for this research, the payments handed to 
beneficiaries were always accompanied by a verbal massage from senior officials 
indicating that such payment was a gift from the prime minister and ruling party [SPF-
B1; SPF-GE3; SPF-GE2]. They admitted that the party was seeking clientelism in the 
implementation of the programmes. 
Another critical factor is the issue of institutionalisation. Despite constant claims by 
high officials to the contrary, the KRGÕs civil services lack neutral public 
administrators. The party controls the administration, and politics has overshadowed 
the citizen-based social policy services. This has consequently resulted in lack of 
sufficiency in provided benefits. 
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Allocating a special government body to serve inheritors of martyrs, genocide and 
chemical gas attack survivors on the one hand and neglected existing government 
social programmes on the other hand, indicates unbalanced interests in the 
implementation of social security programmes. Instead of integrating the RPFMGS 
programme into other social security programmes within the MoLSA, the KRG 
devoted a different ministerial body to do so. This placed a huge burden on the KRGÕs 
general budget and it was also a lost opportunity to put together both the Foundation 
of Martyrs and other government social transfer programmes. The two Foundations of 
Martyrs belonging to the party had 15 years of experience inside and outside the 
government. The MoLSA, as the only specialist ministry in providing social services, 
had the same but richer experience. I believe there are two reasons why the 
RPFMGS did not merge with MoLSA. One reason was that a high number of 
ministers agreed on a coalition government between the KDP and PUK. Increasing 
the number of ministries was to allow the allocation of posts to more party candidates 
in high-ranking positions in the government, an action that was widely criticised. 
Therefore, in the sixth cabinet of the KRG, some ministries were merged and the 
number decreased to 19. However, the MoMA has remained as a ministry. 
The second reason why the MoMA was retained as a separate ministerial body could 
be found in the importance of the RPFMGS programme and other services of the 
MoMA. The KRG looks at MoMA as a high nationalistic institution (Law No.8, Ministry 
of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs, 2006), and does not intend to mix MoMAÕs programmes 
with other social services. 
It is worth noting here that incompetence is one of the administrative characteristics of 
KRG. Until the sixth cabinet of the KRG was formed in 2009, those who had been 
recruited to work in government offices were not recruited based on job description or 
qualification. In fact, other external factors have always played a role in recruitment in 
the public services. Since loyalty to the political party, as opposed to experience or 
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qualification, formed the basis of recruitment, it is unsurprising that the capability of 
administrators and employees was very poor (Heshmati, 2010). Once in office, these 
employees were compelled to obey the party rather than commit to administrative 
guidelines. 
The KRG and major parties not only misused staff recruitment, but also both social 
programmes. The Kurdistan Region is not the only developing region with this 
exploitative welfare provisioning in place. The former ruling party of Tunisia equally 
used the welfare state in a clientelist way and as an instrument of power (Karshenas 
& Moghadam, 2006: 21). The use of social programmes for clientelistic purposes is 
explored further in the next section. 
 
7.2.2. Particracy and Patronage: Clientelistic Use of Social Programmes 
The strategic coalition agreement between the KDP and the PUK helped to create a 
unified government. However, traces of dual administration still remain, creating 
resultant constraints for independent civil servants. As I have emphasised at various 
points in this thesis, due to the party political system of the Kurdistan Region, party 
agendas have dominated ministerial and managerial offices. This condition has 
produced and continued a system which consolidated the power of the party over 
government offices. Employees who are loyal to the party are guaranteed their jobs 
and get promotions. This ensures that they will remain committed to follow party 
interests in every step of their work. For instance, the FPF, a programme run during 
the fourth cabinet of the KRG, was used to attract the loyalty of recipients to ruling 
parties. So, in the Kurdistan Region, social security programmes are implemented 
entirely at policy makersÕ will. 
Such control over the implementation of social security programmes has resulted in 
ultimate corruption. In Sulaymaniyah province, for instance, there was a list of 26,000 
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beneficiaries treated within the SPF programme under the sub-scheme of Special 
Salary. The amount paid monthly as Special Salary varied between IQD 30,000 
(approx. US$26) and IQD 1,500,000 (approx. US$1,250), though it is not 
transparently revealed to public media and researchers. This benefit is not dependent 
on the recipientsÕ need; rather it is simply to show their privileged status as people 
affiliated to a ruling party or political leader, especially with the office of Jalal Talabani, 
General Secretary of the PUK. The highest leaders of the PUK also have the authority 
to send a list of up to 4,000 people to the General Directorate of Social Protection and 
Development in Sulaymaniyah to be included in the SPF programme. Although the 
eligibility criteria and guidelines of the SPF are not applied to beneficiaries of the 
Special Salary, the government is increasingly adopting it for the patronage system 
that the major parties want to continue for the interest of selected yet constant party 
members and closely affiliated to political leaders. As a consequence, the patronage 
system of the Kurdistan Region has encouraged an inequality. This inequality can be 
seen while looking at the way the KRGÕs social security programmes deal with target 
groups. On the one hand, the KRG discriminatively divides social cash transfer 
recipients, prioritising those of high political value to parties and are consequently 
better treated. On the other hand, ordinary people with low incomes and the poor are 
paid less attention. Party-affiliated people who have been covered in the SPF 
programme under the scheme of Special Salary are also provided with better benefits 
in comparison with other SPF claimants. Even besides the social cash transfers, there 
are many people who are without work but simply enjoy the privileges of party 
benefits. It is difficult to obtain any information about the amount paid from public 
budget to members of political parties. 
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7.2.3. Claimants Do Matter: High‐ and Low‐Value Clients 
In tracing the effective implementation of social security programmes in the KRG, I 
was introduced to the concept of preference of target groups in the eye of politicians 
and top officials. As I emphasised earlier in this chapter, the implementation process 
of social security policy in the post-war Kurdistan Region is influenced strongly by 
political interests and administrative characteristics, which the implementation of 
social security programme has conveyed. As has been shown in Chapters 5 and 6, 
the relative success of the social security programme largely depended on the 
importance of their beneficiaries from the political perspective of people in power. 
Almost all approaches and generation models of policy implementation emphasise the 
role of actors or groups of actors during the implementation process (Schofield, 2001: 
255). In the policy implementation research, the role of the service user has been 
researched as merely a recipient of the programme, yet very few researches have 
charted recipients as significant actors in the process of implementation (Lipsky, 
1980). Policy research considers actual actors rather than potential actors. In this 
sense, policy implementation research includes a wide range of individuals such as 
executive directors, programme managers, supervisors and other staff members. The 
potential role of service users in the implementation process is often neglected 
because the focus tends to be on implementers rather than beneficiaries. 
The view that identified implementation actors as those forward policy processes 
towards specific goals is quite nave because, although those groups are pointed out 
as implementers, my research identified potential actors that, directly or indirectly, 
influence the implementation performance: they are beneficiaries. This does not mean 
that all beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme in the Kurdistan Region are actual 
policy implementers. However, the vast majority of RPFMGS employees are selected 
from families of RPFMGS target groups. As this research has highlighted, due to the 
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absence of sufficient social security policy in the Kurdistan Region, as well as due to 
its political considerations, the social security recipients are seen as separate. Some, 
as in the case of martyrs and genocide survivor families, have been well served, and 
some, as appeared in the case of FPF/SPF/SSN, have been given little attention. The 
first group and their programme have been given high attention while the second 
group and their programme have been mostly ignored. 
Although I was aware of the differences in the nature of both the SPF and the 
RPFMGS programmes, at the start I did not intend to carry out a comparison of the 
implementation of both programmes. I did not ask how and why different social 
security programmes of the KRG treat their recipients differently. However, the 
findings about the performance of the RPFMGS and SPF/SSN programmes showed 
that possessing administrative experience and competency does not necessarily 
imply that a programme would bring about adequate outcomes. Taking into account 
the constant implementation of the SPF since 2001 shows that it has not made its 
implementation more successful than the RPFMGS, which potentially started as 
government social transfers in 2006. The data collected from both programme 
implementers produced different findings which enabled me to emphasise that what 
mostly determines the implementation process (either success or failure) of a social 
security programme is the politiciansÕ/administratorsÕ perception of the status of the 
beneficiaries. Both programmes have been approved by parliamentary legislation. 
However, the RPFMGS is more privileged than the SPF/SSN. 
Another advantage of MoMA is that in its staff recruitment policy it gives priority to, 
and to a high extent depends on, relatives and family members of martyrs and 
genocide survivors. As research participants declared, the vast majority, if not all, of 
employees of MoMA have been recruited from RPFMGS programme beneficiaries. 
As emphasised by high officials of the MoMA, recruiting MoMA civil servants from the 
victimsÕ family members has two advantages. First, it gives a job opportunity to the 
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victims and their family members, as it is already one of the ministry policies. Second, 
as has been claimed by different participants of my research, these are the best 
people to comprehend what martyrs and genocide families need and consequently 
they can treat them better while delivering services or dealing with their paperwork. 
In the post-conflict Kurdistan Region, the implementation of policy has inevitably been 
a distinctive departure from that of developed countries. The conflicts and wars of the 
last three decades have resulted in large-scale poverty and victimisation. In the case 
of RPFMGS, I have realised that, in staff recruitment, the priority is always being given 
to victims and their relatives. BeneficiariesÕ influence in the implementation process 
appeared when the implementers became programme beneficiaries at the same time. 
Hence, they can benefit from their relationship with party leaders and provide the best 
services for themselves as client-oriented implementers. 
In the party-political system of the Kurdistan Region, the concept of ÔpublicÕ has not 
been well formulated, to an extent that the government finds itself responsible for 
peopleÕs needs, as can be seen in the case of social policy in developed nations. In 
developed democratic countries, from right to left, the social welfare (either state 
welfare or private sector welfare) focuses on the public. Social policy is a 
governmentÕs response to public needs. In the Kurdistan Region with its 
underdeveloped party political system and administratively less competent 
government, social programmes are not targeted at all people in the same way. The 
KRGÕs social security programmes reflect the party politics rather than public welfare. 
Both researched programmes, SPF and RPFMGS, have been developed and 
implemented in the interests of the dominant political parties and for their clientsÕ 
benefit. 
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Figure 7 Different Social Security Programmes Based on Different Profiles of 
Clients 
 
Source: adopted from research findings. 
 
From this perspective, the beneficiaries of the KRGÕs social security programmes can 
be divided into two groups based on their profile (Figure 7). 
First, the group covered by RPFMGS programmes are high-value beneficiaries, and 
are characterised as high-profile clients of social cash transfers. MoMA beneficiaries 
are not just ordinary citizens, they also acquire a political character. Most of them 
might live in a financially low condition, as the families of martyrs and genocide have 
in most cases lost their breadwinners; however, they are not classified and served 
based on their needs. Even the categorisation of RPFMGS beneficiaries is done 
based on the way the victim has lost his/her life, or the victimÕs status in the hierarchy 
of positions on the Kurdish forcesÕ peshmarga and party. Being a high- or middle-
ranked member of the party, especially the major ones, brings a privilege to the family 
in the case of loss of life; even in the case of natural death, it means being entitled to 
cash transfer programmes of the MoMA. What can be inferred from research findings 
is that not all RPFMGS beneficiaries are provided with decent services. Although the 
MoMA recently tried to equalise the salaries of beneficiaries based on their category, 
the differences mostly appeared in non-cash services, such as the provision of 
housing and health services. Beneficiaries in some areas are prioritised over others. 
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This refers to the contest which still exists between the KDP and PUK, and what each 
of them does for the people in their area of influence. 
What I found was that RPFMGS beneficiaries were properly treated. In the SPF also 
there are numerous beneficiaries who have been entitled to a Special Salary, which is 
implemented with an ultimate lack of transparency. Although the employees of this 
project are officially related to the SPF and the Directorate of Social Protection and 
Development in Sulaymaniyah, there is also a difference between payments of 
Special SalariesÕ employees and other SPF employees. The salience of the 
beneficiaries is transferred to the programme and its implementers. 
The second group of beneficiaries is low-value beneficiaries. Simply being poor, 
disabled or older does not offer the same privileges as those related to martyrs, war 
victims or genocide survivors. Politicians and policy makers are less concerned about 
the implementation of the SPF programme. 
As the importance attached to RPFMGS beneficiaries was transformed to the high 
profile programmes and implementers, neglect of the SPF resulted in the 
marginalisation of the programme and its implementers. It was only after civil protests 
started on 17 February 2011 that the KRG announced that it was going to look back 
at the poor and disadvantaged population. Under pressure from the demonstrators, 
the government promised to increase benefits of SPF five-fold, from IQD 30,000 to 
IQD 150,000 (through implementation of SSN). Despite this improvement, the 
discrimination has served as a basis for favouritism and preferentialism by KRG. 
 
7.2.4. Missing Public Welfare Vision  
Despite the case of RPFMGS, which has been increasingly supported by political 
leaders, others social programmes, such as disabled benefits (deaf, blind and 
physically handicapped), pension benefits, and unemployment insurance for 
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graduates, have recently gained attention from the authorities. However, only few of 
them succeeded to obtain the governmentÕs response. Some of these groups have 
unions to protect their rights, such as the Deaf Society and Blind Society. Other 
recipients have been paid attention to after the pressure of the recent mass protests.  
The Kurdistan Region has been altered rapidly in the last decade. New economic 
opportunities have been adopted, but no coherent vision of social policy development 
is yet in place. Having taken the economic, political and administrative experiences of 
the Kurdistan Region in the last two decades, little attempts could be found for the 
establishment of institutionalised welfare policy. The inaugural speeches of the last 
three KRGÕs Prime Ministers presented in the Kurdistan Parliament (Barzani, 2006; 
Salih, 2009; Brzani, 2012) evidently uphold that until recently social policy has not 
been given any priority in the KRGÕs agenda. 
Another example of the KRGÕs negligence towards social security, if not generally the 
social policy, is the way ministries delivering public services are treated by political 
leaders. For instance, some of the ministries, such as the MoLSA, Ministry of Health 
and Ministry of Electricity are subordinate to others, such as the Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Finance and Economy or Ministry of Oil and Natural Sources. What 
clarifies the importance of the last three ministries more is that the KDP is not ready to 
exchange these ministries with its weaker strategic alliance, the PUK. Even persons 
working at the top level of the ministry (minister, deputy minister, and director 
generals) have not been replaced by newer members from the same party in the last 
three cabinets of the KRG. Economic development does not always bring an effective 
social policy provision. The lack of a well-designed social programme has permitted 
corrupt agents from government and political leaders to manipulate the programme. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, policies and decisions are made upon the agreement 
behind parliament by the two dominant parties in the region: KDP and PUK. 
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Ideologically, the KDP and PUK hold the same nationalistic liberation thoughts, which 
explains the reason behind their concern towards the implementation of a social 
programme such as the RPFMGS. Since both parties and the KRG feel they owe the 
national liberation and civil war victims a great deal for their loss and sacrifice, they 
prioritise the implementation of the RPFMGS programme to reward them. I can 
conclude that what has been prioritised in the governmentÕs agenda is not a social 
welfare provision, but a social cash transfer with a political/nationalistic character in 
support of major partiesÕ clientelistic practice. An adequate system of welfare needs to 
be adopted in order to expect an equivalent interest in all government social 
programmes. 
In my view, the KRGÕs failure in launching a sufficient welfare system is not due to an 
absence of financial and administrative capacity; rather, by and large, the KRG has 
not been taking the issue of public welfare provisioning seriously. As mentioned 
earlier, administrative incompetency is one of the obstacles that prevented the 
implementation process from being systemised, but cannot be considered as a 
determinant factor for unsuccessful policy implementation. Competency can be built 
or adopted. Nonetheless the government officials and politicians have not been 
determined to truly put social welfare into their agenda. Textual analysis of the 
governmentÕs agenda stated in the inaugural speeches of the last three KRG cabinets 
proves that social welfare in general and social cash transfers in particular have less 
space within the governmentÕs priorities. For instance, the fifth cabinetÕs agenda in 
May 2006, known as the administrative unification and reconstruction (speech by the 
KRG Prime Minister N. Barzani, 2006), focused largely on providing security, 
reconstruction and development via investment. The government successfully 
provided security and took massive steps towards domestic and foreign investments. 
The safety continued to develop foreign investment successfully (Kurdistan Board of 
Investment, 2014). In the sixth cabinet of the KRG, known as renewal and 
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reconstruction, despite the promise to continue on the former cabinetÕs path, one of 
the main programmes that the government initiated was renewing the higher 
education system and implementing the scholarship programme, the Human Capacity 
Development Programme, that aimed to develop human capacities in the Kurdistan 
Region in the field of higher education, and later transferred it to all government 
offices and ministries for building and developing government civil servantsÕ capacities 
(MoP, 2012). Therefore, among all these, what is missing and ignored is the Kurdistan 
Regional social welfare. 
 
7.3. Interference and Deviation 
Social programmes cannot be diminished in mere words on the law and regulation 
documents. They should take the forms of practice to be seen. The process of 
transforming words into practice in the case of social security programmes of the KRG 
has always been associated with interference from ruling party leaders and high 
officials. In this regard, it can be argued that policy practice rather reflects the intention 
of politicians and dominant party rather than the populationÕs needs, as clearly stated 
in policy documents. 
I have explored the extent to which the actions of the implementation agencies are 
congruent with that laid down in law or policy documents. When the delivered policy 
actions differ from the promises of a decision, deviating implementations would be 
identified. 
It is top politicians who have a great impact on the implementation process. This is not 
in contrast with other stated views about the position of programme recipients, while 
beneficiariesÕ character is a most important factor in policy making as well as in the 
policy implementation processes. As has been addressed earlier, the effectiveness of 
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policy implementation entirely depends on beneficiariesÕ status within the political 
system of the less-developed Kurdistan region. 
As the research findings revealed, in the process of implementation, specified 
objectives might be diverted according to the high officialÕs intent. They never 
compromise on social security implementation. 
The party leadersÕ interference occurred for several intents, which can be summarised 
in two main directions: interference to demonstrate the salience of the social 
programme and interference to deviate the programme from its stated aims. 
 
7.3.1. Interference to Demonstrate the Salience of the Social Programme 
Social security policy, which comprises the cash transfers, attracts politiciansÕ 
concerns. These concerns encourage them to interfere and exercise control over 
these programmes. In this regard, we have seen how the implementation of social 
security programmes of the KRG have always been a point of misuse by high officials 
and party leaders belonging to the two major political parties, the KDP and the PUK. 
Ruling parties manipulate the programme to attract peopleÕs loyalty (Mahmoud, 2012). 
The interference is always being done by dominant political parties that run and work 
behind the government through exerting influence on decision makers. On the other 
hand, they impose their control upon implementers to accomplish certain goals.  
One side of the interference could be interpreted as being implemented by top 
officials in order to highlight the effectiveness of the programme. Perhaps this could 
be seen in the forms of constant support, supplying financial sources, and facilitating 
the cooperation for the programme within the network of high offices of the KRG. The 
sovereigns (high politicians, legislative, and executive) are only supportive to 
implement a programme when they find political values in the programme or 
programme beneficiaries are attached with a political character. 
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7.3.2. Interference as Policy Deviation 
The interference from top officials has not always benefited the programme and its 
beneficiaries. In the case of this research, interference has two purposes. First, 
interference as the means to deviate the programme from its stated objectives 
produced the implementation failure, especially in the case of the SPF. As it has 
experienced in the last decade, the SPF has been subjected to constant reduction in 
its functions, though at times the expansion might be seen as a positive deviation, 
especially when the SPF was combined with a social awareness scheme. 
The second is interference for utilising social security programmes. The social security 
programmes have been subjected to exploitation by top officials for the purpose of 
fulfilling particular intents. Research findings show that social security programmes 
were manipulated in order to insert ineligible clients. Consequently, these 
programmes have been misused as a tool to attract and maintain clientsÕ affiliation to 
ruling political parties. 
 
7.4. Policy Implementation Theory in Light of Politically Less Developed 
Kurdistan Region 
This research draws on two sets of theories: policy implementation theories/models 
and clientelist politics. For the first one, I have used mainstream policy implementation 
approaches to read the implementation process of social security programmes in the 
KRG. Despite the problematic feature of applying developed social implementation 
theories in a less-developed region, and in a region still in the process of its politico-
administrative consolidation, the case of social security in the Kurdistan Region 
should be studied within the implementation models of developing countries. The 
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second part of the theory is clientelism, which is useful to understand the misuse of 
social security programmes in support of the political patronage system. 
 
7.4.1. Policy Implementation Approaches in Light of Research Findings: Top‐Down, 
Bottom‐up Model 
Implementation models diverge according to whether evaluations are developed from 
the perspective of the initial policy maker (centre), field-level implementing officials 
(periphery), or private individuals to whom the policy is directed (target group) 
(Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989: 12). My research participants include mostly the 
implementing officials and some policy makers. However, in the case of RPFMGS I 
found that almost all frontline staff, programme implementers and higher officials are 
at the same time actual programme recipients. Due to the high political profile of 
beneficiaries of MoMA and particularly the RPFMGS programme, they are actual 
policy designers too. As I discussed earlier, beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme 
have influence on high decision-making points of the Kurdistan Region. They are 
victims, yet belong to political parties. Ruling political parties owe their survival and 
power to those who Òsacrificed their life for the victory of Kurdistan Region and parties 
in powerÓ (quote from MoMA-C3). However, the case of SPF tells another story. 
Implementers of this programme have nothing in common with their programme 
recipients. And, due to being low-profile beneficiaries, clients of the SPF are 
considered as politically low value; this has been the reason behind the forgetting of 
the programme by government.  
As Mazmanian and Sabatier state, the inherent idea of policy implementation 
research is to draw a distinction between decision making and policy performance 
(1989: 7). The initial top-down and bottom-up models emerged from the heart of a 
debate to explain this relationship. Each model has tried to trace the policy to its 
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actual decision makers. Empirical findings from the RPFMGS programme indicate 
that policy implementers are at the same time beneficiaries of the programme. Due to 
their political character, beneficiaries have influence on policy makers in order for their 
needs to be responded to. Implementation does not necessarily start with the decision 
made by top officials in the central government. Having looked from this perspective, 
implementation is an output factor to achieve policy intentions. The case of RPFMGS 
shows that party network and political interest have eased the relationship between all 
players in the policy process. When the character of the decision maker and policy 
implementer all exist in a person entitled to the programme benefits, it is clear that the 
programme would be implemented effectively. The case of the RPFMGS reveals that 
some beneficiaries play a double role as implementers and indirectly as policy 
makers. The RPFMGS chooses its staff members from those entitled to its 
programmes. Again, due to having high-ranked party members as its beneficiaries, 
the policy process in RPFMGS programmes traces a bottom-up approach. The policy 
of the RPFMGS cannot be abridged in merely official documents; its performance is 
not directed by specific standards. A number of elements have also been found to be 
involved in this process, for instance, implementerÕs discretion, politiciansÕ intentions 
and dominant party agentÕs interests. The role of non-statutory factors is high in the 
policy implementation process of RPFMGS programmes. 
Implementers of the RPFMGS are the main actors in policy delivery with having one 
foot in the beneficiariesÕ zone and the other in high officialsÕ/politiciansÕ zone. In 
contrast, in the case of SPF, top officials have ultimate and undeniable impact on 
policy formation and performance. Until recently, beneficiaries of the SPF were seen 
as politically less important clients and therefore the programme had been forgotten, 
with a fixed number of recipients having been served poorly within the programme 
since 2006. The fundamental policy change occurred after the mass protests of 
Sulaymaniyah on 17 February 2011. The governmentÕs first reaction was to increase 
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the benefit to 250 per cent and promised to operate the SSN; after a year the benefit 
increased by 500 per cent. 
What differentiates the top-down from the bottom-up model is not the matter of control 
over implementation. It is the position, discretion and autonomy of policy actors in the 
implementation stage. Implementers of the SPF programme have less chance to 
practise their discretion and autonomy. As non-elected officials, implementers of the 
SPF have worked and maintained their jobs, accumulating experiences and skills, but 
they lack power; whereas top-level officials are devoid of such experiences and skills 
but have all the power to force lower-level workers to perform according to their own 
direction. Based on the fact that top officials are the main and only determinant actors 
in the formation and implementation of the SPF, we can see a top-down approach 
followed in the implementation of the SPF programme.  
Describing implementers as street level bureaucrats or as civil servants who have 
substantial knowledge in the execution of their work, as Lipsky (1980) does, is 
appropriate where they have the authority to do what they want without constraints or 
annoyance. The political system, at least in the context of developing countries, is a 
determinant factor in this case. What Lipsky (1980) conveys is true in a more 
democratic and less centralised administration. The political system (what I call in this 
research political context of policy implementation) indicates whether street-level 
workers have a major impact on the actual direction and outcome of social policy or 
not, whether they can make policy choices or just do what has been advised. Political 
condition may facilitate or constrain policy implementation in the way implementers 
intend to practise. 
What is implicitly understood from LipskyÕs theory of street-level bureaucrats is that he 
views the policy implementation process as real policy making, and implementers as 
actual policy makers, a view which seems to contain only a relative truth due to its 
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contextually constrained applicability. His perspective has been critically assessed in 
developed contexts. Furthermore, in a politically less-developed context such as the 
Kurdistan Region, within which the policies have been politicised, it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to implement without endorsement of power. The street-level 
bureaucrats are important to the extent that they could attract top officialsÕ approval 
and support for a policy to be implemented. In this way, they play a mediation role 
between top officials and policy clientele in terms of making political leaders well 
informed of social problems and peopleÕs needs on the one side, and managing and 
delivering policies on the other side. 
Given the main research findings, I can assert that we cannot simply apply top-down 
or bottom-up approaches to understand the world in which frontline workers actually 
participate in policy making and actively implement policy ideas. The implementerÕs 
approach can be used to know how government employees make sense of their 
work, take action, and interact with their managers in the organisation, clients for 
whom they are responsible and top officials whose obligations they are under. By 
exploring these procedures this approach will help to examine whether they are active 
or passive, autonomous or compelled by high officials. 
Exploring the policy implementation process, on the one hand, is mostly about the 
role of implementers as significant actors (e.g. street level bureaucrats, managers, 
professionals and frontline workers), and on the other hand it concerns the politico-
administrative condition of implementation. In other words, the concept of 
implementation refers to both the performances and the institutional context. 
Therefore, in our research on the implementation of social security policy in the 
Kurdistan Region, what has been acknowledged is how social security programmes 
work under a particular political and administrative condition. In this sense, the focus 
has shifted from implementers to beneficiaries. As affirmed throughout this research, 
the status, value and profile of beneficiaries are the determinant factors. Having 
224  
looked at the importance of implementing the RPFMGS, it is evident how beneficiaries 
of the programme can become focal actors in the implementation process. It is 
understandable that every social security scheme targets certain recipients. 
Therefore, I can assert that within KRGÕs social policy context the benefit rates of 
social security schemes are varied and being distributed based on the socio-political 
status of recipients, not on their socio-economic conditions and needs. The 
government and ruling parties assess and divide the population based on their 
political character and value. 
 
7.4.2. Implementation Process in Less Developed Kurdistan Region 
Lazin (1999) points out how political and administrative institutions of particular 
countries affect their domestic policy implementation process. The developmental 
status of a particular country could be taken into account to help understand its policy 
implementation process. In other words, less developed nations are not feasible to 
become subjects to conduct comparison with more developed nations in terms of their 
policy implementations. With its political instability and rent-seeking party 
administration, the KRG has not sufficiently implemented social security programmes. 
Although elections determine who will run the government in the Kurdistan Region, 
the political party system does not allow for a representative bureaucracy to be 
established. 
A dramatic economic growth is being taken place in the Kurdistan Region. However, 
most of the emphases have been put on investments in the oil sector and 
infrastructure (Kurdistan Board of Investment, 2014). As Jan-Erik Lane (1999) argues, 
policy implementation problems in developing countries are intertwined with basic 
economic and political conditions. He suggested that, while development requires 
economic growth, the reduction of poverty requires political stability. Thus, both 
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economic development and political stability are necessary conditions for effective 
policy implementation (Lane, 1999: 11-12). Inequality and poverty reduction have no 
place in KRGÕs strategic development plan (Ministry of Planning/KRG, 2012). 
 
7.4.3. Political Decision Model of Implementation 
Torenvlied, in his book Political Decisions and Agency Performance (2000), has 
discussed the political decision model of implementation. He highlights the concept of 
ÔnormÕ of bureaucratic loyalty as compelled by political control. He argues that this 
bureaucratic norm emerges whenever it is needed that a group of individuals presents 
a specific action which they would not present in the absence of that norm 
(Torenvlied, 2000: 30); for instance, special concern towards politically important 
clienteles or the loyal implementation of a political decision. This norm would give a 
higher priority to one programme (RPFMGS) than another (SPF), through attaching a 
high salience to it. 
The operation of norms can offer an important explanation for the paradox of 
compliance. Neo-classical models have doubt about the existence of information 
advantage. They argue that political decision makers are apparently able to observe 
implementation agenciesÕ behaviour perfectly, to monitor, and to sanction (Torenvlied, 
2000: 32). It is not easy to claim that implementers have no information advantage. 
What constrains their ability to realise the knowledge, particularly in the case of 
developing societies, is the political interference and control. They will be very lucky if 
their information advantage fits with politiciansÕ desires. 
As Weingast and Moran (1983: 769) state, political control over social security 
programmes would be practised within two conditions. First, policy makers should 
possess sufficient instruments of power which can be used to sanction 
implementation agency. Second, policy decision makers should attach sufficient 
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salience to the policy programme, and then they should make this visible to the 
implementation agencies. Adherence to the norm of bureaucratic loyalty will be 
compelled more seriously and more strongly in relation to policy programmes to which 
are attached more salience by policy makers. 
A number of studies have examined political control and administrative supervision 
over the policy implementation, and behaviour at the frontlines of service delivery 
(Torenvlied, 2000). These studies support the well-defined approach to 
implementation research which focuses on the translation of political decisions into 
street-level actions. However, these studies provide little explanation of the 
importance of political and administrative impacts on the implementation process. 
Most of the studies that explain the political/administrative impact on implementation 
practice mainly suggest that political/administrative conditions play less important 
roles (May & Winter, 2007: 454). 
Power controls policy implementation by changing current policy. This is justified as 
the way to renew and develop or constrain policies. In the Kurdistan Region, the 
representative body and ministers, and high administrators are legally authorised to 
make and adjust policy decisions. However, non-elected people have controlled the 
administrative and legislative bodies. They even have control over elected officials. 
 
7.4.4. Where is the Gap: Clientelistic Practice in Social Policy Implementation 
Traditionally, clientelism involves hierarchical patron-client relationships, Òthe patron 
providing clients with access to the basic means of subsistence and the clients 
reciprocating with a combination of economic goods and servicesÓ (Mason, 1986: 
489). However, in the case of MoMA, the patron-client relationship is reversed. The 
clients have already fulfilled their parts of obligation, and it is now the governmentÕs 
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turn to do so; compensate the clientsÕ sacrifice for the lives of their partners, beloved 
persons or family members. 
Clientelism is defined in political exchange theory as a form of personal, mutual 
exchange usually characterised by a sense of obligation and often also by an unequal 
balance of power between the sides involved (Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1984: 48-9). 
Eisenstadt and Roniger use the term within the context of unequal, hierarchical 
exchange characteristics of feudal society, in which patrons and clients were tied to 
durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligations and duty. However, this old 
form of clientelism has been reshaped in the modern era in both developed and 
developing counties. The unequal balance of social security provision implemented by 
the KRG has been informed by this new form of clientelism. 
The main empirical findings of this research indicate that the programme beneficiaries 
are potentially significant actors that have impact on policy makers. This in the case of 
the RPFMGS has attracted high officialsÕ attentions to the programme. However, the 
case of SPF/SSN indicates that, when beneficiaries are not politically important, less 
attention and support will be given by the government to the programme. 
In contrast to almost all policy implementation theories and models, which focus on 
the role of top officials (top-down approach), bureaucrats and implementers (bottom-
up approach) or both (integrated theory), I have found that the profile (character) of 
beneficiaries of social programmes has a decisive role in the salience given to social 
security programmes, and in the effectiveness of their implementation. 
The importance of clienteles of social programmes introduced me to a wide range of 
literature conducted on clientele politics, especially in developing countries. Social and 
political exclusion of citizens would unavoidably be translated into their inclusion 
within an informal network. In this sense it is important to state that implementers play 
roles as brokers in the clientelistic network. They facilitate a condition to use social 
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cash transfers for a political purpose. Penfold-Becerra (2007) conducted a research 
on clientelism and social funds in Latin America. He argues that, in Latin America, 
social funds can and have been diverted by political interest. He presents evidence 
that, under certain political circumstances, social transfers help either for election 
purposes to buy votes, or can be used to build political constitutions that strengthen 
support for a ruling party (Penfold-Becerra, 2007: 63). 
My research findings revealed that social funds could be politicised and subjected to 
clientelistic practices. This appeared in two aspects. Firstly, high government officials 
and party leaders have controlled the recruitment procedures. Directors of the 
programmes, middle-ranked and even frontline staff are still being appointed when 
recommended by ruling parties. Secondly, these social security programmes have 
been used to encourage party support. 
Clientelistic practice also influences the entitlement procedures. As mentioned earlier, 
clientelism involves a political exchange. In the case of SPF programmes, on the one 
side the only source available to the clients is their vote and potential loyalty to a 
party. On the other side, there are politicians and high officials that possess and 
control government finance. The RPMGF is being used to maintain party affiliation of 
victim families. As for the case of the FPF programme, while it provided a decent 
benefit to its recipients, it was being used to anchor the clients to ruling parties. 
 
7.5. Preference Model of Policy Implementation 
The model of implementation that I am trying to introduce here is called the 
preference model of policy implementation. This model starts from a 
public/nationalistic dichotomy in social welfare provision (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8 Preference Model of Policy Implementation 
 
Source: adopted from research findings. 
 
According to this dichotomy, social programmes and their target groups are 
categorised based on their profile. The first is public/ordinary people that are 
characterised as low-profile clients. They are the ordinary poor and needy and are 
treated under a needs-based benefit. As they are seen and served as insignificant 
clients by party leaders and high government officials, they and their programmes are 
neglected. Despite having a decent legislative framework, the SPF has in reality never 
been adequately implemented. From the perspective of all employees of the 
programme that have been interviewed for this research, SPF has failed to meet its 
targets. 
In contrast, there is a social programme with a political/nationalistic character. This 
programme covers high-profile clients because, from the perspective of party leaders 
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and high government officials, these clients are seen to be more deserving of 
privileges. Due to the political character of the programme and the socio-political 
status of its beneficiaries, the programme is therefore of high priority on the 
governmentÕs agenda. For instance, there is a constant dynamic in the 
implementation of the RPMGF programme. By all means this programme has been 
successful in meeting the programme objectives. 
Party leaders and high administrators deal with social security policy according to the 
salience they attach to the policy programmes. This policy salience is inspired by 
political norms of senior politicians and high administrative officials. The hegemony of 
politicians is entirely visible in both the policy formulation and implementation process. 
Ruling political parties run the government but they also work behind the government 
by exerting influence on the decision makers. They therefore impose their control 
upon implementers to accomplish their own goals. The preference model of policy 
implementation is followed in a discriminative social policy system. 
The politicians deal with social policy programmes according to their political 
preferences. The politicians and top government officials attach importance to policies 
on the basis of the preference they give to those policies and interest groups 
concerned. In this model, policy implementation would be interfered with by politicians 
and high government officials under the pretext of supporting and monitoring the way 
the policy is implemented; in reality, they are preserving their clientsÕ interests. 
Political clientele is considered as a crucial factor in the preference model of policy 
implementation. From the political preference model of policy implementation, 
important clienteles deserve and are treated with an important programme. This 
implies that the clientele is a political subject, and the policy related to them should be 
as significant as they are. Social and political exclusion of citizens would be 
unavoidably interpreted into their inclusion within informal networks. High officials 
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could not dismantle the SPF programme as it has a ministerial regulation background 
and support and could only be resisted by law. 
This model of policy implementation takes into consideration the implementerÕs 
potential discretion and initiatives only on the condition that they do not discard 
political intentions of policy makers. In other words, the implementers might be 
consulted and play remarkable roles in both processes of policy formation and 
implementation. 
In the shadow of this preference model of policy implementation, there are social 
security programmes deliberately neglected. Some programmes are passively 
implemented in a condition whereby their policy beneficiaries, certainly from the 
political perspective of politicians, are not considered as a significant group, and these 
policies are politically marginalised and administratively constrained by top 
government officials. Not only clienteles but also implementation actors are neglected. 
They might neither be consulted in the policy formation nor supported in their 
performance. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter critically discussed and analytically compared the research findings. It 
started by analysing three critical factors that have determined the implementation 
process of social security programmes of the KRG: politico-administrative factor, the 
importance of beneficiaries within the process of policy formation and implementation, 
and finally the impact of lacking an adequate social welfare system on the 
implementation failure in the less developed Kurdistan Region. 
The implementation process of social security in the post-war Kurdistan Region is 
influenced strongly by its political characteristics. This political feature has been 
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inherited from the political structure of the Kurdistan Region. In this context, I 
examined the relationship between top officials and beneficiaries. I argued that this 
relation is defined by political interest, and can be traced to party politics. It is also the 
patronage system embraced by both sides. The deserved place of implementers in 
this relation is only as potential beneficiaries or party patrons. 
Due to wars and the two economic blockades during the 1990s and the early 2000s, 
the Kurdistan population was devastated and all government social programmes were 
suspended, and available resources were either spent on war or agents. This 
situation has endured even after the reconstruction and economic boom in the early 
2000s. The environment and political context in which policy has been made and 
implemented should therefore be taken seriously in any attempt towards policy 
process in general and implementation in particular. 
Comparing the two programmes, I also pointed to the ambiguity and contradiction 
embodied in the formulation and implementation of the KRGÕs social security 
programmes. The programmes are implemented in an ambiguous manner and often 
contradict programme guidelines. In comparing the research findings from both 
programmes, it is revealed that there is no balance in the services delivered between 
the SPF/SSN and RPFMGS. The SPF declined in service until the February 2011 
protests, while in the case of the RPFMGS services have continuously increased for 
the target groups. The attention given to both government programmes is also 
incomparable. Deposited resources of MoMA are enough to cover the clientsÕ needs 
and accomplish all sub-schemes. What is driving the implementation is the politiciansÕ 
vision for a national-public programme. Programmes associated with victims of the 
national liberation movement and wars are better treated than those for the ordinary 
population. The issue of interference was also highlighted to understand how policy 
deviation might influence the implementation process of the social programmes. 
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In light of the two different profiles of beneficiaries and two methods of interference, I 
have discussed the implementation preference model. This style of implementation is 
best understood by taking into account the prioritised policies in the KRGÕs agenda. 
There are many obstacles which bother the government to not have a sufficient social 
agenda. Firstly, all issues have been politicised. In other words, the politicians and 
governors give priority to the political issues, and at the same time the social issues 
are marginalised. 
A linkage between the clientelistic type of political mobilisation and social security 
provision has been discovered. Some programmes, such as MoMA, have always 
been used in a political relationship to maintain the loyalty of party-affiliated people. In 
other cases, such as the FPF, SPF and SSN, they are used either to prevent the 
protests against ruling parties, or to anchor the clientele to the party. The SSN 
programme follows a top-down approach in its implementation. The policy change 
occurred when people raised their voice against authorities and government.  
RPFMGS implementers are representatives of programme beneficiaries. They 
represent the RPFMGS beneficiaries, as they have almost all been chosen from 
families of martyrs and genocide survivors; target groups of the programme. In this 
position they can make requests and their voices are heard better than any other 
groups in society. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by covering the following points, and is divided into 
four parts. The first part summarises the research findings. It also focuses on the 
application and critique of policy implementation theories with reference to the 
relevant literature. The second section of this chapter concerns itself with the 
contribution of the thesis to implementation research in politically less-developed 
countries, with a focus on the post-war Kurdistan Region. Section 3 of the chapter 
discusses the limitations of research in a politically/administratively less-developed 
context. Section 4 highlights some areas for further research. Finally, concluding 
remarks will be presented. 
 
8.1. Summary of the Research Findings 
This thesis addresses the implementation of government social security programmes 
in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. It investigates what the existing programmes are and 
how they are implemented. The research aims to examine the extent to which the 
politico-administrative conditions affect the implementation process. It explores why 
the KRG tends to prioritise one programme, for example RPFMGS, over another, 
including the SSN. This research question led to investigating sufficiency and 
corruption in social benefits. From the perspective of implementers, this research 
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aimed to address implementation gaps in the field of social security provision. The 
thesis tries to test key theories/models of implementation in a politically under-
developed Kurdistan Region. It also aims to understand what lessons can be drawn 
from social security programme implementation in developing countries in light of the 
research findings. 
With regard to the literature, this research is grounded on policy implementation and 
clientelism in social security policy. Having discussed the mainstream theories of 
policy implementation, I argue that policy implementation research should consider 
the politico-administrative context highly. Policy implementation research in 
developing countries should examine the extent to which the political parties and 
government officials control and influence the direction of policy performance. There is 
also the need to explore implementation of social security programmes in terms of 
their consistency with, or deviation from, policy regulations. However, policy 
implementation does not necessarily follow regulations and instructions set by policy 
makers. In this regard, a number of elements, for instance, politiciansÕ intentions and 
dominant party agentsÕ interests, also need to be taken into account. The role of non-
statutory factors is inevitable in a policy implementation process. 
Having discussed the stagist model of policy process in the theoretical background on 
this research, we can conclude that in politically less-developed contexts there is not a 
clear sequence of stages through which social policies proceed, and which therefore 
constitute the Ôpolicy processÕ. As the research evidences of the two programmes 
illustrated, the policy process starts with agenda setting. However, it does not 
necessarily portray policy proceeding through a logical, yet traditional, sequence of 
stages. Consideration of options and agreement on the most suitable option has not 
been reflected in the policy process of the two researched programmes. Moreover, 
societal demands are processed inside the political interests of ruling parties; they 
play an unchallenged role in the formation/implementation process of public policies. I 
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should agree with the criticism raised towards the explanatory power of the stagist 
model in providing an accurate account of how policies are made. In reality, the policy 
process is rather less clear-cut and straightforward. Intervention is one of the ways 
that diverts the policy from its clear and established settings. However, I still believe 
that model can provide useful insights into some of the ways in which social policies 
are made. 
Employing theories/models of policy implementation and clientelism would be of 
benefit for understanding the efficiency and corruption in policy delivery. Chapter 3 
presented two main theoretical approaches to the research. First, most models of 
policy implementation, such as top-down and bottom-up models, with specific focus 
on literature related to less-developed countries have been critically examined. 
Clientelism and clientage politics have also been presented to understand the 
exploitation of social security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. Literature on 
clientelism and clientelistic use of public funds provided some useful guidance to 
analyse corruption in cash transfer programmes of the KRG.  
As shown in Chapter 2, the research asserts that studying social security in the KRG 
would be incomplete were the countryÕs politico-administrative background not taken 
into account. Chapter 3 therefore provided an overview of the regionÕs political 
background. It highlighted the fragile administration of the KRG from the first Gulf War 
in 1991 coupled with civil war, reconstruction and recent economic and political 
developments. I argue that, without considering how the politico-administrative system 
of the Kurdistan Region operates, we cannot understand the clientelism, corruption 
and insufficiency in the implementation of the KRGÕs social security policy. 
In the1990s the Kurdistan Region was suffering from an extreme shortage in budget 
and lack of public services. When the two major political parties started the civil war, 
the KRG was divided into the two zones of the KDP-controlled administration and the 
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PUK-controlled administration. The government budget was also split and went into 
warring partiesÕ pockets. The hegemony of party politics over the government was 
established. 
Since the establishment of the unified KRG in 2006, the division still appeared in the 
two zones of the KRG administrations. However, apart from the Special Salary sub-
scheme in Sulaymaniyah, no significant differences have been observed in the 
performance of the directorates of MoMA and MoLSA. We can still see public funds 
and social security programmes in both zones being equally utilised for political 
purposes by ruling parties. 
Chapter 4 presented the methodological procedures that were employed in the data 
collection and analysis. It explored how political events such as a general election and 
tension between political factions might have impacted on the process of data 
collection, and the difficulties of building relations of trust relationships with research 
participants in this context. Two government social security programmes in the 
Kurdistan Region were selected as case studies. Chapter 4 discussed the rationale 
for employing a multi-methodology of a qualitative case study and comparative 
policy analysis. After addressing the multiple-case study design used in this research, 
the chapter explained how the types of research objective, purposes and questions 
inevitably led the researcher to adopt qualitative and comparative methods. This 
study has adopted a multiple-case (embedded) design to gain more insights and 
robust understanding of the perceptions of the implementers towards the social 
security programmes in the Kurdistan Region. Chapter 4 explained the reason for 
selecting only the two programmes. The RPFMGS and SSN are the major social 
security programmes of the KRG covering a wide range of the population. The 
RPFMGS programme provides cash transfer (plus housing units, health cost 
support, studentships and tax exemption) to families of martyrs, genocide and 
chemical-attack survivors and former political prisoners. The SSN programme 
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provides cash transfers to people on low incomes, disabled people, older people, 
widows, orphans, and poor married students. Other social security programmes, 
such as unemployment insurance and a pension scheme were excluded in this 
research, because the first one has not yet been fully activated, and the latter was 
difficult to cover. The pension scheme in the Kurdistan Region covers only 
government employees and is not implemented as a unified programme. 
Government offices implement their own pension schemes separately, which are 
almost unreachable and difficult to take as one programme. 
As for the methods of data collection, semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
were found suitable with the purpose of the research. Chapter 4 also proposed the 
use of documentary data as supplementary sources to interviews in policy research, 
which contributed to the validity of the research data. 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented and analysed the data collected from research 
participants. Chapter 5 is devoted to the prioritised programme, RPFMGS, which is 
administered by the MoMA. This ministry is also prioritised by the KRG. It is supported 
and prioritised because both political parties, the KDP and the PUK, have the most 
beneficiaries from this scheme. Although the RPFMGS programme is provided with 
sufficient funds and is successfully implemented, it faces difficulties in some cases of 
illegibility and entitlements. In some cases of claimants, especially those of genocide 
survivors, it is very difficult to decide who in the family should inherit the benefit. 
The RPFMGS programme does not involve any sort of testing of the beneficiariesÕ 
income. Beneficiaries of this programme can claim the benefit even if they earn a high 
salary or have capital resources. This programme is not a means-tested benefit. In 
other words, the tests tend to focus on the criteria of the political victim (wounded 
veteran or prisoners) or first-degree family member of the victim (family members of 
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martyrs and genocide victims). Due to their characters, beneficiaries of the RPFMGS 
are highly valued and prioritised.  
In the case of MoMA, beneficiaries play a significant role in policy making and the 
implementation process. However, this characterisation is seemingly problematic. 
Neither are all policy makers beneficiaries of the programme nor does every single 
claimant play an equally significant role. The vast majority of policy makers and policy 
implementers of the RPFMGS programme are at the same time programme 
beneficiaries. Therefore, this programme follows a bottom-up model of policy 
implementation. As expected, due to the position of beneficiaries in the policy-making 
and implementation process, their demands can be easily heard, responded to and 
reflected in the programme. 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the second programme, FPF/SPF/SSN. All three names 
stand for the same programme but in different time periods. Having examined the 
development of the programme, the guidelines and eligibility criteria of the programme 
have been subjected to many changes during the last decade, but this has not 
resulted in improvements to the programme. The financial source available to the 
programme remained steady, and consequently the maximum coverage of the 
programme was restricted. The SSN programme has failed to meet its targets which 
are poverty reduction and inequality. It has been discussed that the real problem is 
not necessarily due to lack of funds, rather it is the programmeÕs lack of importance to 
high officials. 
In terms of the programme objectives, SSN is implemented as a bureaucratic 
procedure without paying much attention to the aim of the social security programme: 
to assure a minimum well-being for needy people in society. What is noticed in the 
case of the SPF is that it is not being implemented as a public right to social security. 
Rather, it is mostly provided as charity by the authorities. Besides this, the programme 
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has experienced an inconsistency between policy and practice. Despite the rapid 
economic changes in the last decade, the programme has not revised the benefits so 
as to reflect inflation and the high cost of living for the poor. 
The programme negligence continued until the mass demonstrations that occurred in 
the Kurdistan Region on 17 February 2011. This suggests that the KRG does not 
attach any importance to social protection programmes unless there is political value 
placed on beneficiaries. 
After presenting the research findings in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 was devoted to 
making comparison between the two cases of the research and further analysis of the 
research findings. Contradictions were found and discussed in the definition and 
functions of social security programmes. The RPFMGS is not implemented merely as 
a needs-based programme. The way the MoMA defines RPFMGS beneficiaries 
indicates that the programme conveys the idea of compensation for the loss that 
occurred. The RPFMGS benefit is not specified based on the financial circumstance 
and family situation of the target group but rather implemented based on the status 
the victims and their families have had in the wars, national liberation movement, and 
Kurdish political parties. For instance, the claimants of the RPFMGS are categorised 
as Ôwar martyrsÕ, Ôcivil martyrsÕ, and Ôgenocide victimsÕ, which indicates that the 
programme functions to reward the families of victims. 
This is not the case in the SSN programme. The SSN provides cash transfers to an 
ordinary disadvantaged population. The list of beneficiaries is not open to all eligible 
people, and it is not transparently implemented. Due to the financial limitation that the 
programme has experienced in the past until now, the programme cannot accept new 
claimants. However, the Special Salary scheme, within which a high amount is paid to 
party clients within the SSN programme, has been excluded from the financial 
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limitation. The list of Special Salary sub-scheme beneficiaries has also been opened 
to cover new claimants. 
Chapter 7 also discussed three critical factors that have determined the 
implementation process of social security programmes of the KRG: politico-
administrative factors, the importance of beneficiaries within the process of policy 
formation and implementation, and finally the impact of lacking an adequate social 
welfare system in the implementation failure in the less-developed Kurdistan Region. 
Throughout this research I examined the relation between top officials, service 
providers and beneficiaries in the programme implementation stage. What drives 
these relations is political interests; through this fact has emerged a patronage system 
which has been embraced by both top officials and beneficiaries. The implementers 
have a place in this relation either as potential beneficiaries or party patrons. This 
research also found that there is high intervention in social security programmes by 
the KRG and major ruling party leaders. 
 
8.2. Research Contributions 
This section aims to discuss and justify my researchÕs contribution to the existing body 
of knowledge and literature concerning policy implementation research in developing 
countries. The key contributions of this research can be presented in three areas. First 
the contribution to implementation literature; second the contribution to research on 
corruption in social security programmes; and third the contribution to research on the 
KRG. 
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8.2.1. The Contribution to Implementation Literature 
The main contribution of this research is to implementation literature. I have examined 
the mainstream top-down, bottom-up models of policy implementation. As for social 
security programmes being described as following a top-down or bottom-up approach, 
to a large extent this does not merely relate to the administrative centralism attributed 
to the developing countries. My research proves that, in addition to a mainstream top-
down approach in the public service structure, there is the possibility for a bottom-up 
model within an administrative centralism controlled by party politics. This, to a large 
extent, depends on the value of a government programme, among others. It is also 
the government that empowers the implementation agencies to practise their 
discretion. The basis of this empowerment is a direct result of the socio-political status 
of the beneficiaries of social programmes. The significant role of the programme 
beneficiaries in an implementation process, especially in the case of the RPFMGS 
programme, is also one of the distinct contributions. 
 
8.2.1.1. Considering the Status of Beneficiaries of the Programme in Policy 
Implementation Research 
There is very sparse literature or studies concerning the crucial role of programme 
claimants in the policy implementation. Throughout this thesis, I have observed that 
most existing policy implementation studies have focused on either implementers or 
high officials as key actors in the implementation process (Schofield, 2001: 255). 
Policy research, therefore, mostly considers actual actors rather than potential actors. 
What I mean here by potential actors in policy implementation is those who are not 
necessarily involved directly in the policy design or have positions in the Ministries of 
MoMA and MoLSA. The political influence of claimants has also to be considered in 
policy implementation research, especially in the case of less-developed contexts. 
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Implementation research therefore places emphasis on the role of claimants only as 
benefit recipients rather than as significant actors in the implementation process.  
Having looked at the significant actors in the implementation of social security 
programmes, I have demonstrated how beneficiaries of the programme can become 
focal actors in the implementation process. It is understandable that every social 
security scheme targets certain recipients. Therefore, I can assert that, within the 
KRGÕs social policy context, the benefits of social security schemes are being 
distributed based on the socio-political status of recipients, not on their socio-
economic conditions and needs, as the case may be elsewhere. This division of 
programme target groups is made based on their political character and value. In this 
way I have found two groups of beneficiaries that are consequently treated differently 
by social security programmes. The first consists of high-value beneficiaries, 
characterised as high-profile clients of social cash transfers, due to their positions in 
families of victims of wars and party-affiliated people. The second is made up of low-
value beneficiaries, as ordinary low income, poor, disabled and older people. They 
are not provided with the same privileges as the first group. The improvement in 
service delivery to the second disadvantaged group of beneficiaries was seen only 
after they showed their political influence in events of mass protests that occurred 
recently in most Middle Eastern countries including the Kurdistan Region. Highlighting 
beneficiaries of social security programmes as a central factor in implementation 
success is one of the contributions of this thesis to implementation literature. 
 
8.2.1.2. Preference Model of Policy Implementation 
The main implication of the preference model of implementation can be summarised 
as follows: first, the government commits itself and deals with social security 
programmes based on a dichotomy of political/national versus public. The RPFMGS 
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programme represents a political/national programme which is devoted to service 
people who enjoy a high profile and are considered important by political parties, while 
the SPF/SSN represents a programme which has been designed to serve ordinary 
people defined as needy and poor. Beneficiaries of the RPFMGS are considered as 
political actors who have contributed with their life in the national struggle against the 
former Iraqi regime. Hence the RPFMGS programme is prioritised by the KRG. As 
claimants of SPF/SSN lack any political attributes, the government neglects their 
programme. The funds allocated to the RPFMGS programme are incomparably 
greater than those which have been available to other social cash transfer 
programmes. 
The second and main area to which my research contributes is that of the 
implementation model. This research introduces a preference model of policy 
implementation, which can help to explain policy implementation in less-developed 
countries. This model of implementation is discriminatory because the government 
pays attention to social security programmes in a selective manner. Under this model, 
social programmes and their target groups are categorised based on their characters. 
Some are characterised as low-profile clients by party leaders and government 
officials. They and their programme are therefore insignificant, neglected and have 
consequently failed. By comparison, the other social security programme covers high 
profile clients (again from the perspective of party leaders and government officials), 
and these clients are therefore seen to be more deserving of privileges. Hence, due to 
the political character of the programme and the socio-political status of its 
beneficiaries, the programme would be of high priority on the governmentÕs list of 
social welfare provision. 
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8.2.2. The Contributions to Research on Corruption in Social Security 
My research makes two particular contributions to social security research. Firstly, it 
demonstrates how social security programmes function in a post-conflict and newly-
established political entity. Secondly, it shows how social security programmes are 
used for a clientelistic practice of ruling parties. In terms of clientelism and clientele 
politics too, this research provides a series of findings that are relevant to the 
corruption, lack of transparency and insufficiency in social security programmes.  
 
8.2.3. Kurdistan Regional Government: Administration, Politicisation of Social 
Programmes and Particracy 
The primary aim of this thesis is to make a contribution to policy research in a 
developing political entity. In English language research literature, very few 
researches have been done on social policy in the Kurdistan Region. 
In the party political system of the Kurdistan Region, the concept of ÔpublicÕ has not 
been well developed to an extent that can compel the government to take 
responsibility towards peopleÕs needs. Social welfare is a governmentÕs response to 
public needs. It emphasises the concept of public. In the Kurdistan Region with its 
underdeveloped party political system and administratively less competent 
government, social programmes are not targeted at all people in an equal manner. 
Social security programmes of the KRG reflect party politics rather than social welfare. 
In the nationalistic versus public dichotomy, the implementation of social security 
programmes in the KRG has always been off-balance. My research results show the 
extent to which the social security policy implemented in the KRG is far from serving 
the ÔpublicÕ, and to what extent the concept of public policy has occupied a marginal 
place in the KRGÕs policies. 
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Finally, my analysis contributes to methodological issues by demonstrating the 
political consideration of policy research in the time around general elections. 
 
8.3. Limitations of the Research 
Looking back on various stages of the research, I faced many obstacles that should 
have been considered. Having chosen a policy-related topic for research in the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region, it has not been without difficulties. I will address these difficulties in 
two stages. The first is the lack of previous studies about the case of study or around 
the research area. One of the limitations of this research was lack of academic 
research on the topic of social security and policy implementation with special focus 
on the Iraq and/or Kurdistan Region. To the best of my knowledge, no specific 
research on social policy, social security, or policy implementation in the Kurdistan 
Region has yet been conducted. Even the cases I have chosen for my research, 
MoMA and SPF, have not been subjected to any policy research, in either the English 
language, Kurdish, Arabic or other languages. My research will be the first in the area 
of social security implementation in the Kurdistan Region. This benefits the study in 
terms of originality and significance; however, it also created difficulty in the sense 
that there were no other works in which comparisons could be made in order to 
effectively identify all research gaps and to place my research into it. 
The second limitation was methodological. Conducting policy research around times 
of general elections and political tensions has its difficulties. The participants of my 
research consisted of forty-six individual interviews and six focus groups. Although I 
managed to meet almost all proposed interviewees during a relatively very short 
period of time, they were not carried out without difficulties. All interviews were done 
after obtaining permission from the first senior officials of directorates and offices to 
conduct my interviews and completing informed consent forms by participants and 
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signed by me. Between the pilot interviews and actual data collection, in autumn 2009 
and spring 2010, a political change had occurred in the Kurdistan Region, and a 
dynamic political opposition emerged which constantly put the KRG into the position 
of responsibility. In this context any endeavour for data collection or conducting 
research on government offices was easily linked to attempts against the government 
and ruling parties. 
During the interviews with my research participants, in many cases, I felt that some 
interviewees are trying to prevent themselves from exposing facts and information. In 
a few cases, especially at a ministry level, I faced questions about whether I was 
doing this research for opposition parties or not. The same suspicion resulted in the 
minister of MoMA not being cooperative with the research, and he did not agree to be 
interviewed. 
 
8.4. Direction for Future Research 
The following avenues can be identified and recommended for further research in the 
areas of policy implementation, social security and the KRG. The current research 
has focused on the implementation of social security programmes in a less-developed 
context. There are numbers of potential extensions to this topic. In this research, while 
the impact of the politico-administrative context on policy implementation process is 
examined, it will be necessary to conduct a research comparing case studies between 
developed and developing countries. This kind of research is concerned with policy 
implementation in different political structures. In this framework, the linkage between 
sufficiency in social policy and representative bureaucracies can be examined. 
Another research avenue would be to look at the outcomes of policy implementation 
evaluating the policy delivery from the perspective of programme recipients. This type 
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of research will make contributions to claimant-focused policy implementation 
research. 
It is worthwhile to study clientelism and transparency in governance. In addition to 
confirming the success of the RPFMGS programme, I have also explored how the 
programme has been used by major political parties (the KDP and the PUK) for 
pursuing a client-patron relationship. There are also other ways of using public funds 
for political purposes in the region. Corruption in developing countries has been widely 
studied. However, the focus has been less definitive on the area of social cash 
transfers. 
The research findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis provide a rich new 
data set which might be explored from a variety of different theoretical frameworks. 
The relation between social policy and nation-building can be suggested for study. 
The preference model of policy implementation addressed in my thesis can be 
justified by the KRG as to how the politics, including consolidating the current situation 
of the Kurdistan Region and the idea of nation building, might be of priority over social 
services provision.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
While studying social security programmes comparing two social cash transfers of the 
KRG I have explored corruption and sufficiency in the implementation of social 
security programmes. This thesis has placed particular emphasis on the politico-
administrative context of policy implementation. Having said that, the political interests 
of dominant political parties are a determinant factor in the implementation of a 
programme to be a success or failure. 
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The thesis also explored the reason behind the importance attached to a programme 
by the government and political parties. The programme that provides services to 
people who are characterised as politically important, mostly party-affiliated people, 
has been prioritised by ruling parties. What drives me to believe that beneficiaries play 
a role in this regard is the fact that, even within a neglected programme of the 
SPF/SSN, claimants of the Special Salary sub-scheme are served significantly better 
than other ordinary claimants of the SPF/SSN. What the beneficiaries of the Special 
Salary have in common with beneficiaries of the RPFMGS programme is the political 
character. Having applied the top-down/bottom-up models of policy implementation, it 
was of benefit to examine the policy implementation approach followed by each of the 
social security programmes of the KRG. Recalling the research findings, I can argue 
that the SPF/SSN programme follows the top-down model in its implementation, while 
the RPFMGS programme follows a bottom-up model. Having considered the 
importance that the government attached to, and the priority it gives to, a programme 
and its beneficiaries, I discovered a preference model of policy implantation. 
According to this model, beneficiaries of the social security programmes can be 
distinguished based upon their profile. 
The KRG has created a sort of welfare system which less targets a disadvantaged 
population in favour of people with party-nationalistic characters. This double standard 
has appeared when one compares the benefits delivered to beneficiaries of RPFMGS 
with beneficiaries of SPF/SSN. In terms of law and regulations, social protection 
programmes enjoy relatively the same status. However, the legal framework does not 
necessarily result in equal treatment. Having looked at the two programmes, I can 
argue that, despite supportive regulations and instructions, policy implementation 
would be varied. It is also revealed that the services delivered are off-balance 
between MoLSA and MoMA, because the attention given to both government 
programmes is incomparable. 
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Ruling political parties exploit social security programmes for political backing. 
Clientelism gave me an opportunity to explore the corruption and misuse of public 
funds for ÔbuyingÕ peopleÕs loyalty. I can conclude that what has been prioritised in the 
governmentÕs agenda is not a social welfare provision, but a social cash transfer with 
a political/nationalistic character in support of major partiesÕ clientelistic practice. An 
adequate system of welfare needs to be adopted in order to expect an equivalent 
interest in all government social programmes. 
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Appendix 1: List of Research Participants (Interviews and 
Focus Groups) 
1. List of Individual Interviews – Social Protection Fund  
1.1. Lower Level Office Workers (civil servants and frontline staff) 
Code Sex Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
SPF-A1 Male Civil Servant (Social Worker) 10 years 21/4/2010 
SPF-A2 Male Accounting 12 years 21/4/2010 
SPF-A3 Male Employee (Social Worker) 4-5 years 25/4/2010 
SPF-A4 Male Senior Employee (Social Worker) 5 years 11/4/2010 
SPF-A5 Male Senior Employee (Social Worker) 9 years 19/4/2010 
SPF-A6 Male Social Worker 5 years 5/5/2010 
SPF-A7 Male Social Worker 5 years 15/5/2010 
 
1.2. Programme Managers and Directors (lower officials), and Senior Social Workers – SPF 
Code Names Sex Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience 
Date of 
interview 
SPF-B1 Abdulrezaq M 
Mustafa 
Male Director Ð Erbil Province Office 
(former) 
4 years 
(2002-2006) 
19/4/2010 
SPF-B2 Aziz Hamad Male Deputy Director  7 years 4/5/2010 
SPF-B3 Dler A Nuradden Male Director of Research Unit MoLSA 8 years 15/4/2010 
SPF-B4 K. O. A. Male Senior Supervisor 8 years 19/4/2010 
SPF-B5 Ali Saeed Merza Male Director Ð Duhok Province Office 3-4 years 26/4/2010 
SPF-B6 Nahro Abdullah Ali Male Director Ð Sulaymaniyah Province 
Office 
6 years 13/5/2010 
SPF-B7 Abas Bra Hama Male Programme Manager Ð 
Sulaymaniyah 
20 years 3/5/2010 
SPF-B8 (N) Female Programme Manager Ð Erbil 17 years 9/5/2010 
SPF-B9 Khalid Suleman 
Khalil 
Male Programme Manager Ð Semel, 
Duhok 
5 years 26/4/2010 
SPF-B10 Salah Usef Male Senior Social Worker (Family 
Protection Fund) 
8 years 27/4/2010 
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1.3. Middle Level Officials (general directors and senior advisors) 
Code Names Sex Position Years of 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
SPF-C1 Hussein Ali Asad Male General Director of Social 
Protection and Development Ð 
Duhok 
2 years 26/4/2010 
SPF-C2 Phicri Khoshnaw Male Senior Advisor ? years 2/5/2010 
SPF-C3 Kawa Male General Director of Social 
Protection and Development 
7 years 4/5/2010 
SPF-C4 Alwan Abdulghafoor Female Deputy General Director for 
Technical Affairs, G.D. of Social 
Protection and Development Ð 
Sulaymaniyah 
24 years 5/5/2010 
SPF-C5 Jiyan M Taha Female Deputy General Director of Social 
Protection and Development Ð 
Duhok 
13 years 26/4/2010 
 
 
2. List of Individual Interviews – MoMA 
 
2.1. Lower Level Office Workers (civil servants and frontline staff) 
Code Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
MoMA-A1 Male Civil Servant 3 years 14/4/2010 
MoMA-A2 Female Civil Servant Ð Duhok 5 years 26/4/2010 
MoMA-A3 Male Civil Servant Ð GDoMA, Erbil 18 years 29/4/2010 
MoMA-A4 Female Civil servant Ð GDoMA, 
Sulaymaniyah 
6 years 5/5/2010 
MoMA-A5 Female Civil servant Ð GDoMA, 
Sulaymaniyah 
6 years 5/5/2010 
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2.2. Programme Managers and Directors and Senior Officers 
Code Names Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
MoMA-B1 Nadir Agha Male Director of Research and Survey 
Ð MoMA 
4 years 12/4/2010 
MoMA-B2 Ahmad Jamel Male Director of Legal Department Ð 
Erbil 
6 years 14/4/2010 
MoMA-B3 Fars Tahr Mho Male Director of Anfal Affairs Ð Erbil 4-5 years 20/4/2010 
MoMA-B4 Barzan Abduobakr Male Director of Martyrs Affairs Ð Erbil 19 years 20/4/2010 
MoMA-B5 Rasool Hamed Male Director of Social and Health 
Services Provision Ð GDoMA Ð 
Erbil 
10 years 20/4/2010 
MoMA-B6 Jiyan Tahr Female Director of Martyrs Affairs Ð 
Duhok 
13 years 27/4/2010 
MoMA-B7 Jiyan Saeed Female Director of Legal Affairs in 
GDoMA Ð Duhok 
8 years 28/4/2010 
MoMA-B8 Zahir Joukhin Male Erbil 7 years 29/4/2010 
MoMA-B9 Kamaran Ali 
Ameen 
Male Director of Anfal Affairs Ð 
Sulaymaniyah 
11 years 3/5/2010 
MoMA-B10 Shadan sadiq 
Hassan 
Female Director of Legal Affairs Ð 
GDoMA Ð Sulaymaniyah 
11 years 4/5/2010 
MoMA-B11 Samal A A Male Director of Martyrs Affairs Ð 
GDoMA Ð Sulaymaniyah 
5 years 5/5/2010 
 
 
2.3. Middle Level Officials (general directors and senior advisors) 
Code Names Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
MoMA-C1 Goran Mustafa Male Director of MinisterÕs Office 3 years 20/4/2010 
MoMA-C2 Ezet Male General Director of Martyrs 
and Anfal Affairs Ð Duhok 
4 years 28/4/2010 
MoMA-C3 Abdulkarim Halladni Male General Director of Martyrs 
and Anfal Affairs Ð 
Sulaymaniyah 
6 years 5/5/2010 
MoMA-C4 Ismail Abduobakr Male General Director of Martyrs 
and Anfal Affairs Ð Erbil 
12 years 10/5/2010 
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3. List of High Officials Interviewed (Ministers and a Member of Parliament) 
Code Names Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
MoMA-D1 Chnar Saad Adbulla Female Minister of Martyrs and 
Anfal Affairs (former) 
4 years 
(2006-2009) 
17/4/2010 
SPF-D1 Asos Najib Abdullah Female Minister of Labour and 
Social Affairs 
7 months in 
current 
position 
2/5/2010 
MP-1 Abdulsalam Barwari Male Member of Parliament, 
Head of Social Affairs 
Committee 
9 months Ð 
current post 
4/5/2010 
 
4. List of Focus Groups 
 
4.1. Focus Group with Employees of SPF (MoLSA) – Erbil 
Code Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
SPF-GE1 Male Social Worker 3 years 8 May 
2010 
SPF-GE2 Male Social Worker 6 years 
SPF-GE3 Male Social Worker 8 years 
SPF-GE4 Male Social Worker 6 years 
SPF-GE5 Male Social Worker 4 years 
 
4.2. Focus Group with Employees of SPF (MoLSA) – Sulaymaniyah 
 Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
SPF-GS1 Female Civil Servant 14 years 5 May 
2010 
SPF-GS2 Female Civil Servant 30 years 
SPF-GS3 Male Civil Servant 24 years 
SPF-GS4 Female Civil Servant 8 years 
SPF-GS5 Female Civil Servant 9 years 
SPF-GS6 Female Civil Servant 13 years 
SPF-GS7 Female Civil Servant 8 years 
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4.3. Focus Group with Employees of SPF (MoLSA) – Duhok 
 Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
SPF-GD1 Male Social Worker 7 years 5 May 
2010 
SPF-GD2 Male Social Worker 4 years 
SPF-GD3 Male Social Worker 15 years 
SPF-GD4 Male Accountant 7 years 
SPF-GD5 Male Social Worker 1 year 
SPF-GD6 Female Officer 1 year 
SPF-GD7 Female Legal Officer 5 years 
 
4.4. Focus Group with Employees of MoMA – Erbil Province 
Code Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview 
MoMA-GE1 Female Officer 12 years 7 May 2010 
MoMA-GE2 Male Officer 5 years 
MoMA-GE3 Male Social Worker/Director 5 years 
MoMA-GE4 Male Officer 3 years 
MoMA-GE5 Male Officer  5 years 
MoMA-GE6 Female Not Provided 10 years 
MoMA-GE7 Male Legal Officer 4 years 
 
4.5. Focus Group with Employees of MoMA – Sulaymaniyah Province 
Code Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
MoMA-GS1 Female Director 3 years 2 May 2010 
MoMA-GS2 Female Legal Officer 9 years 
MoMA-GS3 Female Accountant 5 years 
MoMA-GS4 Female Officer 5 years 
MoMA-GS5 Female Legal Officer 5 years 
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4.6. Focus Group with Employees of MoMA – Duhok Province 
Code Gender Position Relevant 
Work 
Experience  
Date of 
Interview  
MoMA-GD1 Female Accountant 5 years 5 May 2010 
MoMA-GD2 Male Social Worker 13 years 
MoMA-GD3 Male Administrator 3 years 
MoMA-GD4 Female Director of Anfal 3 years 
MoMA-GD5 Female Accountant 1 year 
MoMA-GD6 Male Legal Officer 3 years 
MoMA-GD7 Male Legal Officer 1 year 
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Appendix 2: Interview Topic Guide and Consent Form  
 
University of Nottingham 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
Research Student: Muslih Irwani 
Mobile No.: +964 750 000 00 00 
Email: lqxmi1@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
Dear Participants: 
I am doing a doctorate research on ÔImplementation of Social Security Policy in a 
Politically Less Developed CountryÕ and have chosen ÔSocial Protection FundÕ and 
ÔMinistry of Martyrs and Anfal AffairsÕ as a case study. You, as an employee of one of 
the above government organisations have been selected to conduct a semi-open 
interview, which might take 45 to 90 minutes. Some questions have been attached as 
general outlines for our interview. 
There no right or wrong answer, so I offer a very open atmosphere to talk about your 
experience and to the best of your knowledge express your opinion about the nature 
of the organisation you are working for. 
Your participation is much appreciated and will contribute in understanding and 
enhancing the social policy in the Kurdistan Region. 
Consent Form: 
1. Do you agree that your name can be announced in my research?   YES (  )  NO (  
). 
2. If the answer is YES, please, next to your name in Kurdish put the English spelling 
of it as you want. 
Name of the Participant: (in Kurdish):…………………… (in English):………………… 
3. If your answer is NO, please put a symbol/symbols ………………… 
 
I hereby confirm that I will commit to the above points and use your words and 
information only for academic purpose in my research, and will not do otherwise. 
Participants have the right to withdraw their consent at any time. 
 
Signed by Researcher: Muslih Irwani                       Date:   /    /2010 
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ﺑ$'& )   (     ﻧ$ﺧ"ﺮ )   ( . ﺋﺎﯾﺎ ڕازﯾﺖ ﻟ/ﻧﺎو دﮐﺘﯚراﮐ/دا ﻧﺎوت ﺑﮫ&ﻨﺮ#ﺖ؟1
 . ﺋ$ﮔ$ر وCﻣ$ﮐ$ت )ﺑ$A@(ﯾ$، ﺗﮑﺎﯾ$ ﻟ$ ﭘﺎڵ ﻧﺎوەﮐ$ت ﺑ$ ﮐﻮردی، ﺑ$ ﺋﯿﻨﮕﻠﯿﺰﯾﺶ ﺑﯿﻨﻮوﺳ$ ﺑ$و ﺷ*ﻮەﯾ$ی ﮐ$ ﺧﯚت2
..........................:emaNدەﺗ&و%ﺖ: ﻧﺎو:......................            /                
. ﺋ"ﮔ"ر و7ﻣ"ﮐ"ت )ﻧ"ﺧ2ﺮ(ە، ﺗﮑﺎﯾ" ڕەﻣﺰ*ﮏ دﯾﺎر ﺑﮑ"؟ .........................3
ﺘﯿﯽ دﮐﺘﯚراﮐ$م ﺑ$ﮐﺎر ﺑ(9@ﻦ دەدەم ﮐ( ﭘﺎﺑ(ﻧﺪی ﺧﺎ9(ﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺳ(رەوە دەﺑﻢ و وﺗ(ﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺑ(ڕ1ﺰت ﺗ(ﻧﯿﺎ ﺑﯚ ﻣ(ﺑ(ﺳﺘﯽ زاﻧﺴ
ﺑ@ﻨﻢ و ﺑ! ﭘ@ﭽ!واﻧ!ی ﺋ!وەی ﺳ!رەوە ﻣﺎﻣ!=! ﻟ!ﮔ!ڵ وﺗ!ﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺑ!ڕ8ﺰت ﻧ!ﮐ!م. ﺑ!ﺷﺪارﺑﻮو ﻣﺎﻓﯽ ﺋ!وەی ھ!ﯾ! ﻟ! 
ھ$ر ﮐﺎﺗ8ﮏ ﺑﯿﯿ$وێ ﭘﺎﺷ$ﮐﺸ$ ﺑﮑﺎت و ڕەزاﻣ$ﻧﺪﯾﯽ ﻟ$ﺳ$ر ﺑ$ﮐﺎرھ8ﻨﺎﻧﯽ ﺑﯚﭼﻮوﻧ$ﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﻟ$ﻻﯾ$ن ﺗﻮ*ﮋەرەوە ﻧ$دات.
0102/     / ڕ%ﮑﮑ#وت:        ﻣﻮﺳ+ﺢ ﺋﯿﺮواﻧﯽ )ﺋﯿﻤﺰا(:
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions 
 
1. Can you tell us about this government organisation, I mean how you look at the 
(Family Protection Box) or (Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs)? 
2. How you can describe your position and work within this programme? 
3. Can you tell me a bit in detail about the objectives of implementing this 
programme? 
4. I would like to ask your opinion about the extent to which this service has been 
delivered and has met its objectives? 
Or, according to your experience during work in this organisation, how can you 
evaluate the implementation of this programme? 
5. To what extent do you think there is sufficient professional/administrative efficiency 
available for implementing this policy? 
6. Can you talk a bit more about your relations with staff, your seniors or inferiors, in 
this organisation? 
7. To what extent do you think this programme has been taken into consideration as 
an important scheme by government and political leaders? 
8. Do you think a sufficient budget has been allocated for this programme? 
9. To what extent do you think the emergence of opposition in party politics and the 
parliament has affected, or you think will affect, the implementation of social security 
programmes? 
10. To what extent is your opinion taken into account for making, amending or 
revising the decisions made? 
  062
 
 hsidruK ni snoitseuQ weivretnI yeK
 
ﭘﺮﺳﯿﺎرەﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﭼﺎوﭘ&ﮑ$وﺗﻦ
. دەﺗﻮاﻧﯽ ﻟ"ﺑﺎرەی ﭘ3ﮑﮫﺎﺗ" و ﺋ"رﮐﯽ ﺋ"و دەزﮔﺎﯾ"ی ﮐﺎری ﺗ3ﺪا دەﮐ"ی و ھ"روەھﺎ ڕۆ'ﯽ ﺗﯚ ﻟ"و 1
ﻓ#رﻣﺎﻧﮕ#ﯾ#دا ﻗﺴ#ﻣﺎن ﺑﯚ ﺑﮑ#ی؟
. ﺗﺎ چ ڕادەﯾ/ک ﺋ/م ﺑ/رﻧﺎﻣ/ﯾ/ی ﺣﮑﻮﻣ/ت ﺑ/ﺷ1ﻮەﯾ/ﮐﯽ ﺑﺎش ﺟ1ﺒ/ﺟ- دەﮐﺮ,ﺖ؟ دەﮐﺮێ ﺑﺎﺳﯽ 2
#ﮐ#ﺗﺎن ﺑﮑ#ی؟ﻻﯾ,ﻧ, ﺳ,رﮐ,وﺗﻮو و ﻧﺎﺳ,رﮐ,وﺗﻮوەﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺋﯿﺸ
. دەﺗﻮاﻧﯽ ﺑﺎﺳﯽ ﺋﺎﻣﺎﻧﺠ+ﮐﺎﻧﯽ )ﺑ+رﻧﺎﻣ+ی ﭼﺎود7ﺮﯾﯽ ﺧ2ﺰان/ ﺑ+رﻧﺎﻣ+ی ﻣﺎف و ﺋﯿﻤﺘﯿﺎزی 3
ﺑﻨ#ﻣﺎ6#ی ﺷ#ھﯿﺪ و ﺋ#ﻧﻔﺎﻟﮑﺮاوەﮐﺎن( ﺑﯚ ﺑﮑ#ی؟
. ﺗﺎ ﭼ"ﻧﺪ ﻟ-ﮫﺎﺗﻮوﯾﯽ ﺋﯿﺪاری و ﭘﯿﺸ"ﯾﯽ ﭘ-ﻮﯾﺴﺖ ھ"ﯾ" ﺑﯚ ﺟ-ﺒ"ﺟ-ﮑﺮدﻧﯽ ﺋ"و ﺋﺎﻣﺎﻧﺠﺎﻧ"؟4
ﯾﯿ#ﮐﺎﻧﺖ ﺑ# ﺋ#واﻧﯽ دﯾﮑ#ی ﻟ#و ﺑ#رﻧﺎﻣ#ﯾ#دا . دەﮐﺮێ ھ&ﻧﺪ5ﮏ ﻗﺴ&ﻣﺎن ﺑﯚ ﺑﮑ&ی ﻟ&ﺳ&ر ﭘ&ﯾﻮەﻧﺪ5
؟چ ﻟ* ﺧﯚت ﺑ*ﺳ*رەوە ﯾﺎن ﺧﻮارەوە ﮐﺎر دەﮐ"ن 
. ھ,ﺳﺖ دەﮐ,ی ﺳ,رﭼﺎوەی داراﯾﯽ ﭘ8ﻮﯾﺴﺖ ﻟ, ﻻﯾ,ن ﺣﮑﻮﻣ,ﺗ,وە داﺑﯿﻦ دەﮐﺮێ ﺑﯚ 6
ﺟ4ﺒ%ﺟ4ﮑﺮدﻧﯽ ﺋﺎﻣﺎﻧﺠﯽ ﺑ%رﻧﺎﻣ%ی ﭼﺎود9ﺮﯾﯽ ﺧ4ﺰان/ ﺋﯿﻤﺘﯿﺎزی ﺑﻨ%ﻣﺎ(%ی ﺷ%ھﯿﺪ و 
ﺋ-ﻧﻔﺎﻟﮑﺮاوەﮐﺎن؟
ﺖ دەﮐ"ی ﮔﺮﻧﮕﯿﭙ3ﺪاﻧﯽ ﭘ3ﻮﯾﺴﺖ ھ"ﯾ" ﻟ" ﻻﯾ"ن ﺑ"رﭘﺮﺳ"ﮐﺎن ﻟ" ﺳ"رەوە ﺑ"و . ﺗﺎ ﭼ"ﻧﺪ ھ"ﺳ7
ﺑ"رﻧﺎﻣ"ﯾ"؟
. ھ)ﺳﺖ دەﮐ)ی ﺑ)رﻧﺎﻣ)ﮐ)ی وەزارەﺗ)ﮐ)ﺗﺎن وەک ﭘ+ﻮﯾﺴﺖ ﺟ+ﺒ)ﺟ' دەﮐﺮێ؟8
. ﺗﺎ چ ڕادەﯾ$ک ﭘ9ﺘﻮاﯾ$ ﺳ$رھ$6ﺪاﻧﯽ ﻣﻮﻋﺎرەزە ﻟ$ ﻣ$ﯾﺪاﻧﯽ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ و ﭘ$رﻟ$ﻣﺎن ﮐﺎرﯾﮕ$رﯾﯽ 9
ﻧﯽ ﺋﺎﺳﺎﯾﺸﯽ ﮐﯚﻣ#+ﯾ#ﺗﯽ ﺣﮑﻮﻣ#ت؟دەﺑ,ﺖ ﻟ#ﺳ#ر ﺟ,ﺒ#ﺟ,ﮑﺮدﻧﯽ ﺑ#رﻧﺎﻣ#ﮐﺎ
. ﺑ"ﻻی ﺗﯚوە ﺟ4ﺒ"ﺟ4ﮑﺮدﻧﯽ ﺑ"رﻧﺎﻣ"ی ﮐﯚﻣ",ﯾ"ﺗﯽ چ ﻣﺎﻧﺎﯾ"ﮐﯽ ھ"ﯾ"؟ 01
. چ ﭘ.ﯾﻮەﻧﺪﯾﯿ.ک دەﺑﯿﻨﯽ ﻟ. ﻧ,ﻮان داڕﺷﺘﻨﯽ ﺑ.رﻧﺎﻣ. وﺳﯿﺎﺳ.ﺗ.ﮐﺎن و ﺟ,ﺒ.ﺟ,ﮑﺮدﻧﯿﺎﻧﺪا؟ ﺋﺎﯾﺎ 11
و  ﺗﺎ ﭼ&ﻧﺪ ﻟ&و دەزﮔﺎﯾ&دا ﺑﯚ داڕﺷﺘﻨﯽ ﺑ&رﻧﺎﻣ& وﺳﯿﺎﺳ&ﺗ&ﮐﺎن، دەﮔ&ڕ,ﻨ&وە ﺑﯚ ﺋ&زﻣﻮون
ﺷﺎرەزاﯾﯽ ﮐﺎدﯾﺮەﮐﺎﻧﯽ ﺧﻮارەوە؟ دەﮐﺮێ ﻟ$و ﺑﺎرەوە ﻧﻤﻮوﻧ$ﻣﺎن ﺑﯚ ﺑﮫ'ﻨﯿﯿ$وە؟
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Appendix 4: Request Letter for Permission to Conduct 
Interview with MoLSA Employees  
A translation of my letter to the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs asking for 
permission to conduct research interviews: 
 
7th April 2010 
To Minister of Labour and Social Affairs 
  And Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs 
RE: Permission and Support for Research Interviews 
Hello, 
My name is Muslih Irwani. I am a PhD student at the University of Nottingham in the 
United Kingdom. As part of my research, I am planning to conduct about 25 interviews 
with employees of directorates of Social Protection and Development-Social 
Protection Fund in all cities and provinces of the Region. I would like to ask your 
permission and support letter to relevant directorates. 
Kind Regards, 
Muslih Irwani 
PhD Student Ð Social Policy and Administration 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Nottingham 
University Park 
Nottingham 
NG7 2RD 
United Kingdom 
 
Attached with this request letter: 
1. Interview topic guide and Summary of the research plan 
2. Interview questions 
3. Support letter from my supervisors in the School of Sociology and Social Policy, 
University of Nottingham 
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Kurdish Copy of the Request Letter to MoLSA 
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Kurdish Copy of the Request Letter to MoMA 
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Appendix 5: Permission and Support Letter from MOLSA 
The letter was directed to three directorate generals of Social Protection and 
Development in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok 
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Appendix 6: Permission and Support Letter from MoMA 
The letter was directed to three directorate generals of Martyrs and Anfal Affairs in 
Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok 
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Appendix 7: Financial Instruction No. 10, 2010 
This document appoints 23 levels of salaries for beneficiaries of martyr families in 
accordance to their victimÕs previous position in political parties and peshmarga. It 
also allocates the monthly salary to civilian martyrs and genocide victims: 
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Appendix 8: Financial Instruction No. 24, 2011 Social Safety 
Net Benefits 
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